MR. ELLIS: My name is Mark Ellis, Executive Director of the International Bar Association, and I just want to give you just a few minutes on kind of the journey that we took to get where we are today with this new task force, and it really started back on September 11th, 2001. Justice Goldstone and I were in London at that time, actually meeting for lunch. We left lunch and started walking back to the IBA offices in London, and as we were walking back, looking at the expressions on peoples faces, we knew something was amiss, and when we entered the IBA offices, the entire staff were sitting around television, watching in silence the events unfolding, and of course recognizing, based on what the world was witnessing, that we were entering into a period we had simply not seen before. I remember turning to Justice Goldstone, and without saying a word, we both knew that we were facing something that was quite extraordinary, and something that I think made us feel a need to respond in some way. As governments and non-government organizations move forward to take this journey, recognizing that we were facing these complex issues in combating this new form of terrorism, the International Bar Association decided as well in October of 2001 at its annual meeting, where the leadership of the IBA agreed to the request to create a terrorism task force, a task force to look at the international issues and components in combating international terrorism. So the International Bar Association set that first task force up in 2001. Justice Richard Goldstone was the chair, co-chair of that task force, along with Ambassador Emilio Cardenas, and at that moment we created a task force that worked for over a year in looking at again, the issues in regards to international law, and how to deal with issues relevant to accountability, relevant to the prevention of these terrorist acts. But even then, what was key for us, and it was important for the entire association at that time, is in looking at what our core journey would be, it would be how do we combat this scourge of terrorism, but at the same time protect these fundamental rights, human rights and civil liberties. Thats where the first task force in its report focused on, and it was a very successful publication and in great demand. But of course since 2003, we have still witnessed issues such as Guantanamo still perhaps being the most striking symbol of the flagrant violation of international law, and yet even today, not being able to have any certainty of when there would be a deadline closure date on that. Obviously, we then faced terrorist acts in London and Madrid and Mumbai and other cities that acts, the terrorist acts were foiled, but yet all of these acts are geared towards civilians. So this started the IBA thinking yet again it was time to create a new task force, to bring up to date this analysis of international law, kind of a fresh and updated assessment of where we needed to be. So two years ago, once again the International Bar Association and its leadership, with the support of the IBA Foundation, created a task force, chaired again by Justice Goldstone. So this is an opportunity for us to launch this important report, and so again were thankful for all of you being here today. Before I turn it over to the task force, I want to mention a couple of things. One, to acknowledge Alex Wilks over here as the senior IBA attorney in the London office. Hes a remarkable young man who has really been the person that has steered this report for the last two and a half years, and he should get a great deal of credit in helping us to stay on track and get this report created. Elizabeth Bates, who is not here, and who was the primary author of the report and how we approached this, with Elizabeth setting out the various chapters of this report and then working in a collaborative way with the task force, in assessing, revising the report. In the end, thats the approach we took, and I think that was a very successful approach. Im very grateful to Elizabeth, and unfortunately shes again not able to be here. But she certainly earns a lot of credit for the work shes put in on this. Finally, to the Open Society Institute. The OSI has played such an important role in this area of international law, as we all know, but its particularly important for the International Bar Association to be able to do this, in cooperation in partnership with OSI because OSI has played such an important role for us over the years, and has been a strong supporter of what the International Bar Association has been doing in the field of international justice. So Im very appreciative to OSI for hosting this. I have been asked before I turn it over, to give you one lawyerly phrase here that Im supposed to read. Im just going to read what they have given me. Please note that this event will be recorded. By participating in the event, you are giving your permission for your comments to be included wherever the events audio recording is features, such as source or OSI podcast and the IBA website. So you are now warned on this. I want to encourage whats going to happen here, is even those that are listening on the webcast are going to be able to send in questions to the panelists. So were eager to have all of those who have signed up to listen to this live webcast, to be able to do that, and were looking forward to engaging them through this question and answer period. So I am now going to turn this over to task force. Youre going to say a few things on OSI, and I again want to appreciate or thank all of you for being here tonight. Thank you. MS. SINGH: Thank you, Mark. Welcome, everyone. Im Amrit Singh. Im senior legal officer for National Security and Counterterrorism here at the Open Society Justice Initiative. This program litigates and conducts advocacy on human rights abuses conducted in the national security context. We are delighted to be able to co-host this launch of this very important report. I think the IBAs engagement in the counterterrorism and international law issues, and the report in particular, are especially important because I think there is no other issue that is as dangerous to the checks and balances that are emblematic of constitutional democracies as the issue of counterterrorism and national security. What we have seen, well before 9/11 and even after 9/11 is a growing trend of countries that increasingly invoke exceptionalism when it comes to adhering to the rule of law in the context of national security and counterterrorism policies; discrimination against minorities, Muslims, South Asian and other minorities is rampant in many countries; arbitrary detention, administrative detention with trial, torture and forced disappearances and I will not continue to -- the report goes into an enormous amount of detail about the list of kinds of human rights abuses that we are witnessing. I think that this report is therefore of particular importance because this issue threatens to causing lasting damage to the very nature of the checks and balances inherent in constitutional democracies, and also because I think that it threatens the adherence to international law. So you know, to the extent that the panel seems, thinks its appropriate, I think it would be nice to hear what the views are on a report like this in a context like this. What do we expect countries to do in this, in this climate of exceptionalism in terms of their obligations under international law? Just a quick comment on the partnership between the IBA and the Open Society Justice Initiative. Weve had the opportunity to work closely with Alex and in the context -- and the IBA in the context of a particular human rights defender in Kenya, who has recently become the target of arbitrary detention by the Ugandan government. His name is Al-Amin Kimathi, and the case, Al-Amin is a tireless human rights defender, Kenyan human rights defender who has for many years worked on national security-related human rights abuses in Kenya. When he went to Uganda to monitor trial proceedings for six Kenyan nationals who were rendered without due process from Kenya to Uganda, Mr. Kimathi was detained, along with another lawyer, Mbugua Mureithi, also a Kenyan national Supreme Court advocate in Kenya. As it happens, and what we see in our work is, I think the IBAs work is particularly important because lawyers and human rights defenders today who are working on national security issues are themselves coming under an enormous amount of threat. Al-Amin is now detained. He has now been detained for six months on trumped up terrorism-related charges in Uganda. When Mbugua Mureithi, the lawyer, was also detained with him but subsequently released, and then