Speaker 0: MODERATOR: The issue today is Iran and the question couldn't be more straightforward. What do we do? That is a question no doubt that has been asked many, many times in the Western capitals and capitals around the world in the 30 years since the Islamic revolution. But arguably it has never been more urgent then it is right now. This is a country whose politics are in turmoil since the June elections. All of these weird checks and balances in this sort of peculiar system that is being stripped away. You have the supreme leader Ali Khamenei who is no longer [INAUDIBLE] he has come down from the pedestal. He is just another politician now. And because of that, the regime has lost credibility. And maybe because of that, in turn there hasn't really been a cohesive, coherent response to Barack Obama's extended hand. The fist is still clenched whether it is still in anger or just paralysis. We dont know. What we do know is that the latest attempt to bridge the divide this [INAUDIBLE] deal doesn't seem to have gone anywhere. This was a deal where Iran was supposed to have shipped out and got back fuel which would be more difficult to enrich their [INAUDIBLE]. That doesn't seem to have gone anywhere. So now the conversation is once more about sanctions, oil and gas sanctions, energy. There doesn't seem to be a great deal of enthusiasm about those because there are concerns as to who will sign up for them, to what extent they will back fire and to what extent they will be effective. So there is a sense that Western policy making on Iran has been a bit like trying to jiggle a key in a lock. If doesn't seem to be working. We don't know whether to keep on jiggling and hoping to walk away or to use a brute force. And the stakes couldn't be higher. You have the risk of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, the unraveling of the [INAUDIBLE] regime or possibly a military conflict. For example, if Israel tries military action and yet in the face of these risks there's a sense of diplomacy has come to a dead end and people have run out of ideas. But we've got an hour and a half. We've got a room full of very sharp minds and an excellent panel. Ruprecht Polenz is the chairman of the foreign affairs committee. And Murat Mercan is his counter part in Turkey, the chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the Turkish parliament both with a lot of experience in Iran, having been several times, both from interesting countries as far as the debate is concerned, this is how I suggest we do this. We are going to kick off with just a bit of discussion on the floor and then we will open it up to questions. There are always more questions and comments from the floor. There is always more questions and comments than there is time. I suggest we just keep it as brief as we possibly can and as few of speeches as we possibly can. I'm going to kick off with a basic question. Is there anything that we, the international community, the West, whatever, can do about Iran. Is there anything we can do to stop extending of nuclear program? Is there anything we can do it influence the internal politics of Iran? THE HON. RUPRECHT POLENZ: Yes. I think we can do something. We should adjust our approach towards Iran while having realistic goals. We want to have objective guarantees that Iranian nuclear program remains a peaceful one. And this request we want to have objective guarantees was in 2003 transformed in you have to stop enrichment and to suspend enrichment and some of the [INAUDIBLE] understood this suspending enrichment as ending enrichment as an indefinite term. This was in my eyes from the beginning an unrealistic goal but it might be realistic to change this goal. We want to have Iran rectifying the additional protocol and we want to enable the atomic energy agency to control whatever they want and wherever they want in Iran. This has been offered by Iranians until 2004 and 2005. It was not on our agenda so we missed this opportunity and therefore some kind of uncertainty is do to this, in my eyes, failure of negotiating strategy. Second point. We have to stay together. It is one thing which makes really an impact in the Iranian decision making processes, this is if the international community stands together. When India sided West in the beginning of all of this it had a huge impact on the Iranian discussion. And if Russia and China were with us with the sanctions and security counsel this also had an impact. So, yes, if you are considering new sanctions, if the security counsel endorses them it is fine and it will have an impact. If not, it would be otherwise. We should broaden the scope focusing only on the nuclear question: Has [INAUDIBLE] in this country tremendously. Because he could divert attention from his not very successful economic policy and from other shortcomings to this nuclear question. And in the nuclear field, we have to understand that there is a broad consensus within the Iranian society that they should have the right to use nuclear energy for specific purposes including enrichment. The right of enrichment is a phrase that is wide spread by most of the Iranian people. MODERATOR: So you think the international community should give in to that point the attempt to stop enrichment is going nowhere?? THE HON. RUPRECHT POLENZ: I would say we should go a step backwards and say we would like to discuss with you what kind of objective guarantees you give to us that the program remains peaceful. This is also the phrase [INAUDIBLE] used last week when he spoke about additional sanctions. He put it in this context, not of stopping enrichment but having intrusive inspections. But I guess we kept the Russians having intrusive inspections. If we ask Iran to sign according to the additional