Pulitzer-winning author of The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Dark Sun, and Arsenals of Folly Richard Rhodes completes his tetralogy on nuclear weapons with his new book, The Twilight of the Bombs: Recent Challenges, New Dangers, and the Prospects for a World Without Nuclear Weapons.
A single weapon profoundly shaped world history for most of a century. Its disappearance can have equally profound effects.
Richard Rhodes is the author or editor of 23 books including The Making of the Atomic Bomb, which won a Pulitzer Prize in Nonfiction, a National Book Award and a National Book Critics Circle Award; Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, which was shortlisted for a Pulitzer Prize in History; an investigation of the roots of private violence, Why They Kill; a personal memoir, A Hole in the World; a biography, John James Audubon; and four novels. He has received numerous fellowships for research and writing, including grants from the Ford Foundation, the Guggenheim Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation Program in International Peace and Security and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. He has been a visiting scholar at Harvard and MIT and a host and correspondent for documentaries on public television's Frontline and American Experience series. He is an affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.
A third volume of nuclear history, Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race, was published in October 2007 by Alfred A. Knopf. It examines the international politics of nuclear weapons thoughout the Cold War. A fourth and final volume, The Twilight of the Bombs, was published August 24, 2010. Rhodes lectures frequently to audiences in the United States and abroad.
Pulitzer Prize-winning author Richard Rhodes presents a simulation of the potential impact of an India-Pakistan nuclear exchange. The immediate destruction, he says, would kill 20 million -- followed by another billion from failed crops in the aftermath.
First atomic bomb test, near Alamogordo, New Mexico, July 16, 1945.Courtesy of Los Alamos National Laboratory, New MexicoWeapon whose great explosive power results from the sudden release of energy upon the splitting, or fission, of the nuclei of heavy elements such as plutonium or uranium (seenuclear fission). With only 1133 lb (515 kg) of highly enriched uranium, a modern atomic bomb could generate a 15-kiloton explosion, creating a huge fireball, a large shock wave, and lethal radioactive fallout. The first atomic bomb, developed by the Manhattan Project during World War II, was set off on July 16, 1945, in the New Mexico desert. The only atomic bombs used in war were dropped by the U.S. on Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 1945, and on Nagasaki three days later. In 1949 the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb, followed by Britain (1952), France (1960), China (1964), India (1974), and Pakistan (1998). Israel and South Africa were suspected of testing atomic weapons in 1979. See alsohydrogen bomb; Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty; nuclear weapon.
He's either lying or ignorant of what happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The nuclear winter studies he sites extrapolate from Hiroshima firestorm data, ignore Nagasaki and don't acknowledge the fact that neither are anything remotely similar to a modern city.
Hiroshima was made primarily of densely stacked wooden housing units furnished with paper screens. Hiroshima hadn't seen rain for 27 days. Cooking was done with coal-fired braziers and the bomb was deliberately dropped at breakfast time to capitalize on this fact.
The few fires that were started by the blast did not start in the wood of the housing units; they started in paper screens that had direct line of sight to the fireball.
Most fires were started by the blast, which knocked over coal-braziers. 5 minutes after the bomb was dropped, there were a lot of flattened buildings, but no raging inferno. The fire grew and spread and eventually peaked after an estimated 2-3 hours.
Nagasaki had only had 10 days since last rainfall, the city was a slightly more fanned out geometry and the bomb was dropped at lunch time. Result: No fire storm.
You just cannot get nuclear winter without fire storms. That's why the Kuwait oil fires failed to produce a nuclear winter, as some people had predicted they might. The plumes didn't join up into one giant slug of hot air, instead they rose and cooled quite quickly, never lofting soot all the way up where it needs to be.
Modern houses, even when their exterior is made of wood, contains several tonnes of gypsum, mineral wool and other materials that do not sustain fire very well.
There are no coal-braziers. There are no paper screens. Some fires would start in leaf piles, some in thin curtains and newspapers with line-of-sight to the fireball. But these firestorms covering hundreds of square kilometers from a single bomb is a complete fantasy.
It's true that thermal radiation scales better with yield than blast and ionizing radiation(which are attenuated not only by distance, but by interaction with air), but it takes much longer for a big device to deliver that thermal energy. Where as it takes 6 calories/cm^2 to ignite newspaper with heat radiation from a 100 kt bomb, it takes 9 from a 1 MT bomb and 25 from a 10 MT bomb.
Pakistan has been given 1.5 Billion U.S.Dollars every year for the next 7 years. 10.5 Billion Total to try and buy their love for America. Yet they top the list of Countries who Hate America. They will divide that money amongst their War Lords to then spend on buying better counter measures to our current counter measures to blow up our troops and our allies troops. They also love to hide our worst eneimies like Osama Bin Laden. Not to mention the support the Taliban gives to anyone who hates America. So I think America and the rest of the World would survive a Nuclear Exchange between them and India who has also always been luke warm in it's suppor of America. Millions of Indias people hate America too. So let them Incinerate each other. It will reduce the danger for everyone else!
Eric you must be on another subject we are not here talking about Islam.