subsequently my colleague, Clara Gutteridge and I went to Uganda to monitor the bail hearing proceedings for Al-Amin, we got detained at the Uganda airport for more than 17 hours. So what were seeing increasingly is a trend towards criminalization, towards harassment of people who are trying to in fact just do the right thing, just trying to monitor the rule of law, which I understand to be very fundamental to what the IBA does. Then finally, I dont want to spend too much time on -- in between the audience and the panel, but Id like to just talk a little bit about what the Justice Initiative in particular is doing on the issue of addressing human rights abuses in the national security context. Well, we had a victory that we actually cant take credit for just last week. A client of ours, Mohamed El-Sharkawy, was detained in Egypt for 15 years without trial or charge, administratively detained, and owing the regime change he was just released. We had filed a case on his behalf before the African Commission, challenging his prolonged detention without trial or charge. So certainly this is good news. In East Africa, were monitoring a broad range of national security-related abuses in Uganda, Kenya and other countries, and then finally we are working, together with our Freedom of Information program, to bring accountability for extraordinary rendition policies. In particular, we are engaged in European court litigation in the El-Masri case that the Freedom of Information program has taken the lead on. This is a case that, just to quickly sum up the facts, as a man who was detained at the Macedonian-Serbian border by Macedonian forces, acting in complicity with the United States in the context of the extraordinary rendition program that was driven by the CIA. He was detained and abused in Macedonian custody and then handed over to the CIA and detained for five months in a CIA detention facility in Afghanistan. Then ultimately he was dumped on the roadside in Albania without any kind of apology or explanation as to what, why he was treated in this horrific manner. Mr. El-Masris attempts to obtain justice in the United States courts have not met with any success. His cases were dismissed, his case was dismissed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on the grounds of the state secrets privilege and the Supreme Court of the United States denied cert in 2007. The case before the European court brought by the Justice Initiative challenges Macedonias complicity in the extraordinary rendition program, and seeks remedies against the government of Macedonia. Id just like to say three things about why this case is particularly significant. First of all, the claims raised against Macedonia include claims under Article 3 of the European Convention, which prohibits the transfer of individuals to countries where theyre at risk of torture. So the factual, as a matter of fact, the European Court application is against the government of Macedonia, but the Article 3 claim is inextricably linked with the abuses that Mr. El-Masri endured because of the United States role in this case. So while the United States may have escaped every measure of accountability in its own country, there still stand other jurisdictions. There still are courts that may be open to at least indirectly address accountability, if not for the United States directly then through holding Macedonia accountable. The second reason why this case is important is that the European Court has communicated the case to Macedonia with a list of questions about -- specifically addressed to Macedonia, saying Macedonia, did you engage in the following acts with respect to Mr. El-Masri? This is significant from a jurisprudential point of view, because the case in the United States did not even make it to a stage where the United States government was required to respond on the merits to the complaint. So here is a European Court, its a preliminary stage. But nonetheless, it has advanced to a stage already beyond what U.S. courts have permitted. Then finally thus far, the state secrets privilege has not been invoked in this case, in contrast to U.S. court proceedings. Then finally Id like to mention one more case that the Justice Initiative is engaged in, and its the case of Abd al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, who is a Saudi national of Yemeni decent, who has been held now in CIA custody since 2002, almost a decade. He is currently detained in Guantanamo, and the Justice Initiative has brought litigation against the government of Poland for hosting Mr. Al-Nashiris torture and detention essentially on a CIA black site. Again, we hope that this will bring some measure of accountability against the government of Poland, and also indirectly against the government of the United States. With that, I turn it over to the panel. JUSTICE GOLDSTONE: Well, thank you very much Amrit, and thank you also from me and the panel for hosting this evenings event. Mark Ellis mentioned the first report that the International Bar Association brought out in 2003. That report presciently suggested that the events of 9/11 of 2001 had set governments, international law makers and non-governmental organizations on a long journey to tackle the many complex legal problems inherent in responding to what was a new form and what is a new form of terrorism. At the core of the journey lay the task of combating terrorism without jeopardizing the protection of basic rights and freedoms. Since the publication of that report eight years ago, fairly large scale attacks have been taken, Mark Ellis mentioned, in major cities around the world, and what is important, several other attempts have been foiled. The rhetoric of the Bush administrations war on terror has stood in sharp contrast to the belief of many that terrorist threats are the proper purview of policing and the criminal law and criminal justice, rather than military intervention and the law of war and the talk of war. Some nevertheless have questioned even whether contemporary international law is equipped to meet the challenges of modern terrorism. Complex legal questions have confronted governments and lawmakers alike. Many questions have been asked. Do states human rights obligations apply extra-territorially? Does the use of force in counterterrorism constitute armed conflict, that the consequence of international humanitarian law should apply? If so, what is its relationship to international human rights law? To what extent are states obliged to provide remedies for victims of terrorist attacks and victims of violations which occur in the course of counterterrorism operations? So in light of these questions, the dilemma that faced the International Bar Association was really whether to update the 2003 report or start a new one, to set up a new task force and rather than update what had become very quickly a dated report with a new one. The decision was taken, I think correctly, that there should be a -- not a second edition but a new book, a new consideration, a fresh consideration of these and many other challenging issues. In response, the IBA convened a new task force, and as Mark has also mentioned, it was able to do so thanks to the generous support from the Foundation of the International Bar Association. The objective of the new task force was to provide expert analysis of relevant international law, and the consideration of the manner in which it continues to regulate states counterterrorism policies, and to provide a truly global overview of the considerable developments in state practice including, but not restricted at all, to the United States-led war on terror. What was the methodology we adopted? It was important for the IBA, as really the international voice of the legal profession, to attract a wide range of expertise to the task force, in order to reflect the global and multidisciplinary nature of the challenges. I happily accepted the invitation from Mark Ellis to lead this second task force. Im pleased to say that we have three other members of the task force with us this evening, and who will shortly speak to us. Let me introduce them in the order in which they will speak: Professor Juan Mendez is the co-chair of the IBAs Human Rights Institute and currently the United Nations special rapporteur on torture. He was formerly the president of the International Center for Transitional Justice, the RCTJ, and the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights. His scholarship in the field of international law and knowledge of the Americas proved indispensable. Julia Hall is Amnesty Internationals senior counsel on counterterrorism in Europe. Julia brought with her a wealth of experience from