protocol. Since we are a neighboring?? let me say first that the first country [INAUDIBLE] is my country, Turkey. There is no doubt about that. The international community is the same view. It is agreed upon the objective. But the means of achieving this, of course, the difference of opinion. This is my first point. And the second point is that if there is international decision through UN, United Nations I think all of us will abide by these rules. So those are the two that I will try to make here. However, right from the very beginning I have three options; in fact, the whole world has three options. Either you are going to implement additional policy or authorize the enrichment policy or engagement policy. If, in fact, after [INAUDIBLE] regime was over or the Romania regime took over the country, the rights that they empowered, we would probably not be talking about Irans nuclear ambition so while we are talking about confrontational policy it is pros and cons and we are at the same time [INAUDIBLE] policies. Currently none of them seem to be working very well. It didn't start here Irans ambition. So I think as he said we should probably stay a step ahead and try to engage Iran one way or the other, try to maintain dialogue with Iran, to talk to Iran. And convince him to be more wanting to get into the world community. It's what we are trying to do. Just a few days ago our foreign minister met with regarding this nuclear ambition and whether he can play a stationed role to stop those Uranium. So this track has to be given an opportunity for a while. At the same time the policy, I don't think the international community agreed upon one package, one model. And so that's the case. It won't work. MODERATOR: Your prime minister went to Iran and he said as far as I can say this is for a totally peaceful humanitarian program. Do you agree with that? Now, of course, that has to be a channel with Iranian regime, Iranian government which at least facilitate dialogue. MODERATOR: Do you believe that the Iranian nuclear program is peaceful? What's your belief based on what you know? Based on my experience Iran is far from developing nuclear weapons. MODERATOR: Does it intend to? Intention wise, I'm not quite sure. I'm neutral to say the truth. I'm not quite sure whether Iran really wants to develop nuclear weapons but there is a possibility, I have to say. THE HON. RUPRECHT POLENZ: I think if you look to the parts of the Iranian program and how they developed it I think you come to the conclusion that at least when Sadam Hussein was after the bomb the Iranians had also a military program themselves. Then we had this assessment of the United States security services that they gave up this military program around 2000 something. And in my eyes they have not yet made the decision really to test a nuclear bomb that this might be the goal like Pakistan or India but they do want to have the so called break out capability that they will be able to like Japan and other countries in the world, Brazil, to have the bomb if they think it is necessary. They know pretty well, in my eyes, that if they would arm themselves with a nuclear weapon right now it would not take very long, that neighboring countries in the region would do the same in which way ever, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others and this would diminish Iranian security and not enhance it. Therefore, I think it is in their interest to achieve this kind of break out capability. The questions can be limited. We will discuss it. The other questions can be avoided. This is also due to the discussion right now. But in their eyes they have learned a lesson. They have been put on the axis of evil together with North Korea and Iraq and this might be a wrong misconception, but they saw how the world treated North Korea and how Iraq was treated. And they say it's due to the fact that North Korea has a weapon and therefore they want to be secure not to be attacked because all of this discussion about regime change in the last 30 years made them also feeling very uneasy. So from their perspective, I think it has a military potential but they might be willing to stop on the stage as Japan or maybe other countries who have developed nuclear industries have the abilities but not the weapon. MODERATOR: Let me stop you there. I have a note saying we only have an hour not an hour and half so we are under more pressure to come to a solution. Question on the floor. AUDIENCE: From the British American Information Security counsel. A comment to Mr. Polenz asking Iran to provide assurances that the program is peaceful. The thing is that this is what the IAA has been trying to establish for some years. My question is actually about sanctions, whether the panel thinks that they might not be counter productive, this looks like the way that the UN security counsel might be moving. Counter productive in the sense that the A. the regime could be strengthen, particularly the revolutionary guards; and, B, obviously, that there could be some kind of black market counter to that in a country where the economy is based on the bazaar. MODERATOR: Thanks very much. Now, in my opinion, if there is unanimous decision about the sanction, it might work. But my observation so far is that there hasnt been international agreed sanction program. It is possible that international community would not come to that decision in the coming days. And, in fact, the other side of the story is very straightforward. Sanction in its initial phase always help the regimes to strengthen themselves. I was in Iran just a year ago. I saw with my own eyes the sufferings of the people under the current conditions. But there is no doubt that those sanctions have affected the people but didn't help change the