Back to Dr. Rhodes and nuclear bombs. In 1949 Einstein, Albert Schweitzer and Bertrand Russell Lobbied in the USA to stop Nuclear Testing. Albert said I do not know how the third world war will be fought, But I can tell you, what they will be using in the fourth-ROCKS!Days before Einsteins death in 1955 he sighned the Einstein-Russell manifesto to stop nuclear testing. Einstein and Russell and Schweitzer were accused of spreading communism by the USA Senate. The USA is most guilty of nuclear abuse! THIS HAS TO STOP NOW! I would like to know the amount of testing from 1999 to 2010, This should take us to 3ooo testings since 1945. What a waste of MONEY and scientific energy. We are Still a fear based society, Shameful.
As for Erics comment, please get on the same page, thank you fora tv.
When He understood that the water of the Yamuna was being polluted by the black serpent Kaliya, Lord Krsna took action against him and made him leave the Yamuna and go elsewhere, and thus the water became purified.
If Islam is considered to be like Kaliya in the Hindu mind then the result may be an India and Pakistan war. Wahhabi belief is no less tolerant
Wahhabi theology treats the Qur'an and Hadith as the only fundamental and authoritative texts. Commentaries and "the examples of the early Muslim community (Ummah) and the four Rightly Guided Caliphs (632-661 C.E.)" are used to support these texts but are not considered independently authoritative.
Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab further explains in his book Kitab al-Tawhid (which draws on material from the Qur'an and the narrations of the prophet) that worship in Islam includes conventional acts of worship such as the five daily prayers; fasting; Dua (supplication); Istia'dha (seeking protection or refuge); Ist'ana (seeking help), and Istigatha (seeking benefits). Therefore, making dua to anyone or anything other than Allah, or seeking supernatural help and protection that is only befitting of a divine being from something other than Allah are acts of "shirk" and contradict Tawhid. Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab further explains that Prophet Muhammad during his lifetime tried his utmost to identify and repudiate all actions that violated these principles.
Thank you Fora TV very very good lecture, I learned how much I knew, I learned how much I forgot, growing up with nukes. Iam at loss with words,therefore I will refer to Albert Einstein september 20 1952, published in Japanese magazine, Kaizo Tokyo. My part in producing the atomic bomb consisted in a single act, I signed a letter to President Roosevelt.....He goes on to say, I was fully aware of the terrible danger to mankind in case this attempt succeeded. But the likelihood that the Germans were working on the same problem with a chance of succeeding forced me to this step. I could do nothing else although I have always been a convinced pacifist. To my mind, to kill in war is not a whit better thaqn to ordinary murder. Albert ends with, Only if we overcome the obsession can we really turn our attention in a reasonable way to the real political problem, which is,HOW CAN WE CONTRIBUTE TO MAKE THE LIFE OF A MAN ON THIS DIMINISHING EARTH MORE SECURE AND MORE TOLERABLE? THANK YOU ALBERTAND THANK YOU MR. RHODES.
ALEXANDER RHODES: Hi there. I'm Alexander Rhodes, the Executive Director of the LongNow Foundation. Some of you who come to these know that we generally play a shortmovie that exemplifies long term thinking. And can we bring the lights up just alittle bit? This one is a movie done by a Japanese artist named Isao Hashimoto. Itwas done in 2003 and it's called 1945 to 1998. And one thing I just wanted to do aquick poll in the audience. For those of you who have not seen this movie, I'm goingto ask: How many of you think we've detonated less than a hundred atomic bombs since1945? How may of you think we've detonated less than five hundred atomic bombs? Howmany of you think we've detonated less than a thousand atomic bombs? Okay and howabout two thousand atomic bombs? Okay. Please roll the movie. Up in the top right arethe months going by and the year. The bottom is the number of detonations. So youjust saw Trinity, now the two bombs dropped on Japan and the flags you'll see come upas the different countries do their tests. Pacific AToll test by the U.S. Totalnumber of detonations in the bottom right. Russia gets the bomb. Great Britain startstesting. Notice never in Great Britain. Australia and the United States. France getsthe bomb. Also not testing in France. Africa and the Pacific A toll. Canada getsthe bomb. We're now passing 1974. Notice we just passed the 2000 mark in number ofdetonations. Then the testing treaty was signed. STEWART BRAND: Good evening. I'mStewart Brand from the Long Now Foundation. Well, you could say the glass is halffull, only one thousandth of those was dropping on people to kill them so far. Most ofthe time we think about nuclear weapons or the nuclear age sort of in terms of what'sgoing on at the moment: Terrorism now, Cold War then. And long-term thinking is thekind of thing Dick Rhodes brings to the subject because he's been on the beat ofnuclear weapons since his book The Making of the Atomic Bomb. He's seen this kind oftrend not just in terms of the explosions on the surface of the earth and undergroundexplosions, but how it's actually playing out in the technology and the politics andthe geo politics. Richard Rhodes. RICHARD RHODES: Thank you. One of the things thatintrigues me about that sequence that we just saw is the extent to which those testsover the years were kind of a communication, very low grade communication back andforth between the United States and the Soviet Union. The other things that'sintriguing and I think hopeful in a quantifiable hard data sort of way is that theyslowed down and essentially stopped. The only tests that have been conducted in thiscentury have been those tests in North Korea. It may well be that they're going to bethe last of them, we'll see, or we may have a few outliers like Iran that need toexpress that particular national will, that particular reach for national prestigebefore they're prepared to go any further. What I'd like to talk with you abouttonight is where we got to after the end of the Cold War. Where we are now and how wemight move from here to some more stable state which might be the abolition of nuclearweapons, I think we'd all like that if it played out right or it might not be. Itmight be something else. One of the things that surprises me is how many Americansevidently think we got rid of our nuclear weapons at the end of the Cold War. At firstthat sounds ill-informed but on the more fundamental level it's really interesting