the field, important practical experience, and added a valuable practitioners viewpoint to the task force, apart from her really indepth and impressive knowledge of international law. Professor Javaid Rehman is the head of Brunel Law School in London. Hes an expert in Islamic law, international human rights law and international terrorism, in particular relating to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Professor Rehman brought with him a critical insight into the challenges affecting this troubled region. Two other members of the task force are not with us this evening. They are Professor Judge Eugene Cotran, chairman of the Center of Middle Eastern and Islamic Law at the School of African and Oriental Studies, SOAS, in London, and Mr. Gijs de Vries, who between 2004 and 2007 was the European Unions counterterrorism coordinator. The author of the book is Elizabeth Stubbins Bates, who unfortunately also cannot be with us this evening. She was at the time the David Davies Research Fellow at the London School of Economics, and is currently a visiting fellow at the London School. She was commissioned by the IBA to write the report. With its intention of providing expert analysis of such a broad range of legal issues and global coverage of examples of state practice, the report was ambitious in its scope. Elizabeth demonstrated her understanding of the key debates in counterterrorism in formulating the structure of the report, and consistently producing draft chapters to the task force that really have been of exceptional quality. Mark has mentioned Alex Wilks, who really managed with tremendous skill the whole operation. He spent a tremendous amount of time and gave devotion to this task, and I know he has the deep gratitude of each of the members of the task force. I speak on behalf of the whole task force in saying what a privilege it has been to work with you, Alex. Thank you very much. The task force had two plenary meetings in London. We exchanged many and long, long, long emails during the course of the proceedings. The task force oversaw in support of the drafting process of Elizabeth Stubbins Bates, and offered its guidance on research and on latest developments. The task force held its second and final plenary meeting in May 2010, towards the end of the drafting process, approving the final chapters of the report and its conclusions and recommendations. We took a multi-lateral approach, striving to present the range of opinion of its members, thus remaining, we hope, scholarly and rigorous. The report analyzes the key current issues in counterterrorism, including the extra-territorial application of international human rights law, the interoperability of international human rights law, and international humanitarian law, reform in counterterrorism and victims rights to remedy and reparations. We also hope that significant value lies in its updated analysis of the case law, and examples of state practice drawn from a truly global selection of jurisdictions, ranging from Colombia to the Philippines. The report aims to contribute and add value to the current debate surrounding counterterrorism and international law, through providing authoritative conclusions and recommendations for states, for intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and institutions, the judiciary and policymakers, to consider how to strike the balance, a very difficult balance to strike, between ensuring respect for fundamental rights on the one hand, whilst protecting all people from terrorist violence on the other. Without further ado, it gives me great pleasure to call on Juan Mendez. MR. MENDEZ: Thank you. First, I want to thank Mark and the International Bar Association generally for giving me the opportunity to participate in this task force and the privilege of working with my fellow task force members, and particularly working with Alex but under the chairmanship of Justice Goldstone. It has been quite an interesting task for me to participate in. It was a challenge to follow on an excellent report that had been published by the ABA earlier on, but I also think this report should be seen in the context of a growing literature of analyses of how the policies to counterterrorism should be conducted with full respect for international law obligations of every state. I had the privilege also of working early on in the 2002 report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which is one of the reports well worth mentioning. But I also want to mention the recent International Commission of Jurists report done by a panel of eminent jurists, chaired by Justice Arthur Chaskalson of South Africa, which is also an enormous contribution. I want to mention a report written by Helen Duffy for Interights in London. I think our report nevertheless contributes something with a special emphasis in two or three important matters, and in that sense complements all these other important reports in a significant way. I think as the publication itself signifies as a subtitle, the report concentrates on issues of accountability, meaning the obligation of states to provide accountability for violations that may have happened in the context of counterterrorism, of remedies, meaning that the states have obligations to provide victims of those violations, remedies that are contemplated in international law, and also concentrates on reform, in the sense that in the almost ten years in which the war on terror has been going on, theres been many occasions to rectify the wrong paths that have been taken, and theres always an agenda for reform. This report tries to contribute to it. I think the reason to insist the war on terror has the limits of international law is perhaps self-evident to all of us, and its not only a legal and a moral question, but its also a condition of effectiveness. Many people say, you know, that if you really want to defeat terrorists, the best thing that we can do is to stick to the moral high ground, and that means respecting every states obligations under international law, because the opposite is just an occasion to breed more dissatisfaction and contempt, and create the training ground basically for new generations of recruits to terrorist organizations, to fight against democratic states. But obviously our main argument is not a practical one. Our main argument is legal, and I think another important argument, of course, is moral. Im glad the Amrit has mentioned exceptionalism, because the whole tendency after 2001 was to pretend that terrorism was such a new phenomenon, and of course it was different in significant ways after September 11th of 2001. But it was such a new phenomenon that it allowed states to write on a clean slate, as it were. This report obviously takes the opposite view, that no matter how novel the situation created after 9/11, there wasnt a clean slate. There was a set of obligations, legal and moral, that were, that had to be respected by states, no matter what type of choices they made in pursuing terrorist organizations. That, I think, precisely this sense that you could rewrite the laws of war and rewrite the laws of human rights because this was an exceptional situation, brings out the ugliest face of exceptionalism. I have to say that in the United States, a lot of people talk about exceptionalism in a positive way. But outside of the United States, it sounds exactly the opposite. Quite frankly, every dictatorship that I have been -- had not the privilege but the obligation to be engaged with in my human rights work, have always invoked some kind of exception, some kind of state of exception, some kind of necessity that is not contemplated by international law. So in that sense, I think its important to point out what the legal framework is, and also to signify that the legal framework does not unduly tie the hands of people who in good faith want to fight against terrorism. Nevertheless, its important to point out that states that do have a choice to attack or counter-attack terrorism as a law enforcement option or as an armed conflict option. But those choices are not wide open. I mean they are limited by the conditions in which either law enforcement or armed conflict has to be carried out. In that sense, the matter of defining the war on terror in such a broad way, as to not having any kind of limitations in geography or in time, obviously is a bad faith application of international humanitarian law, because it extends rights and abilities that states have under international humanitarian law, to situations that were not contemplated by the Geneva Conventions or by the whole body of international humanitarian law. So the rhetoric of calling something the war on