people's mind. MODERATOR: In what way have the sanctions up to now affected the people? Because mostly they have targeted and institutions involved in the nuclear missile program. In what way do you believe the sanctions up to now have had any effect on the people? These are very targeted sanctions. People's daily lives. The gasoline is on [INAUDIBLE]. MODERATOR: But that is a governmental policy. I don't think because Iran is not [INAUDIBLE]. Iran has a long history of state. Iran has its own tradition, has its own culture. So the society, the Iranian society is quite different than other country's society. So in my opinion those sanctions, whatever they are in the form of lack of investment, in the form of lack of consumption goods, whatever they are don't help the loosening of the government. In fact, if you threat regime go on its own course without external pressures from outside??. Okay, I rephrase that. I should say, I think the regime would have been integrated into the international community much earlier. THE HON. RUPRECHT POLENZ: I said that Iran doesn't want to be isolated. And one of the criticisms of the policy of within is that its policy has isolated Iran from the rest of the world. Therefore, I think if the security counsel endorses security sanctions it will be a strong signal that Iran is isolating themselves. Therefore, I am favoring sanctions if the security counsel endorses them. What kind of sanctions this might be, we will see because of the interests are a little bit different with regard to the extension of the sanctions probably. But one remark with control of the EIO; you know that Iran had acted according to the [INAUDIBLE] for awhile. And then the whole thing was put to the security counsel. And in my eyes Iran punished itself saying now okay now the additional protocol is no longer in charge. I think we still can get it and we can know more about what they are doing than we know now. Next question was up here. AUDIENCE: From the German Daily Speaker. I would like to follow up on the sanction question but a slightly different angle. What are the relation between sanctions and protests movement we since the summer? Probably we don't want to hurt with sanction that class which is at the moment driving the uprising. So publicly just as an example would hurt the middle class, that's maybe not a good idea if you don't want to hurt the uprising. Could you a little bit elaborate on this question how sanctions and the protest movement relate generally but also in the timeline? Of course, we all don't know how quick any changes can be achieved in Iran even if the summer events came a little bit surprising to most of us. THE HON. RUPRECHT POLENZ: First, I think the European Union missed to endorse sanctions after the demonstrations were pushed down with violence. We did this in Russia very successfully because we had very targeted sanctions on the president of the university who pushed the students because they participated in demonstrations in or elsewhere and we should have done the same after the Iranian revolution guards and others who were so violent against the demonstrators. So we missed a signal with very targeted sanctions on those who violated human rights, basic human rights saying for quite a while we don't want to see you in Europe. And this would have been a strong message also to the opposition movement and to all of those interested in human rights questions. We did not discuss with Iran human rights because we were focusing so much only on the nuclear question. This was a mistake. And, secondly, I take serious [INAUDIBLE] and others are telling us please don't endorse sanctions which will hurt our people. And so I think either the security counsel should very carefully target the next of sanctions that they cannot be misunderstood, that they send a clear signal. We don't like this kind of policy. We are targeting those who are pursuing this policy but we don't want to take all the people hostage for creating pressure on the government because this will very well not function. And this has also a moral side which is at least disputable. MODERATOR: Let's take another question here. Half way down on this side. AUDIENCE: I understand you are now concentrating mostly on short?term programs connected with this question of Iran and nuclear weapons. But let me be a little bit more proactive. If no agreement is reached and the sanctions possibly even a tougher version of the sanction fail to have any part, other option would be considerate so military action is considered a risky option aimed in denying Iran military capabilities. But U.S. state secretary Hillary Clinton in August hinted that the possibility of extending what she termed, if I remember well, a defense umbrella to a region, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons. This could comply in a sense a defense posture to prevent a nuclear arms race in the region to deal with the reality of a nuclear Iran. I would like to know your view on this eventual possibility. First regarding this opposition in Iran. I don't think that this should interfere internal political discussion debating demonstrations in Iran. That always back fires. I don't think the Western world should support opposition. MODERATOR: Speak out on human rights. You can speak about human rights with no problem. If the impression within Iran is that the West is supportingor whatever and these intelligence agencies are supporting the opposition, the opposition will definitely lose not because of the pressure that will be imposed on them but because they will lose the popularity within the people. Iran has, in my opinion, been a dynamic political and social structure that it will create its opposition within itself. That's my personal view. And on