thatpeople would feel the connection between the nuclear arms race and the long Cold Warbetween the United States and the Soviet Union and understand at some really quiteprofound level that with the end of that long conflict we don't need nuclear weaponsany more. At the same, time the opposite response has been present in our governmentin particular. An effort to find some way to rationalize keeping all the weapons thatwe built during the Cold War or at least some large subset of those weapons, almost aprocess of looking for new enemies. Dick Chaney was Secretary of Defense in the yearsimmediately after the Cold War under George H.W. Bush and he is as he's often saidsomeone who believes that you should be ready for any possible future. For him therewas a real effort in the early 90's to write the Defense Department document that woulddefine a more dangerous world than I think most people here and abroad felt we had cometo. And in particular there was an effort on the part of political conservatives toreframe China as the coming enemy with the potential for another Cold War with China.It's been quite a struggle in those years to pull away from that particular approachand to try to rethink everything because the obvious thing to do is to stay withwhatever you have as if somehow the future isn't different from the present. I hearfrom any number of people in the nuclear weapons business that everything is nice andstable, let's stay where we are. But, of course, that's not the way the future works,certainly not the way we've seen history working. Let me read to you from a speech ofGeorge Kennan's back in the 80s, really quite a prescient look at where we came to bythe end of the Cold War. You remember there was a general crowing on the part of ourPresident, George H.W. Bush, that we'd won the Cold War and although some of hisactions during his presidency were absolutely first class in terms of reducing nucleararmaments in pace with the former Soviet Union, taking all of our tactical nuclearweapons back to the United States and getting rid of all our tactical nukes that wereground launched in the process, clearing out all of our nuclear weapons in South Koreawhich was a real opening for North Korea to think about changing its stance. He feltthe pressure, as I guess we're pretty familiar with today, of the Republican right totake a strong stance about all of this and to say we won the Cold War in the sort ofclassic Reaganist sense. Let me give you Kennan's view ten years before that time ofwhat we have won and what we haven't won. He's been speaking about the development ofthe Cold War between the two super powers: "It is from these great mistakes," hewrites, "that there has flowed as I see it the extreme militarization, not only of ourthought but of our lives that has become the mark of this post war age. And this is amilitarization that has had profound effects not just on our foreign policies but alsoon our own society. It has led to what I and many others has come to see as a seriousdistortion of our national economy. We have been obliged to habituate ourselves to theexpenditure annually of a great portion of our national income for what are essentiallynegative and sterile purposes, the production of armaments, the export of armaments andthe maintenance of a vast armed force establishment, purposes that add nothing to thereal productive capacity of our economy and only deprive us every year of billions ofdollars that might have otherwise gone into productive investment." To which I wouldjust mention that today despite a really dramatic reduction in the number of nuclearweapons that we have deployed down as a result of this latest treaty to in a short timeonly about 1,200 weapons on the U. S. side and a comparable somewhat larger number onthe Soviet side, Russian side. Yet those weapons are costing us upwards of fiftybillion dollars a year simply to maintain. "This habit," Kennan goes on, "this habitof pouring so great a part of our gross national product year after year into sterileand socially negative forms of production has now risen to the status of what I haveventured to call a genuine national addiction. We could not now break ourselves of thehabit without the most serious of withdrawal symptoms. Millions of people in additionto those other millions who are in uniform have become accustomed to deriving theirlivelihood from the military industrial complex. Thousands of firms have becomedependent upon it not to mention labor unions and communities. It is the main sourceof our highly destabilizing budget deficit." He goes on. "And the problem is madeworse by the unnecessary wastefulness of this entire exercise, by the inter-servicerivalries that cause so much duplication of effort, by the double standard we apply tocost and results in relation to the military, economy and the civilian, by the lack ofany coherent relationship between the criteria Congress applies to militaryexpenditures and those it applies to non-military ones." To which I would just add, thedouble standard that he mentions, he's referring, of course, to the system that's usedto build new weapons and acquire new armaments where the cost is basically paid for bythe government with an additional profit on top where the system is triggered so thatthe weapon systems that are possibly to be built are kind of cut in up front so that bythe time that it might be possible or should be necessary to eliminate them becausethey don't work well, it's too late. It only makes sense at that point to finish them.So let's look at what we paid for the Cold War. These are numbers that were developedby a group of scholars in the late 90s which I have updated to present dollars so thatyou understand their force. Carl Sagan in 1995 was talking about the cost of the ColdWar and I think summed it up brilliantly in this one sentence: "In other words,everything in the United States except the land." The share of that total that wasdevoted to nuclear weapons and the infrastructure around them, 7.8 trillion, grantednot nearly the whole, but considering that only two of these weapons have ever actuallybeen used in the context of war, it's really quite amazing that we put so much trust inthem and devised such an elaborate and philosophical structure around the notion thatsomehow a first strike and a second strike and this strike and that strike back andforth and around and so forth as if it were a bloodless business which, of course, it'snot. Every year the American Society of Civil Engineers prepares a report card onAmerica's infrastructure. This is the most recent of those report cards. It ismarginally better than the one that I first looked at which was in 2003, but as you cansee it's not-- I think it reflects very