terror like the war on poverty cannot be extended to apply without limits to a war that doesnt have a geographical limit or a temporal limit, and cannot allow use of force, use of deadly force to be applied in situations that are completely extraneous to armed conflict per se. In the area of accountability, I have to say that two years ago we were very encouraged by some of the early steps of the Obama administration, and Im still encouraged by some of them, but discouraged by some other ones. I think first of all, the prohibition of torture, the reinstatement of the Uniform Code of Military Justice under no uncertain terms is one of those positive things. The prohibition on the use of black sites and the prohibition on extraordinary renditions are also obviously steps in the right direction that were taken two years ago. I obviously want to be sensitive to the possibility that even black sites and extraordinary renditions may still be happening, because they were mired in secrecy when they were happening before 2009. So its impossible to say that theyre not happening now again. But be that as it may, the official sanction against them and keeping our fingers crossed, the lack of new evidence that theyre still being used, is one of those steps in the right direction that I think bears mentioning. I also think that the decision by the administration not to challenge the use of the exclusionary rule in the Gilani case, and to allow the case to go forward by excluding evidence that had been led to via the torture of Mr. Gilani, is also an encouraging step. But on the other hand, I think we cannot say that everything is the way it should be, because when it comes to torture particularly, the state has an obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish every act of torture, and not only that has not happened; the administration has been actively preventing it from happening. I think in fact in the area of accountability, is where some encouraging first steps like Congressional inquiries, like the Senate Armed Forces report, Committee on Armed Forces report chaired by Senator Levin, that went, that encouraged us to believe that some of these things could be investigated to the full extent of where the facts led us unfortunately has not been followed through. For example, we still dont know what the result is of the inquiry conducted by the Senate Committee on Intelligence that supposedly was the counterpart of the Levin report. Also, the special prosecutor named by Attorney General Holder has not produced a significant report or prosecutorial action, although he was charged precisely with looking at what the results of the torture memos have been in terms of actual practice of torture. In terms of reform, I think its very discouraging to see the use of preventive detention, especially recently the administration applying it. Let me make it clear that in the context of international humanitarian law, detention until the end of hostilities is, of course, permissible. But I am afraid that the executive order goes far beyond the limits of detention under the laws of war, and would allow people who have been arrested in a context completely separate from any kind of combat situation, to be held in prolonged arbitrary detention without trial. The same, I think, can be said about the use of military commissions. The administration still holds to the possibility of using civilian trials, and we hope that that remains true, although the opposition in Congress is especially putting lots of obstacles to that. But I would hope that the use of civilians trials would be done to the exclusion of military commissions, and unfortunately that is not the case. Im also hoping that the policy is still to close down Guantanamo, but its taking much longer than we all had hoped for, for that symbol of deviation from the high ground by the United States, to be over. Targeted killings is also something that we are very concerned about. Again, targeted killings of combatants is perhaps not a violation of the laws of war. But were still in this ambiguous of what the war is that would allow targeted killing of people that have no relationship to combat situations, and that would constitute extra-judicial execution and no other terms would apply to it. Im also concerned at the use of state secrets, and its the state secrets to prevent torture victims from exercising their remedies is a clear violation of an international standard, because under the torture convention, every state has an obligation to provide remedies for torture, and putting obstacles on those remedies is contrary to international law. This is having extraterritorial effect, because in the Commission of Inquiry in England and the United Kingdom, for example, there is a lot of talk about what they call the control principle. If the evidence is provided by another intelligence agency from another country, they are under -- they have the control of whether the evidence can be revealed or not. So the use of state secrets by the U.S. government is having a negative effect even in other parts of the world as well. Im going to finish just basically making the perhaps obvious point, that the United States is losing a lot of opportunities around the world by not fighting this war on terror within the framework of international law and even of United States constitutional law. I just heard this afternoon, and perhaps anecdotal evidence, but a human rights, someone quoted a human rights leader from Egypt saying that they do want to talk to the United States about how to reorganize the new democratic Egyptian state, but that they dont want to hear from the United States government, at least, until the United States can point out that it has cleaned up its act, and its now another again a part of the community of nations that do respect human rights. Thank you. (Applause.) JUSTICE GOLDSTONE: Julia Hall. MS. HALL: Im not sure how I -- PARTICIPANT: Yes, just turn it on. Yes, you can turn it on. MS. HALL: Im supposed to be the lounge singer there with the mic. Is it on? Thank you. Okay, good. I also want to thank OSI for hosting all of us today. Weve had all of our meetings in London. Its wonderful to be here in New York, and I want to say what a pleasure its been and a real privilege for me to work with this really incredible group of distinguished jurists and academics. I do want to talk about the book. I want to shift our focus a little, though, and talk about our commitment to including in this book a very serious and detailed section on victims rights. As you all know, the developments in terms of terrorism and counterterrorism in the last decade have been so numerous, and deciding how to take this 200 pages and use them to full effect was difficult at times. I think thats fair enough to say. But I think the one thing that we had good consensus on was that we absolutely had to restate what rights devolved upon victims. There is a very detailed chapter in the book that deals with various types of victims. So we do address the issue of victims of terrorist attacks. We do address the issue of victims of state-sponsored terrorism. But what Im going to talk about is fairly narrow, and it really links up with what Amrit began talking about. Im going to talk about victims of rendition and secret detention. Id like to start the conversation by talking about the other labels that these victims have, that have made it so difficult for Amrit and this entire group and many of you out there to advocate on their behalf. That is because of the other labels that have been applied to them, labels like terrorist, labels like national security threat, labels like Islamic militant. These labels do not rest easily with their status as victims, right, because if the discourse is that they are implicated in some way, they are in fact terrorists or national security threats, we have had a hard time as advocates than also saying But theyre victims as well. I think a byproduct of that difficulty has been that we have angled a lot in our advocacy. We say well okay, the governments have been very successful in casting victims of human rights violations as terrorists and national security threats first. How can we get around that? How do we have legitimacy as human rights lawyers and activists, when that discourse is so powerful, and the governments are in league in that way? In many instances and over the last eight years, instead of relying, for example, on the absolute legal prohibition and moral abhorrence of torture and enforced disappearance, to advocate on behalf of victims many, many of us, and I include myself in the group, we really resorted to more instrumental arguments, right? Weve kind of avoided