this question of if it comes first and if military action is the only option. I don't want to think about it because military option will never work in Iran. Iran is not a country by itself. Iran has impacted the region especially within the Shiite Belt Region and Iran is at the door steps of Israel and other countries. So military option, if you ask me, will not work in Iran because it didn't work in Iraq, as well. So I'm very hesitant about the military option. MODERATOR: Gentleman in the back. It's coming to you. AUDIENCE: The question for Mr. Polenz following up on Italian friends point. As a member of the chancellor's party, what does she mean when she says, and she has repeatedly, that an Iranian nuclear weapon is unacceptable? Unacceptable, if you look at the position the United States has since it says all options are open to it, all cards are on the table, means as explained to me with some discomfort that this act shall not stand in diplomatic policy. Any diplomats want to challenge that? But I don't get what it means in the mouth of your chancellor. Unacceptable, what in terms of German policy does that signify and how should the Iranians read it and how should German partners read it when you have had so much difficulty going along with sanctions so far? THE HON. RUPRECHT POLENZ: Unacceptable means that we should do everything possible to avoid that Iran becomes a nuclear armed. And, of course, America does not consider Germany attacking Iran militarily because we simply don't have the means. But according to the so called military option Robert Gates made a statement that he thinks that a military strike would only delay the Iranian program for 1 to 3 years. This is what he stated just recently. If this is the result of our toughest means, so to speak, then this is also the benchmark what you can ask a diplomatic solution for, buying time for one to three years. And having the hope that if we are able with diplomatic means to get this time you can get the same use or better use of the time we get to bring Iran on a different path than with a military strike with all the side effects of escalation risks and chain reactions in the region. And this is because I said in my beginning, in my first statement, we have to broaden the scope. We have to tackle all of the reasons, the Iranian reasons which might be behind their program. And in my eyes, there are two. There is one the ambition in the region and second security concerns. And both cannot be tackled from Germany and from the European Union. It can be taken first from the United States and from the neighboring countries in the region. So we need mechanisms to speak with the Iranians but what is behind their program. And this can now start because the American administration has changed 30 years of not talking to the Iranians with the Obama initiative we are willing to talk without preconditions. I think it was over due to do this; and, hopefully, these talks will start. And, secondly, we need some kind of process which includes all of the countries in the region to talk about the security problems. MODERATOR: Let's do some questions today. AUDIENCE: From France. I had a remark on the issue of enrichment and a follow up question on that. The remark is that basically the Iranian enrichment program makes no sense from an economically research perspective. Thousands of institutions running with the British nuclear weapon program started with 16. So I don't really see sort of a middle ground option in terms of allowing a right to enrichment that would constitute research in that. Based on that sanction, I'm not sure the issue is can we improve the offer. Because if we look at the 2006 offer that is now is completely backed by the U.S. it does have the security dimension, the economy dimension. And based on that it seems to me that when you look at the current situation, the question should rather be how can we convince the Iranian leadership to completely change their calls when they actually believe currently that the crisis is the best option for them to stay in power? MODERATOR: Over here. We have another one. MODERATOR: And dealing with the Iran issue for a long time. AUDIENCE: I completely agree with Mr. Polenz that you missed the opportunity to take measures against the protests and Iran being oppressed. But the opportunity to correct that is in three weeks when there will be the next demonstration in Iran. My question is about international community. I think Iran is not that strong but we are weak. And the reason for that is we have different interests. The Russians and the Chinese and even the U.S. have different interests. My question is: when we look to the sanctions we can see that the main reason to them is not to harm Iran but put international community together. My question is what do you think the interests are with the Russians and the Chinese? We have to elaborate and try to keep them together and keep them closer to us to go further with the sanctions? MODERATOR: I will go to someone else on the other side of the aisle and then well go back to the panel. Just down here. AUDIENCE: From France. And well, since 2004 I have been to Iran something like 14 times. And I left there in three days before the presidential election. I would like to make one comment. First, we must not be confused between sanction policy and the situation of the Iranian economies. Because the most important sanction and blow to Iranian economy has been the economy policy of the current president. And, indeed, the sanction aggravates this situation. They don't produce that situation. And the average citizen in Iran is well aware that the economy policy has to change in Iran regardless of the problem of the sanction. That's my point. My second point is that