accurately my personal experience, probablyyour personal experience of the infrastructure we move through and live in: the holesin the roads; the crumbling schools; the bridges that fall down and so on. Two pointtwo trillion of that 7.8 trillion and surely we could have done with a few fewernuclear weapons than we built, the 20,000 that we built, in fact I think we were upcloser to 40. The Russians in the course of their years built something like 95,000because they were operating on that system where you're supposed to over produce everyyear compared to the previous year, 110% every year and nobody knew how to turn our thespigot. Furthermore the system in Soviet factories was that you always put some goodpieces aside so that if you screwed up the next year you could slip those into theproduction and say I over fulfilled my quota comrade so the numbers were even worse intheir case. But I ask you to think about how different this country would be had wespent this 2.2 trillion to maintain our social infrastructure rather than to buildnuclear weapons that we never used and in truth would never have used. Every presidentstarting with President Truman after the end of the Second World War said that clearlyin private and sometimes in public that there was no political circumstance that hecould imagine that would require the use of nuclear weapons. And the same was true inthe Soviet side starting at least with Nikita Khrushchev who in his memoirs sayssomething like "for the first three days after they gave me the briefing I couldn'tsleep and then I realized that I would never use them and after that I slept." Whatwere we doing? I think it's pretty clear that for political leaders once you make thedecision that you're not going to use these things they become counters in a verycomplicated and elaborate political game. We know what the international game was likeall those years, what has been discussed less and what I try to go into a bit in thisnew book of mine is how much of the nuclear arms race was for domestic consumption onboth sides? On the Soviet side where there was constantly a sense that they werebehind, that we were ahead, that somehow being ahead mattered where nuclear weapons inquantity are concerned. And on our side there was the constant drum beat back andforth between the two political parties and it wasn't always the Republicans who wereplaying the hawks and claiming the other side was weak on defense. Some of you willrecall John Kennedy's famous missile gap which he created by refusing to get thebriefing on what we actually had and where we actually were until after he was electedand inaugurated at which point, not surprisingly he discovered we didn't have one. Wewere, in fact, ahead. In fact, throughout the Cold War it would have been animpeachable offense for an American president to have allowed the Soviet Union to getahead of us in any meaningful sense of the word. And we never did. But those who saythat we spent the Soviet Union into bankruptcy forget about this. We spent ourselvesinto a kind of bankruptcy, too, although not one that we couldn't dig our way out offairly easily. Now, as I said, many Americans think we got rid of our nuclear weaponsat the end of the Cold War, expressing a common understanding that our nuclear weaponswere there because we felt threatened by another large nuclear power. And, of course,we didn't. But it's also true that even a few nuclear weapons exploded in the rightcontext would be a disaster not simply for the region where those weapons were explodedbut also for the whole world. The threshold for world scale systemic environmentaleffects is much lower than we have been led to believe. The scientists who worked upthe original nuclear winner model came back to it around 2006 or 2007. They werecurious to see first of all if the new and improved weather and climate models that hadbeen developed in response to the concern about global warming would give them a morenuanced and richer picture of the classic nuclear winner where you have a full scaleexchange of nuclear weapons in large numbers between, let's say, the United States andRussia. They did that work and they found that if anything their model was theconditions the results were even worse than they had predicted before. But then theywere interested at the question of: What about a small so called regional nuclear war?What if India and Pakistan which became nuclear powers at full scale in the 1990safter the end of the Cold War, what if India and Pakistan exchanged simply 150 eachHiroshima sized atomic bombs? The assumption in this model was that they wouldnecessarily bomb each others cities, they wouldn't as we pretended to later on in theCold War target everything on missile silos out in the middle of Montana or Kazakhstan.They would attack each others cities because their weapons would only basically beuseful in that context. Those cities contain large volumes of flammable materials and,in fact, the main effect of nuclear weapons contrary to what you may have heard isfire. Most of the people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki died of fire, not of radiation, notof blast. Those have fairly limited extents from ground zero, but when a fire ballwith a temperature of 40 to a 100 million degrees is ignited in the sky over a city, itsimultaneously ignites all the flammable material within a very large radius. I lookedat a model that had to do with a 300 kiloton war head exploded over the Pentagon inWashington. If you only calculated blast it would basically destroy everything out tothe Capital Building. Those of you who have been there have a sense of that distance.But if you count the effect of fire of the ignition of materials by the huge heat ofthe fire ball, everything all the way out to the ring roads around Washington would bedestroyed, burned to ash, nothing organic left. So it's the fire storm that causes thereal damage with nuclear weapons. And if you used even 50 on each side, 15 kilotonHiroshima sized bombs-- this by the way shows you one such mass fire, this wasHiroshima that day. But this would show you what happens with that hypotheticalIndia-Pakistan war. As I said, this was a model that was developed by the samescientists who developed the nuclear winner model and here they used the latestsimulations of weather patterns around the world. So within a few months you have aworld where, something like the world of 1816 when a large volcano in Sumatra spread apall of ash and soot around the world. It was called the year without a summer. Therewere hard freezes in Pennsylvania in July. They found John James Audubon about whom Iwrote a biography a few years ago commenting on the conditions that summer in theeastern part of the