the moral argument. We understood the United States government to say that it hasnt, it actually hasnt been torturing, right, even though we all knew it wasnt true. So we couldnt actually find a real anchor to do our advocacy. I think that a professor at the American University School of International Service really hit the nail on a head in a book that she wrote in 2009, another book, called After Abu Ghraib: Exploring Human Rights in America and the Middle East. Her name is Shadi Mokhtari. Some of you may have heard of her, and she posits a very provocative argument, and I feel like the book should also give rise to some debate. We should be provoked, and so let me provoke you. She says that while identifying the victim is critical to creating and sustaining a human rights consciousness, the victims of Bush era human rights abuses were nearly absent from the debate in the U.S. In her critique of human rights activists, of whom I count myself among, she charges that the arguments and overarching frames employed by activists remains centered on the United States identity and its interests. Meaning, I mean she actually invokes John McCains mantra, which always was Its really about us. Its really about us as Americans that we shouldnt torture. Its really about the utilitarian arguments related to torture. Its really not about the legal prohibition or the moral abhorrence. So the U.S. should not engage in torture and enforced disappearance because then our own service people would be vulnerable to these practices, right, you know, tit for tat. We shouldnt engage in torture because by employing abusive interrogation techniques, the U.S. lowers itself to the likes of Al-Qaeda. Then theres the most often invoked argument, right, one weve heard time and time again, and Im not sure that we can actually prove, and that is torture simply doesnt work, so why use it? So in the end, it was these types of arguments that eclipsed or seemed to eclipse for me, and I think Mokhtari really has a point, eclipsed the argument that these behaviors were illegal under any circumstances, and they were immoral in all circumstances. Now its really true that, and we all know, having done this work over the past decade, that it has been very, very difficult to humanize victims of rendition and secret detention, because of the discourse I talked about before. It wasnt an easy task. But Mokhtari argues, and I have to say that I have some sympathy for this argument, that perhaps more forcefully pursuing the project to humanize the victims as individuals would have given the human rights community better long term results. What were suffering right now, right? We want better long term results in terms of accountability, and we want to have public support for that accountability. Not only do we not have the accountability; we really dont have the public on our side either. Now many activists and lawyers would argue that they did attempt to give face and voice to victims. I know; you just named some of the victims that you and I and others have been working on behalf of. Many of you know the name of Maher Arar, who was the Syrian-Canadian citizen who was sent from the United States back to Syria, where he was tortured. He was released about ten months later, came back to his home in Canada and gave a very compelling statement about what had happened to him in terms of his rendition, his torture in Syria despite numerous visits by Canadian consular officials, etcetera. But lets look at what happened to Maher in Canada versus what happened to Maher in the United States. When you compare Mahers name recognition in the U.S. with the fact that he appeared in a positive light as a newsmaker of the year in the Canadian edition of Time magazine in 2004, you understand that he had status as a victim first and foremost in Canada. Times Canadian bureau chief at the time Steven Frank said this about Maher Arar. This was before the inquiry; this was before anybody knew much, right. He said He has stepped into the spotlight, emerging as a vocal proponent of human rights in Canada, a symbol of how fear and injustice have permeated life in the west since 9/11. But the reality is that most victims of rendition and secret detention cannot step into the light the way that Maher did. Many are still in Guantanamo Bay and may remain there indefinitely. A number are in prisons abroad, serving sentences after unfair trials in places like Egypt. A number have been so psychologically damaged by the actual abuse they suffered, which gave them the victim label, and the continuing psychological abuse that they suffered because they still have the taint of being a terrorist. I would argue that Khalid al-Masri is that kind of a person, who has now really suffered tremendously, even though he has an actual acknowledgment by two governments that hes an innocent victim of these practices. In terms of stepping into the light, in 2007, a group of six human rights organizations created a list of 38 ghost detainees, people who had disappeared. Some of them have resurfaced, but dozens remain out of the light. We dont know where they are. It is true that a few victims of these practices have fought for accountability publicly. Most notably a group of former Guantanamo Bay detainees in the UK, led by a group called Cageprisoners, whos --one of the heads of the organization, Im sure youve heard his name, Moazzam Begg. But they do so with very little public support, and with the label of terrorist always being invoked whenever theyre in the newspaper or on the television. This is despite the fact that not one of them has ever been charged or tried in a fair trial, or convicted of any criminal act whatsoever. But I, and I believe that this task force believed as well that its not too late and its worth the effort to reassert the proposition that victims of counterterrorism operations the world over have rights, whether they are innocent victims or indeed whether they are implicated. Its an ideal time now in this accountability phase of the so-called war on terror to reassert the rights of victims, and I really think that we tried to do that with the book. So Im particularly proud of that in the book. So just very briefly what does the law require? It should be said that victims of rendition and secret detention have a right to truth. They have a right to justice and they have a right to reparation. When it comes to the right to truth, its very interesting to note that its not just them who have the right to truth; their families have a right to know the circumstances of their disappearances, why they have residual effects related to torture and ill treatment. But you and I also have a right to truth. We have a right to know what our government, whether you -- it doesnt matter which government, if youre from the UK or Germany or Italy, any of the governments that would collude with the U.S. on these practices, we have a right as the public to know what governments did in our name, particularly when they have done things to fundamentally abuse the most basic of rights. Second is justice, what Amrits project is doing here in terms of seeking litigation, strategic litigation opportunities, is absolutely critical. We have nothing going on in the U.S., but there is a lot of interesting stuff going on in Europe and a number of countries in Europe, and we need to really press forward on that. The last thing is reparation, and I think it really needs to be said that reparation isnt just about monetary issues, and you will hear the victims of these practices say it often, that they would trade the million dollars for an apology. So what are the elements of reparation? It could be money, but it could be restitution, some attempt to put people back where they were before these things happened. Sweden tried to do this with two rendition victims. They actually after the fact, after theyd been sent to Egypt and theyd been tortured and their cases were adjudicated at U.N. level, they repealed. They basically took back the expulsion orders. It was a symbolic thing, but it had a lot of meaning for both men, for their advocates and for their families. It also means satisfaction. Satisfaction would be the apology, which very few, if any rendition and secret detention victims have gotten. We had a couple of politicians in the U.S. apologize via video-link to Maher Arar. But I think hes still waiting for the big dogs to say theyre sorry. And finally, the issue of non-repetition. Non-repetition is really what the end game is from all of this, and that means reforms put in place with respect to evidentiary issues, with respect to invoking state secrets, with respect to knowing that there is no rendition and secret