we are talking about Uranium. We've got to address a more important issue which is the level of competence of workers, engineers and scientists in Iran. That's the reason why I do think that we have to consider that now. Iran is a state nuclear on the threshold being capable as you rightly pointed out to decide to go to weapons if it is necessary for security reason or another reason. So my problem and I would like to add your point of view from both of you, my problem today is who has now in Iran, the power to decide, the power to formulate a diplomatic position which is sustainable and which can be a basis for a new dialogue with the P5 plus 1 or even a new bilateral dialogue with the Americans? The problem we have today is that we don't know if the leader has that power. We don't know what is the magnitude of the influence of Mr. Larigani. We don't know what kind of guardians of the revolution are now in power. Who is in charge? MODERATOR: Who is in charge? Start from there and comment as you like from the other questions. THE HON. RUPRECHT POLENZ: Two questions Russia and Chinese interest. Both countries don't want to see another nuclear arm state in the world. And they don't want to see Iran becoming a nuclear arm state. But they have also other interests. Russia, for instance, gets some kind of profit from the present situation because they are also an energy supporter and due to the American sanction, for instances, Iran is not able to explore its energy resources in a way they could do if the country would be settled. And Russia would not like Iran becoming the best ally of United States in the region as it has been until 31 years ago. The Chinese interest is they need energy; and Iran, as far as I know, is the second largest energy distributor to China. And China is now starting to deliver gasoline to Iran which is important if you are discussing sanctions on the gasoline sector because I doubt that the Americans, if they put it unilaterally on Iran, this bill which is now in both the House and the Senate. They will sanction Chinese companies if they continue to deliver gasoline to Iran. To the next question. Who has the power to decide is right. After the elections let's say the support for the regime has fallen less than 30 or 20 percent and we see a split between the military and the clerics and we see rivalries within the regimeand so on. But I would still think that Ahmadinegad is in charge. He is balancing all the groups. It's a very fragile situation at the moment. And this might be one of the reasons why this deal with regard to the research we are told is not accepted and why they are so paranoid with mistrust not to accept this offer. In my view we should do what we can to make this happen even if we change step by step low enriched Iran against in their country because this would be one move forward to build up some kind of mutual trust in this field of the nuclear. MODERATOR: So we should go with their deal and do it in Iran simultaneous transfer? THE HON. RUPRECHT POLENZ: Of course it would have the best if the proposed would have been accepted. But I don't think it is of a disadvantage for us if we would accept an exchange as the Iranians are proposing right now because we should not give them the argument which I read yesterday in the paper that if you are not allowed to buy higher enriched Uranium for our research and we cannot get it, we need for cancer treatment, we need this and therefore we have to the enrich our own to a degree of 9.75 percent which is they are not doing so far. We should not give them this argument. Regarding who makes the final call, it could be Ahmadinejad to a certain extent. However, the only thing that I know is that all of these sticky places and all these disappointments within this society will definitely have impact on their decision making procedure. Whatever the decision they are making right now. If this protest is a deep root in the society, which I believe there is a deep root, they will have to change their strategies, they will be more coming to meet the needs and expectations of the society. Over the long run I think that whoever in power and whoever is making the final call, while they have this ambition of dominating the region at the same time they will have to respond to the needs of the people. So I expect a gradual change within the Iranian ?? I won't say Iranian regime but Iranian government because regime change takes a longer time than we think. One other issue. On this nuclear enrichment ambition, we have to give Iranians an exit strategy that you will keep them at least on board without having to give up everything. So the dialogue with Turkey and Iran should be given in [INAUDIBLE]. In fact, this dialogue may be true in the coming days. We may have to see how this dialogue is developing because they start talking about what kind of mechanism store this enriched uranium but I think it should give it the chance to start. MODERATOR: We are going to go back to questions. We are going to take a quick vote on a couple of questions. Who in the audience believes that ultimately we will have to allow Iran to have some kind of limited enrichment in return for more intrusive inspection? Who believe that ultimately that is what we will have to settle for? Yes? No? Don't know? Who believes that sanctions can be effective? If the right sanctions are used, can stop Iran enrichment? Not very many. Who believes that sanctions will be useless? Many more. Okay. Over to you. AUDIENCE: I hesitated to speak being the third French in a row. My question is to the panelists. Is there a link between the Iran case and the Israel?Palestine case? It is said by Israel that solving the Iran case is kind of a requisite for peace. On the reverse, many others are