United States. So here we are and this is the result. Twentymillion approximate deaths from blast fire and radiation, that's the immediate firestorm or mass fire. But then perhaps a billion people dead because their crops failedand they were living on the thin margin anyway. So all of us are still at risk; all ofus are still responsible; all of us have reason to be worried about nuclear weapons inany countries hands including our own. And here are today's inventories. Thesenumbers for Russia and the United States will go down in the next couple of yearsbecause of the new Stark Treaty. That 8,008 weapons, if you put them at let's say 100kilotons each which is probably a pretty good average, that would be about eightmegatons eight or eighty, somebody with better numbers than I, I think it's only eightthough. Never the less the fire storms that I was showing you between India andPakistan represented 1.5 megatons. We have nuclear weapons which have a larger yieldthan that. So the world is still very much one where we have a problem with nuclearweapons and where, as I'm sure you know, there is an increasing movement among nationaland international leaders including President Obama, a movement to some extent begun bythe so-called four horsemen: Sam Nunn, Bill Perry, Henry Kissinger, and George Shultzat Stanford. They were trying to think about how to commemorate the Reykjavik Summitwhen President Reagan and President Gorbachev came within a hare's breath of agreeingthe elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world, but hung up on the fact thatPresident Reagan felt he needed a physical rather than a political defense against thepossibility of cheating and because I must say with Richard Pearl would spring over hisshoulder like [Inaudible]. I've written the play about the Reykjavik Summit which hashad some readings around the country. And I went back and re-read Othello and realizedthat all I had to do was borrow the character. Richard Pearl fit the mode perfectly,but be that as it may the fact is they did eliminate a whole class of nuclear weaponsin Europe at the time and really began a process that I think has been bubbling alongsomewhat under the surface ever since. These retired American national leaders gottogether at Stanford on the 20th anniversary of Reykjavik and began saying "what do wedo now?" They were particularly concerned about the possibility of a terroristnuclear weapon. That's another place where things have changed. It used to be thatcountries built nuclear weapons, countries that were potentially at risk of retaliationif they attack another nuclear power or even a client of a nuclear power. With the endof the Cold War with the spread of nuclear technology it's theoretically now possiblefor a sub-national group-- assuming it can require the necessary quantities of highlyenriched uranium or plutonium, but probably highly enriched uranium, because it's veryhard to make a bomb out of plutonium, it takes a very sophisticated design and it'svery fairly easy to make one with highly enriched uranium-- but if they could acquiresuch material then theoretically they could do the work of, rather simple work ofputting together a weapon. And the effect, as many people have discussed, of even asmall yielding, let's say one kiloton, 1000 tons of TNT equivalent weapon exploding ina major American city would be world scale, economically and in many other ways. Ithink we would probably arm ourselves to the T rather than sit down and say this ismadness. Let's figure out a way out of this. I don't know. So there have been in theyear since the end of the Cold War a number of efforts to figure out how we move on.One of the most interesting was the Canberra Commission that was called together by thePrime Minister of Australia in 1995-1996. An interesting group of internationalfigures of various kinds, members of the Swedish Parliament, the man whose hands arespread here as Richard Butler who is a special Ambassador from Australia for armscontrol and the elimination of nuclear weapons, a very special position and he was theChair of the Canberra Commission. What came out of the commission besides some verygood ideas about how to move toward eliminating nuclear weapons was what Richard callsprobably the most important single thing that the committee did and that was to definewhat he calls the Axiom of Proliferation. To Richard Butler this is the fundamentalfact about the political realities today and in the future, that as long as any statehas nuclear weapons others will seek to require them. When President Obama spoke inPrague in the spring of 2009 he made a statement that could qualify, probablydeliberately qualifies, intentionally qualifies, as a corollary or a restatement, ifyou will, that was if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable thenin some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons isinevitable. So pleasant as it would be to believe that nuclear weapons are off thetable, then all we have to worry about now is North Korea and Iran only one of whichactually has any nuclear weapons at this point. The fact is that so long as nuclearpowers exist in the world, others are going to want to have weapons to protectthemselves against those nuclear powers, indeed the reason the United States in 1940and 1941 and 1942 decided to develop the atomic bomb in the first place if because webelieved with some reason that Nazi Germany was working on a bomb and as one personsaid who worked on the bomb, the prospect of a third Reich ruling the world for athousand years with a nuclear weapon was absolutely at horrid and untenable. Later, ofcourse, we discovered that the Germans had taken a false turn and had not actuallygotten very far at all in working on nuclear weapons, but we didn't know that when webegan. One other thing that Butler, Richard Butler, says about his axiom that appliesto President Obama's corollary is that as a fundamental legal and political right ininternational law for one nation to maintain a nuclear arsenal and demand that othernations either not develop such an arsenal or eliminate the ones that they have issimply beyond the pail. That means that in many ways that the United States and to alesser degree the former Soviet Union, Russia are the worse offenders, not Iran, notNorth Korea, not Libya or Pakistan or India, we are. We maintain the largest arsenalsin the world of nuclear weapons. We are, of course, the good guys. And, indeed, inthe George W. Bush Administration for eight years the theory of nuclear weaponspossession was, it's okay if the good guys have them. It's only wrong for the bad guysto have them which is why the George W. Bush Administration aided India in thedevelopment of its nuclear power