detention going on full stop, so that theres a reformed system where these types of abuses can never happen again. So thats it. (Applause.) JUSTICE GOLDSTONE: Javaid. MR. REHMAN: Okay, thank you very much. Firstly, I would like to thank the IBA. It was an honor for me to be invited as a member, so Im really grateful to Mark and in particular to Alex. Secondly, I want to thank really wholeheartedly the chair of the task force, because it was such a controversial subject and there were moments when without his leadership, I think we would have gone astray. So thank you, and its from the depth of my heart that I really feel honored to be under your leadership. And of course my thanks to all my colleagues, who supported sometimes very generously some of the controversial and heated arguments that we had. But theyre really pleasant memories that I will always retain. So thank you to everybody. Now the time that Ill have, I mean Ill try to be brief, but there are a few things which I want to say, and essentially I want to look at three areas. I mean my mandate is more specific than just broad international law. But while Im looking at Pakistan and Afghanistan, international law will come into it, and there are really quite relevant issues that are happening. So briefly what I want to do is firstly, I want to look at some of the sensitive issues which we have elaborated indepth in the report. Obviously, I dont have the time to go into detail, but I can touch upon those. Secondly, I think its important for us to retain a historical perspective to all the debate that we have on any issue, particularly something like terrorism and counterterrorism. So Ill just briefly allude to that. Thirdly, I want to update you on what has happened very recently, once the report was in its final stages and its now been published. But there are issue which are emerging, which we were quite concerned about when we were completing the final drafts. I mean more specifically I want to consider the issue of legality relating to drones, and its already been mentioned, things like targeted killings, secret detentions and domestic counterterrorism legislation, particularly in Pakistan. Now one of the issues which is quite sensitive and has been a very recent occurrence is, as some of you might know, last week, i.e. March 17th and 18th, a certain individual called Raymond Davis was released from Pakistan. He had -- he was charged for having committed murder in the country. The day that he was released, I mean its very controversial; we dont have the time, but there are differing opinions on it, whether he had diplomatic immunity or whether he was in fact a CIA operator or an agent. But despite his release, the next day there was a drone attack which killed 40 people, including many civilians. So there is a growing amount of resentment, and it was echoed, I think quite prominently, by the state organs, i.e., the Army, which very strongly opposed that drone attack. So it is quite revealing for us what is going on in that country in terms of the drone attacks. So let me just give you a brief flavor of the historical perspective, which I said is important. Now as you know, in Pakistan and Afghanistan, these issues go back quite a long way. I mean these are -- both these countries are, I mean they have significance in geopolitical terms, and its unfortunate that that region has faced a lot of double standards, particularly dare I say from the United States. I mean some of you would be aware of the post-1979 issues which Pakistan faced, when we had a military dictator at that time, and suddenly the sort of villains became heroes overnight. I mean General Zia was a military dictator, but because the West needed him, I mean there was a lot of support for what he did. What he essentially did was he radicalized, brought religious extremism in the social fabric. So you would still hear of laws such as blasphemy laws. I mean I dont have the time to go into that, but theyre really extreme to the core. Similarly, you have Hudood laws with discrimination against women and minorities, religious minorities. We hear a lot of talk about the Madrisas, but that was the product of that time. Similarly, there was a lot of support for the Sunni radical organizations, Lashkar Taiba (ph), for example, which now are deemed terrorists, and most importantly you know that there was a lot of support for Taliban, who were at that time Mujahedin, and you know, Osama bin Laden was a close ally of Pakistan and of course the West. Now jumping straight on to the position after 9/11, again we had a scenario where you had a military dictator in power, and he latched onto the opportunity, and he became an ally of the United States and the West. Then you see a whole raft of arbitrary detentions, other undemocratic, you know, functioning. I mean colleagues have already mentioned disappearances, detentions, arbitrariness and abuse in domestic counterterrorism legislation, support for targeted killings, drones and extra-judicial killings that went on, were under the garb of what we have in terms of a military dictator, claiming that these are extraordinary times, so we have to rely on the war on terror. So that is the sort of brief historical perspective that I want to give you. I mean as I said, theres a lot more to it, but I mean we dont have the time really to go into this at that point. But what I want to focus now is the issue of legality in terms of the drone attacks and targeted killings. Now what we have is there are a number of legal justifications that are produced in terms of drone attacks and the killings that are going on, particularly in the northwestern frontier of Pakistan. One issue that is quite significant for us to realize is that under human rights law, it can never be justified have premeditated, intentional killings. So for example, shoot to kill policy is always unlawful. It is a different matter when its a self defense issue, when you cannot -- when you dont have the opportunity to think and to react appropriately. But under international human rights law, that is never permissible, and Im glad to say that our report has exemplified that in quite some detail. The other issue, which is quite interesting and quite complicated, is the position of targeted killings and drone attacks under international humanitarian law. Now this is interesting, because as was mentioned earlier, what is the position in armed conflict? Now there are lots of rigid normative criterion. For example, the issue of combatants, that they have to combatants. But if you look at some of the instances, I mean even the most striking case, for example, the killing of Baitullah Masood, who was supposedly an alleged Al-Qaeda leader. Well, you can argue, you can justify that, but there were 12 people who got killed alongside him. He was -- allegedly he was receiving treatment. So he was actually not an active combatant at the time of his death. So that raises issues in international humanitarian law in any event. But then his wife got killed. His parents-in-law got killed. There was a medic that got killed at that time. So you know, there is a question of accountability when you have these drone attacks. The point that I want to make is if these -- if there is an armed conflict thats going on in Pakistan, then what is the liability of the operators of these drones? So for example, someone sitting in the United States just presses a button, and the drone goes and kills someone in Pakistan. Now are these combatants? I mean what are the sort of rules of engagement? So these are really complex legal issues, but they have political dimension as well. The final point on this I want to make is about legitimacy of the debate on self defense. Again, we dont have the time, but there are really rigid issues about whether there's an armed attack in Pakistan, whether theres anticipatory self-defense, whether the action is proportion. It must be proportional, but these raise serious points of concern. In terms of the political costs, this is a huge issue, and Im really disappointed to mention to you that under Obama administration, these drone attacks have actually increased more significantly that it was in the case under the previous administration. So the whole point about winning hearts and minds argument, I think, its really lost, because if you talk to people in Afghanistan and Pakistan, you know, youve lost the case there. There is a huge amount of disproportionate killings that are going on. Drones are not humans. Drones dont have emotions. People have emotions, and they can see and they can feel the issue. Now finally, I will just turn to one further issue of legality that relates to the existing legislation