saying that solving this case might diminish the arguments of Iran. So where are you on those two points or do you think it is absolutely indifferent? MODERATOR: I will take another question. The man in the back with the glasses there. AUDIENCE: I'm interested in the Iranian?North Korea connection. We know for a long time that Iran has bought missiles from North Korea back to the days of the Iran?Iraq war. They have been onsite watching the [INAUDIBLE] launches so clearly there is a flow of information that way. About two years ago, there was a very high level visit by the North Korean Head?of? State to Iran. Now, what is happening with nuclear information? Are the North Korean supplying the Iranians or are the Iranians supplying the North Koreans on nuclear information and how do we deal with that? Are the Iranians taking the same view of the North Koreans with the lessons of Iraq that where not having the weapons of mass destructions is a problem or is it the threat for Israel and can we really solve this problem without talking about the Israelian nuclear program? MODERATOR: And a third question from the lady half way down this row. AUDIENCE: Im with the United Nations association in Canada. And I want to come back to the human rights side and the expectations including upcoming protests about what the leaders are and I heard one of our interpreters say that we have to leave them alone in the West. Of course, there are been expectations of citizens in the West that we have to respond to the protesters and the violent treatment. What are your suggestions around that? MODERATOR: Mr. Polenz, why don't you go first, THE HON. RUPRECHT POLENZ: With regard to Iran and North Korea I don't know about their specific relationship. What you mentioned is also known to me with regard to the missiles program but how they are cooperating and if they are cooperating in the nuclear field, I simply don't know. With regard to Iran and Israel, yes, of course, there is a connection. Iran is playing very well. The most proPalestinian state in the region and using [INAUDIBLE] to interfere in the attempts to reach a solution between Palestinians and Israel. And having done so successfully has created additional pressure on the Arab regimes because they were asked by their population what are you doing to help the Palestinians. And I think this awareness has led to the shift in the Saudi Arabia policy to say for decades it was also for us a convenient situation that we put strict attention to the Palestinian cause if we were criticized. But now Iran is using the Israeli?Palestine conflict to enhance its ambitions of termination in the region. And doing successfully so because the Arab likes [INAUDIBLE] says in his head speeches, for instance. And therefore it is key also to diminish the ambitions of Iran in the region that we see progress with regard to the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. If, for instance, we would come to negotiations again and closer to a solution this would cut down the influence of Hamas and of his and therefore also of Iran. King of Jordan described this strategy as going after the tentacles of Iran and not first to the center, to bring the Iranian ambitions in the region to extend where are the other countries can live with. At the moment they are afraid of what Iran is trying to achieve in the region. Therefore, it is also very important which is not discussed so much in the moment that Obama is successful in stopping, in getting settlement activities stopped because otherwise Saudi Arabia and Egypt who are in the peace camp of stateside have no success, at all to show to their people. MODERATOR: We can go a long time on the Middle East. THE HON. RUPRECHT POLENZ: So you see all the conflict in the region to some extent is linked but because they are so complicated we are used to taking one and not the other (inaudible. I agree. But we have to the region including Israel conflict, Syria, Iraq, Iran. So that with one objective, with one mission to create that part of the world peace and stable. We have to be more creative than we are today instead of creating hatred and sides we might take a different approach. On the human rights side, the reason why I say this is because sometimes support of outsiders to the protest of a country is counter productive. And most of the time it is counter productive especially countries like Iran which have been strong of being a nation. But for that reason, the approach of western community to human rights issue toward Iran should not be different than its approach to Russia or its approach to Saudi Arabia. MODERATOR: Do you think it is different? Sometimes we might have some double standards on those issues. MODERATOR: There is a man waiting very patiently down here but before we bring him on. I am aware that most of the discussion has been very European. I am wondering if anyone wants to stand up in the audience and make the case for military intervention and that it can be effective? Anybody want to stand up and do that? Out to you. AUDIENCE: I will go ahead and ask my question. I'm from Istanbul University. I have a worse case scenario question. By all indications, if the past experience is in regard, we should fail to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons if it is really determined to have them. So the question is what do we suppose Iran will do with these weapons once it has them? What do you think? What do they do? THE HON. RUPRECHT POLENZ: This what if questions are very well known but I don't think they lead us to anything fruitful because I think the Iranian interest to stay where they are now and maybe a little bit further because they would not enhance their security if they would go further. And they are not stupid. And