capabilities knowing full well that that would add tothe knowledge of the technology necessary to build and make more sophisticated India'sarsenal. Against the idea that you need nuclear weapons to protect you against othercountries, it's an idea that originated in Germany and West Germany in the 1970's underBilly Brandt and his advisor Agon Barr. They were looking at a way to solve thedilemma of a divided Germany and as they thought true this very difficult question theycame to the understanding that it was only with the Soviet Union and not against theSoviet Union as Konrad Adenauer had been that they were going to achieve their goal.Out of that came the idea as it was expressed a few years later by a U.N. commission in1982 of what they called common security. This is that statement that security canonly now be achieved in common, no longer against each other but only with each othershall we be secure. What that meant to them in Europe at the time was that they signeda treaty with the Soviet Union that all the existing borders of the states of Europewould be official and accepted by all the parties which looked to the Russians as ifGermany was agreeing to remain divided permanently. But, in fact, it was the beginningof that discussion and this idea was the beginning of the end of the Soviet occupationor domination of Eastern Europe. The Palma Commission, which was the U. N. Commission Imentioned and which issued a paper on the subject in 1982 called "Common Security",said this: "All states even the most powerful are dependent in the end upon the goodsense of the strait of other nations." Everyone has a shared interest in survival andin the long run they added "no nation can base its security on the insecurity ofothers." These ideas, and I don't know the extent to which Billy Brandt and Agan Barrand others knew this, but these ideas go back originally to Niels Bohr, the Danishphysicist who, when he learned of the American bomb program, thought his way through tothe inevitable conclusions of the development of nuclear weapons. I will come back tohim, let's see, I'll come back to him at the end and what he said, but I just want tomake the point that Bohr saw that when you have an energy source that is essentiallyunlimited, that the whole basis for war which is that one side accumulates moredestructive force than the other in the form traditionally of cannon shells and bombsand bullets and all the rest, that the other side finally capitulates rather than bedestroyed. But if both sides have the capacity to tap the energy and the nucleus ofatoms, millions of times more per gram of material than the chemical energy that hadbeen used for centuries to make weapons of war, you've short circuited the wholeprocess. So when Bohr found his way to-- in fact, let me skip forward to this. WhenBohr found his way to President Roosevelt in 1944 hoping that what he had come tounderstand about this process and these developments would convince the world's threewartime leaders in the west, meaning Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, that rather thango through the incredible expense and danger of a nuclear arms race they should sitdown at the outset and realize that no such race could ever be won, that the onlypossible outcome would be either stalemate or the risk of mutual suicide andessentially the destruction of the human world. Bohr tried to explain that toRoosevelt and Roosevelt was interested. He went to Churchill and Churchill threw himout of his office. Churchill's country was bankrupt by then and the notion, and forChurchill the only way he could see Britain to survive was if it acquired nuclearweapons itself and allied itself with the United States which was, of course, howthings played out. But in the process the arms race that Bohr foresaw coming came andit was only, believe me, by the thinnest of margins that we made our way through theCold War without a Cuban missile crisis erupting to the full extent that it might haveerupted. There were other Cuban missile crises like near misses all the way throughthe Cold War. There was one, for example, in 1983 when President Reagan movedintermediate range nuclear missiles into Europe following the failure of negotiationsto convince the Russians to remove theirs from Eastern Europe. And then we had a largeNATO exercise that fall called "Able Archer" which was going to include a practice runup to nuclear war with the participation of national leaders such as Margaret Thatcherand the Soviets not surprisingly knowing that one way you start a war is to pretendyou're having a war exercise and then go from there. That was the standard way theSoviets started wars. Thought that perhaps the United States was in the process oftrying to set up a first strike against their country and it was only at the lastminute when President Reagan got word of this development and sent word to Moscow, nothat's not what we're doing and stood down the exercise that the Russians backed off alittle bit and that crisis was over. I've talked to people who have reason to know inour government and told them that story or reminded them of that story and they've said"oh there were a lot more events like that than have ever come out." But short of thatBohr saw that nuclear weapons and the huge amounts of energy that were released in theprocess were going to short circuit war, that you simply couldn't fight wars anymore.And I think that's the real message of the last 60 years. The United States wasprepared to lose a war with a small third world country, Vietnam, North Vietnam, ratherthan introduce nuclear weapons and risk a response from the Soviet Union. The SovietUnion was prepared to lose the war in Afghanistan under similar circumstances. Theweapons were not deterrent, if by deterrent you mean something that is of use, theydeterred it, what Washington now likes to call the existential level, meaning theythreatened your very existence and therefore you were careful about when and where youmight use them. But they never deterred in the process of negotiations. In fact, theNorth Vietnamese famously at the Paris Peace Talks told Henry Kissinger "We knew wecould win because we knew you wouldn't use nuclear weapons on us and short of that weknew we could win." And they did. So let me go then to the question of how we mightproceed toward a safer world with nuclear weapons under, at very least, reduced numbersand much greater control. These are steps which I indicate have to some degree in theearlier numbers actually already begun. Securing all nuclear materials, as I saidearlier, you cannot make nuclear weapons without highly enriched uranium or plutonium239. No one else has figured out any other materials that can do that job. Some ofthose