in Pakistan, and the difficulties that we have in terms of counterterrorism legislation. There are a number of laws, primarily the antiterrorism legislation, which we have discussed in our report, the 1997 Act. There have been a series of amendments. But the problem that we faced is firstly, the definition. Against, we have discussed that, and I must give credit to the report, without really going into too much controversy, that the report has given a very good version of terrorism and how we define it. But in countries like Pakistan, you have a big issue. How do you define a terrorist? So for example, within the ambit of definition we have sectarianism coming into it, you know, Sunni-Shia conflict, and these guys are tried by antiterrorist courts, not by ordinary civilian courts. Then also, I mean things like blasphemy. There's a big issue, you know. You try people in antiterrorist courts, you know, who are having committed [violations of] blasphemy laws. So this is a real point of concern. Now under the administration of General Musharraf, the problem was that these counterterrorism laws were further amended, and the executive, i.e., the military was given the mandate to actually decide on these, sit on these courts and make judgments. They were actually targeting the political opponents, i.e., their own opponents, as well as those accused of terror. So this has created widespread irregularities. I mean we have mentioned detentions, the torture. Theres a huge amount of abuse of suspects, and unfortunately, the problem goes on, because the current civilian administration is actually following the same mandate, and it has not reformed the counterterrorism legislation. So Ill end here. Thank you. JUSTICE GOLDSTONE: Thank you very much. (Applause.) JUSTICE GOLDSTONE: Well, thank you very much to the three members of the panel. The discussion is now open for questions or comments. Well start with the audience here, and then well find out whether there are any questions coming over as a result of the webcast. Who wants to --? PARTICIPANT: This is, I guess for Juan, but then anybody else. What do we do when international law runs up against national democratic practice and for that matter national judiciary rule of law? Specifically, for example, in the United States at this point, it used to be that you can see what the President, Bush, Nixon and so forth, would do things and youd have a terrible time trying to convince the legislature to call a stop to it. But now we have a situation where, giving Obama the benefit of the doubt, hes trying to do things, but the Congress specifically forbids him to do it, a very conservative judiciary gets in his way. I mean for example, just to give an example, if Obama wants to move Guantanamo to a state-side prison and Congress votes democratically no, you cant do that, denies him funds. In Europe when this sort of thing happens, you can always appeal to the European Court of Human Rights or something. But what kind of -- as a believer in the rule of law, how do you deal with a situation like that? MR. MENDEZ: Well you know, under international law, the state is responsible anyway, and it doesnt matter whether the judiciary is the violator or the legislative branch or the executive branch. The state also cannot invoke its domestic legislation to avoid obligations under international law. Thats all, you know, well said and done, but it does leave us with the declaratory nature of the violation of international law. You obviously said something important. The United States does not submit itself to any kind of international adjudication, except before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, that, as you know, valiantly tries to do its work, beginning with interim measures or precautionary measures on Guantanamo already in 2002. But also very recently, issuing a very, very strong report and fortunately a report that was well-received in the U.S. press, on immigration detention in the United States. So I think, you know, you should ask somebody like Anthony Romero why go to the Inter-American Commission when you dont have any kind of enforcement mechanism? Anthony would say well, at the very least, you know, we get the victims to have a day in court, to have, to be heard, to be -- to have the opportunity. We highlight the incongruity of the United States presenting itself as a defender of an international order based in law, but not willing to be, you know, beholden to its own international law obligations. PARTICIPANT: Can a Pakistani in Guantanamo go to the Inter-American Court for relief? MR. MENDEZ: Yes. Not the Inter-American Court; the Inter-American Commission, because for the Inter-American Court, the U.S. has not signed or ratified the American convention. But because it is a member of the OAS, the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Commission does have jurisdiction to hear cases, and it doesnt matter who, the nationality of the victim doesnt matter. MS. HALL: Can I just add to that? Can I just add that accountability in a number of European countries is something that is ongoing right now. I mean in at least four or five different countries, I mean CIA agents have actually been prosecuted and convicted in Italy for an abduction that was related to a rendition to torture. I think its those opportunities as well that give victims some sense that someone somewhere will be held accountable. I think youre right when you say that you have to bracket the U.S. But I dont think we focused enough attention on accountability in other places. In Spain and Italy and Lithuania, in Poland, in Romania, the latter being places where secret detention centers were located. I think we really -- that is really the game right now, is to continue to push on the European front, because if the interest really is for us to be victim-centered, its in those for a right now where we see the most hope for any kind of accountability. JUSTICE GOLDSTONE: Im sorry. Could you use the microphone? PARTICIPANT: My question is for Julia. Is it on now? Ill just speak really loudly. Regarding Arar, I found your comments thought-provoking. Thank you. I did indeed find your comments thought-provoking, and Id like to hear a little bit more, because I think that Arar is a somewhat unique case. I say this as a dual U.S. and Canadian national, and I think that some of the -- a major reason why Arar was such a prominent case in Canada is because it allowed the Canadian public to criticize the U.S., which is a major feature of sort of Canadian identity, particularly post-9/11. Theres a rhetoric around the big, bad United States that does these terrible things. So even though the Canadian government took responsibility and acknowledged its own role, I think the overarching theme was still an opportunity to criticize the U.S. and its role in the war on terror. So Id like to hear a little bit more about what we can do inside the U.S., in terms of changing this dialogue. Because as you said, so many of us have spent a lot of years talking about the victims, and we stopped because it wasnt working. People would say when you talk about these victims, instead we just see terrorists, and the American public just sees another terrorist. So stop putting their pictures in the papers; stop telling their stories and talk about these other more instrumental arguments that I agree with you are somewhat problematic. MS. HALL: There were several commentators who had a similar reaction to the Mokhtari article. It was, you know, its been really difficult. Weve tried our best, so we had to have these alternatives. First on Arar, I mean whats fascinating about that is Canadas been like the U.S.s, like -- I shouldnt say like -- has been the U.S.s, one of the U.S.s most willing partners, in terms of the global war on terrorism. So you may say that this is an opportunity for Canada to thumb its nose at the U.S., in terms of its counterterrorism policies and practices. But I think its more layered than that. I think Maher Arars case was so extreme, and he was willing to come forward in a very honest and forthright way, and in a way that many other victims havent been able to. So Im not totally convinced that it was just this one dimensional kind of blowback to the U.S. You know, I dont know the answer to your second; I just dont know what it is. I just came from Europe where the same problems obtain, trying to figure out how to humanize victims of counterterrorism policies, how civil society can actually fight the discourse of terrorism and national security threat. I think that others may be -- I am really at a loss, and I wish my brain were bigger. JUSTICE GOLDSTONE: Juan? MR. MENDEZ: I just shared a panel