therefore, I know all the nightmare scenarios giving them to terrorist or giving them to or whatsoever, I don't think this is in the Iranian interest. They know pretty well that Israel may even have a second spy capability and there would not be very much left from Iran if they would like to use these weapons. So I don't think that these questions bring us to any wise strategic conclusions. MODERATOR: Can I ask you something? As I understand Germany intelligence believes or has restarted and even took the unusual step of giving evidence in a case, in a court case against an arms smuggler to say that that was the case. Do you share that belief? THE HON. RUPRECHT POLENZ: I said we have, of course, seen many parts of the Iranian program which are only useful if you have the idea to construct all the nuclear weapons. And obviously in the 80s and 90s while they saw themselves threatened by the Iraqi nuclear program, it was a decision to have taken at these times. The question is what they did after Saddam Hussein was toppled and we have the assessment of the secret services of the United States on the one side and we have our brain to read their interests. And I don't see that it makes any sense and we have statements, of course we must not believe them, but what has said in Times Magazine some two or three years ago we should also not forget and put aside as it doesn't matter, we have these from others that the nuclear weapon is unIslammic. We must not believe it but I think it matters at least to some extent that that have that. MODERATOR: We have a few minutes left. Let's do some rapid to people who have not had a chance to speak. AUDIENCE: The point you made earlier about Russian and Chinese economic interests in Iran is true but despite those economic interest both countries were persuaded between 2006 and 2008 to accept five security counsel resolutions including three with economic sanctions. It looks like this year their position on sanctions may have hardened. I wonder if you agree with that; and if so why? MODERATOR: Thanks and the gentleman over there across the way. AUDIENCE: Thank you; Im a member of the German parliament. I wonder if I would put myself into the position of being an Iranian leader how serious I should take this question of the sanctions. First, because we don't seem very much united in that, and secondly would we really be ready to go the final steps? Would you really say if all sanctions were done would we go the military way? I don't think so. How serious do I have to take it? Is it much more likely that if you look into the Iranian society with the demographic problem they have and having more than 2/3 of the population being younger than 30 years and not having the economical development they need to employ all of those people that it may rather be that the society in the best way will see a regime change, a shift in government or in the worst case see an implosion or explosion. What do we do then when we are in that case? Because I don't think this can be in our best interest either? MODERATOR: One last. This man over here behind you. AUDIENCE: I'm wondering whether you have any comments on the prospects for multilateralizing Iran's enrichment program and integrating it into those IAA programs? MODERATOR: So as Russia trying to harden that position with Irans threatened with an explosion and with the IAA multi?lateralizing. THE HON. RUPRECHT POLENZ: Of course multi?lateralizing the Iranian programs is a good idea. They have offered joint interest in the Iranian soil; so far we have not accepted it but we should take this offer into consideration because it would give us a deeper insight in what they are doing and what is to be done in Iran. With regard to additional sanctions, I read who said we want to see Iran moving and we want to have better inspections and in the Washington post he was quoted in this way that he would favor some additional sanctions, probably they would not be as crippling as the state secretary Clinton had in mind. Last remark. I don't think we can force our will up on Iran with regard only to the nuclear question. If we have considered all of our means we have they are not sufficient enough to force our will up on them. And if this is true, we have to look to other means. Therefore, if we broaden the scope and if we analyze that we have areas where Iran has similar interests than we have, for instance, in Afghanistan, Iran wants to see a more or less stable advantage Afghanistan. They hate the Taliban. They are inflicted from the drugs from Afghanistan; they are willing to cooperate with us on this field, with Iraq the same. And in other fields as well then we can change the Iranian attitude towards the region and towards us. It is over due that we start to work on engagement policy not blue eyed and not naive but this is the only way to get a change in Iranian behavior. MODERATOR: Last thoughts. I don't think that you will have come up with healthy and long lasting strategies in response to your question. I think that we still have to deal with Iran with the dialogue and the engagement policy. And Iran to the answer to the question of problems in Palestine, Iran is a country, is a state ??whatever happens internally, I don't think that we have any business to do within internal government. Whatever happens let it happen and we adjust our policies accordingly. MODERATOR: Thanks very much. And that's all the time we have. It seems to me that the dominant thing in here that in a way a battle had been lost, the idea of stopping enrichment. There has to be some new accommodation of Iran that allows limited enrichment for much more intrusive inspections. That seemed to be the majority here but definitely not a consensus. Thank you very much to our panelists.