materials in the former Soviet Union were dispersed among a lot of laboratoriesunder a system that the Soviets called Guns, Guards, and Gulards. Basically the wholecountry was a prison camp and under those circumstances nobody could get out just asnobody could get in. So they really weren't worried about signing out some highlyenriched uranium to a lab director somewhere in the vast Soviet Union who wanted to dosome experimental work with it because they knew there was no place else it could go.When the walls came down, when the fences came down, when the borders opened suddenlythe former Soviet Union found itself in the same situation we have been in, in thiscountry since the beginning of the nuclear age and before which is open porous borders.So we had devised systems for keeping track of every last gram. Supposedly, we recallthe plutonium factory in Boulder, Colorado which had a bunch of plutonium in the pipesbut that's allowed for and understood as part of the process. In any case, we had areal time accounting system so whenever a piece of material was moved from one place toanother or transformed chemically or whatever was done with it, it was accounted for inthe record. We had systems that protected not only from attacks from the outside butalso thefts from the inside which is something the Soviets had not protected forbecause, again, where would you go? If someone gave you a million dollars in theformer Soviet Union what good would it be? We've been working with the former SovietUnion since 1990 in a process that has cost the United States a very, very wellinvested several billion dollars. It's been slower than it might have been becausepolitics intervene. Most of the contractors were required by Congress to be Americancompanies. You know how all of this goes. But the process has been ongoing and SamNunn, for one, estimates that about 60% of the former Soviet Union's nuclear materialsare now under lock and key. Stage reductions, you know we've been doing that and thatwe're now down with the new Stark Treaty to relatively low number in the thousands, butas you saw from the India-Pakistan graph we really need to be down in the tens at most.It will take a while to get there and both the United States and Russia are nowbeginning to talk about the fact that other countries are going to have to come in, aswell. France has perhaps 300 nuclear weapons, England about 240, Israel anywhere, theestimates are all over the place, but the best estimate is 8,200 and so forth. In theprocess, President Obama has proposed a four year program to secure all the world'snuclear materials within the next four years. That may be ambitious, I don't know, butit's at least under way and people are aware of it and it's the right first step. Thensimultaneously as has been going on, reducing our nuclear arsenals at the same time,and this is farther along than you might guess, a worldwide technologicallysophisticated, unconstrained inspection system. We have a lot of the system in placeas a result of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which has to be policed and therefore thereare all sorts of sensors underwater and on satellites and elsewhere that keep track.We have an underwater sensing system that can track. In fact, this is the test of thesystem to be sure it works right. Fifty pounds of dynamite exploded as far as 1000miles away so the chance of any country cheating on an agreement about eliminatingnuclear weapons is really quite small by the time the whole system is instrumented to afar greater level even than the system we are already building. Nuclear weapon freezones have been one of the ways that a lot of the world has already cleared out anypossibility of a nuclear weapon. I think most recently all of Africa put together atreaty that made it in its entirety a nuclear weapon free zone. Eventually you crowdthem into the corners and then you have to deal with those corners. One of the nicethings about the idea of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East is that it mightallow Israel to eliminate its considerable nuclear arsenal without ever having toacknowledge that it has one. That's actually serious. But then we're left with thehard cases, the two hardest cases I really left out of this list. I think the hardestcase is going to be the United States of America myself and I mean that with deadseriousness. I think we are going to have more trouble agreeing to eliminate our lastnuclear weapon than any other country partly because we seem to be a country thateasily falls into fear, partly because threat inflation and fear mongering is part andparcel of our domestic politics. It's going to be a long time, I think, before thatlast nuclear warhead is disassembled and thrown away. Nevertheless we know that thesecountries have particular problems with their security needs that are going to have tobe addressed by the rest of the world. Butler, Richard Butler proposed the idea thatthere be a Security Council at the U.N. for nuclear matters that doesn't have a veto,which would mean that, of course, no one on the council could prevent a majority fromacting. And then one that I never see anyone talk about but is, in fact, one of thereasons I think we are going to be a hard case. If the rest of the world and weeliminated all of our nuclear weapons we would be proportionally more powerful than weare now because we have such a huge conventional military and conventional weaponsystems. Indeed, the reasons small countries like North Korea and Pakistan and othershave gone nuclear in the past or tried to has been because of their fear of the UnitedStates' conventional force. If Saddam Hussein had indeed developed nuclear weapons,would we have invaded him on the ground twice as we did? I think it highly unlikely.So that has to be resolved and the United States has to be willing to discuss reducingthe level of our conventional forces. There's a chapter in my book, actually twochapters, devoted to the first war with Iraq back in 1991. I was fascinated inthinking about it for this talk to realize that even though as it turns out we thoughtthey had nuclear weapons, this is '91 now not later, we didn't think they had nuclearweapons. George Bush made that up because he didn't want to stop at the border afterclearing them out of Iraq, I mean of Kuwait. He wanted to go on into Iraq and weakenits military but he needed a reason and his reason which was invented was that theIraqis were working on nuclear weapons. We didn't know that at the time. After thewar was over we discovered low and behold they were and it was a very interesting time.When inspectors under United Nations control from the International Atomic EnergyAgency roved all over Iraq with considerable