last week with Maher Arar in San Francisco, but he had to talk via Skype, because hes on a no-fly list. One thing we can do is demand that if he hasnt been charged with anything, he has been declared innocent, he has been the victim of such an incredible abuse, at the very least the United States should not prevent him from visiting the United States. There was also a campaign by Amnesty International to seek apologies for him, which I think is a very well-taken point by Julia in her earlier remarks. The problem that we have with the war on terror is that we dont have the public with us, and we dont have the public with us because the public doesnt want to know who the victims are. Torture is okay as long as it happens to people whose faces we dont see and whose names we cant pronounce and we dont even want to pronounce them. That is, you know, compared to many campaigns that weve had against torture in many parts of the world, that is a big handicap, because we have lost a lot of ground in terms of the condemnation by society itself of the practice of torture. PARTICIPANT: This might be slightly off the topic, but Id like to take the opportunity with the panel. The United States is essentially in a war situation of going to Libya, and thats the ultimate in trying to do human rights. Whats very scary now is the news thats coming out that maybe we were out there and we may be protecting people that are supporters of Al-Qaeda. So Id like you to comment, because were all about human rights and we get all this information from the press, and now weve seen things and its caused a huge furor in this country is where the Congress should have been consulted. I really would like the opinion of this panel, who are so focused on human rights. JUSTICE GOLDSTONE: Javaid, you want to take that? MR. REHMAN: Yes, thank you. This is not easy. This is not easy. But I think what I would say is that Libya is a complicated case, I mean, in terms of international law. If you look at the mandate which the Security Council has, historically its only been when there is a threat of aggression or threat to international peace and security. But the current case forms an exception, because it is about purely a domestic situation, where there was serious risk of a regime abusing its own people. The Security Council took an unprecedented or I think there are some precedents, but this was quite one of those, where it decided to take action against a brutal regime. Now I think personally that if the United States and its western allies, although you know, youve seen my criticism previously. But if they hadnt taken any action, wed be sitting here and criticizing the West for actually ignoring a brutal regime killing its people systematically, as unfortunately happened in the case of, for example, former Yugoslavia for a very long time. So I think its now we have to see what. I mean I think the Security Council was right, and the United States was right to take action. But the question is how do you operate it? Its a problematic issue. I mean they have set up a no-fly zone. They attempted to secure a no-fly zone, but there are issues in terms of operation. I think theyve got to look at what is the long-term future? I mean U.S. or any other country cannot be engaged in a conflict for a very long time. I think they would have to negotiate and obviously regime change is not a mandate that the Security Council or international law at the moment provides. So it is not easy, but I mean personally, I would not -- I dont feel terrified in terms of the U.N. taking some concrete actions to protect people who would otherwise be facing genocide. That was the situation on the ground. I dont know if Ive -- MR. MENDEZ: I also think that the Security Council was wise in referring the case to the International Criminal Court, because now the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over every action there. So if the international forces violate the laws of war, theyll be subject to the ICC jurisdiction. So we have a monitor. Thats not right? Im sorry. PARTICIPANT: There is an exception. Only Libyan nationals. No foreign nationals. MR. MENDEZ: Okay, sorry. I stand corrected. PARTICIPANT: For the U.S., that was the condition -- (Simultaneous speaking.) MR. MENDEZ: Well, but at least well be looking. Well be looking. Thank you. JUSTICE GOLDSTONE: Well, I would just add, I think its important to recognize this is really the first use of the responsibility to protect, which was very much a soft law. There was no international law behind giving any force to this idea of responsibility to protect innocent civilians, the responsibility that is in the first place on governments, and when governments fail, then of the international community is entitled to take action. Thats what the Security Council has done for the very first time. So this is a very new, its a very new development, and certainly by my knots, a very exciting one. Yes. PARTICIPANT: I just wanted to go back to the book. I just wondered what the goal of the book was, and how you think how it could be used to address the issue of public accountability that you were talking about earlier, to build more support -- JUSTICE GOLDSTONE: What the goals of the report were. PARTICIPANT: Its a pretty general question, and maybe (inaudible). MS. HALL: Well, I mean the book is actually, you know, we struggled with do we want a very turgid, legal, analytical text, did we want something that was more accessible. I think weve struck a nice balance. I think the book can be used, in some instances, as a real primer. You know, what are the requirements of IHL when it comes to these phenomenon, etcetera. But then it goes into a lot of the case law, and I think thats what distinguishes it. It goes into a lot of the current developments in case law, and then makes the argument for accountability and victims rights, etcetera. We kind of take it to the end game, right. So I actually think the book can be used, I think it can be used for training. I think it can be used in law classes on rule of law and counterterrorism. Theres a number of ways that it can be used. It is fundamentally a very accessible text. The notes are quite extensive, but the text itself, I think, has really been written in a way to give broad access, as I said in my presentation, to a number of different types of actors. JUSTICE GOLDSTONE: Are there any questions from, because were running out of time. (Off mic comment.) MR. ELLIS: Sorry. So this is the question from our web audience. Do you believe there is any real possibility of an indictment against members of the Bush administration, for example lawyers or CIA agents, and if so where, or under what jurisdiction? MS. HALL: I feel like Im talking a lot. We can only hope. You will note that there are various interesting things that have happened. So President, former President Bush was supposed to visit Geneva a few weeks ago, and human rights groups across the world really joined forces and submitted documentation, memoranda, evidence, etcetera, to prosecutors in Switzerland. There were different strategies. But in any event, it became quite an issue, and he cancelled the trip. Now obviously the goal there, after former President Bush issued his memoir, where he acknowledged that he authorized torture in the form of waterboarding, the goal there was for him to go and to get arrested, and that didnt happen. But symbolically, it was very, very important to press the issue. There is a case in Spain right now against six actors in the former Bush administration, basically for drafting the memos. So its basically issues of command responsibility that is still alive in Spain. We have had some unfortunate defeats in Europe. A German case that was intended to force the government to transmit arrest warrants for 13 CIA agents whod been implicated in renditions failed, unfortunately, in the German courts just this past year. The 22 CIA agents and one military officer who were convicted for an abduction related to a rendition in Italy, that case is now on the highest appeal in Italy. So whether it happens in the U.S. or not, I think I would leave it to the lawyers who practice in the U.S. But certainly in Europe, theres still -- the issue is still alive. JUSTICE GOLDSTONE: Well unfortunately, weve run out of time. So I want to thank everybody for coming to be with us, to the audience on the web, and particularly to OSI, Amrit thank you, and to the IBA, Mark, for having conceived of the book. We hope that people will read it, and we hope that they will learn from it and even hope that they might enjoy reading it. Thank you very much for the panel. MR. ELLIS: Thank you. JUSTICE GOLDSTONE: Thank you very much.