resistance from the Iraqis varying year byyear and found what they had made, what they had hidden, what they were already blowingup out in the desert somewhere and blew up the building, sent all the uranium andmaterials out of the country and basically cleaned the place out. I mentioned thatbecause at some point in time if a country like Iraq resists the world's demand thatthey eliminate their nuclear capabilities as part of a move toward complete eliminationof nuclear weapons, that's the kind of inspection system that will have to be applied.And I think that speaks also to the question of what if someone cheats. I mentionedthat to Richard Butler and he said, "Why the whole world would come down upon such aperson," with a wonderful Australian accent I can't imitate. And he's right itwouldn't be a question if someone cheated and the neighbors around him let him get awaywith it. La, la, la. It would be the whole world would be concerned about anyparticular country that tried to steal a march on the rest of the world. To that pointwhat we're really talking about when we talk about the elimination of nuclear weapons,given the facts that the knowledge is with us and will stay with us as long as wemaintain that knowledge, we're really talking about delayed deterrence. If we decidedtoday that we wanted to make the world a little safer, we could agree with Russia thatboth sides would take the war heads off their missiles and move them into the emptysilo next door and that would mean that it would take about an hour to get the missileready to launch. And you would have an hour instead of six minutes or fifteen minuteswhatever the number is. If you wanted to go a step farther you could take off the warhead and put it in a truck and take it 60 miles down the road and then it might take aday or two. You see where this goes. Ultimately if you eliminated the physicalwarheads, disburse the materials, whatever you need to do by agreement with yourneighbor countries. There's always the possibility of reconstituting a nuclear arsenaland under those circumstances so long as that was secure it really doesn't matterwhether the deterrent works in 30 minutes of three months as long as it's certain. Asthe Acheson-Lilienthal so called Baruch Plan Committee worked out all the way back in1946 at the very beginning of all of this. Ultimately in a world where everyone hasagreed not to build nuclear weapons, attempting to do so as Robert Oppenheimerexplained to Bernard Baruch who said where's your army? How are you going to policethis treaty? Oppenheimer said well if another country tried to cheat that would be anact of war and every other country in the world would essentially be technically thenat war with that country and you might try diplomacy and you might try negotiation andyou might try conventional war which would probably be sufficient, but if all elsefailed you could reconstitute your own nuclear arsenal on your own soil and in the endwe would only be back to where we are now. That's why the notion that it's impossibleto make this happen strikes me as so unrealistic. It's much more realistic to see how,indeed, it is possible. Within the context of the hardest kind of thinking of thedefense department, what do we need to do to make this solid? Not of idealism or anyof those qualities that people seem to think are somewhat less than real even thoughthey drive the world. More recently-- I saw a paper just yesterday by a British scholartalking about the idea of a virtual nuclear arsenal. This is in a way sort of likewhat you would have on the way to zero, but the idea is simply that you get rid of mostof your weapons, everybody does, and you have a few dismantled, stored away somewhere.And then if you need them you can put them back together and do threaten or do whateveryou're going to do with them. So I don't even have to go into detail about that. Itreally was assumed within the context except, of course, it has a different end point.It says we're not going to get rid of nuclear weapons; we're going to keep a few in adisassembled state. This is basically, by the way, the way Pakistan and India maintaintheir nuclear arsenals. I talked with a Pakistani General in Monterey a couple ofyears ago who said, "well you know we don't have first strike capabilities on eitherside, both sides have disassembled war heads, pieces are kept in separate places,partly for security, partly because we don't see any reason to assemble them and havethem ready except in the course of building up to a war." Well, that doesn't soundlike the American theory but that's the way, in fact, India and Pakistan maintain theirarsenals. So it's rather something like this. So, again, it's been tested in the realworld. It isn't simply somebody's idea. I'm going to close out here because I know youwould like to talk and raise some questions. This is Bohr and his comment to Rooseveltin its purest form. It seems so simple. I have spent 30 years thinking about thissentence and what it means and it means everything. It's about the fundamental changethat came to the world when we learned how to release the incredible energies locked inthe nucleus of the atom. That seemed like a table top invention, an experiment, adiscovery. It has led to such enormous changes in human life and in human welfare.Immediately and since 1945 a vast reduction in the number of manmade deaths from war,from a height from 1943 and this has been an almost exponential climb since the 18thcentury as technology was applied to war to a height in 1943 of something like 25million deaths that year. Dropping off abruptly in 1945 to about a million or amillion and a half a year and staying there ever since because of this discovery,because science went about its work of discovering how the world really works ratherthan how we wish it would work. That's where we are and now we're kind of at a crossroad and we have a lot of choices, interesting choices, choices that could lead to avery different world from the one we've lived in. Sometimes this need to make sureeveryone's secure before you eliminate nuclear weapons. Looks to me like the idea thatonce we have world peace you could eliminate nuclear weapons, but, in fact, the two gotogether in a curious way. They ask each other the question of what we need to do tobe secure as a nation and as a people, we and all the other nations and peoples. Ithink we're a long way down that road. I think we're left with very few areas andnations that are still so struggling to find some trivial phrase, comfort zone forthemselves, but you know what I mean. We are struggling to find a place in the worldand a way to express their genius and their talent to fill their needs withoutresorting to war and to violence. Thank You