Global Transatlanticism: Where the Allies Are

MR. CRAIG KENNEDY: I want to welcome all of you back for the first formal panel of the Halifax International Security Forum. But I want to start by saying I hope the visitors here got a chance to get outside in Halifax today. I think you now understand why they refer to Halifax as the Miami of Canada. It is always sunny. It's always warm here. Christmas Day it's usually 70, balmy. So if you are looking for beach front property this is the place to come. One of the things that we're trying to do with this conference and some other things at GMF is emphasize the idea that the transatlantic community is something bigger than just North America and Europe. It has a set of connections, a set of responsibilities, a set of challenges that go far beyond the Atlantic basin. And so this next panel, Global Transatlanticism: Where the Allies Are is our way of starting to set the stage for that kind of discussion. The term friend is used very casually in conferences of this sort especially when you are introducing someone. In this case, though, I can honestly say that Karl-Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, the Minister of Defense of Germany, is a friend. We have worked closely together ever since he joined the German Bundestag. He has been a frequent visitor to Washington. I don't know how many times you have been to Canada but it is good to get him in the habit of that. And we've asked him as the relatively new Minister of Defense of Germany to set the stage for this panel. And when he finishes we'll have just a brief interlude while we redo the stage just a second and then we'll get to the discussion. So minister, the forum is yours. THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: Thank you very much, Craig. It's a privilege and honor to speak here today or tonight, actually from Germany in a plane to Washington yesterday and we are starting a habit now, Minister Peter not to have stopovers in Canada, but to have visits in Canada regularly. And, Craig, first of all I have to express my gratitude to you for inviting me as [INAUDIBLE] economic minister. It saved my character, actually, to Brussels and as I'm now responsible, ladies and gentlemen, or co-responsible for a Munich conference and as I'm seeing what Craig has established in Brussels and what is now starting here in Halifax, it gives me quite some reason to think, at least. But the Munich conference I think is such a tradition and many traditions can co-exist and this is a very fruitful coexistence as I recall it. We have celebrated in Germany during the last weeks and months as certain occasions. Sixty years of founding the Federal Republic of Germany, 60 years of our constitution, 20 years of the fall of the Berlin Wall. And I would like to take this opportunity here today where I ask to say thank you not only to our American friends, I said thank you in Washington already, but also to our Canadian friends for your support, for your help and also for all the friendship that we have received over the last decades. And it is a good reason to say thank you. Peter, we were very happy that you made it to the celebration and the nights in November this you and that you were in Berlin. And I have just understood the question about the wall, the gentleman over there and just recalling the moments when the presidents and the state leaders specifically also President [INAUDIBLE] where wondering from the east to the west to the Brandenburg Gate shows me, at least, that this wall has been fallen and I think we cannot remind ourselves often enough to that very occasion and have good reasons to celebrate in the year of 2009. Global Transatlanticism: Where the Allies Are. The topic shouldn't be misunderstood as an invitation to build new coalitions of the willing or even worse to replace good old NATO by a new type of OSCE organization. Do we really want this? I don't think so. From a German politician you can quite rightly expect a comprehensive answer, as we like the term comprehensive, and I'll try to fulfill these expectations at least partly. And we'll answer two questions. First the simple and often repeated question: Is NATO still relevant today? And secondly: How do we assess NATOs evolving role? This will include a snapshot of the future working relationship between the alliance and its non alliance partners and its non NATO partners and this will bring me to illustrate my understanding of global transatlanticism. First handedly a misleading term and specifically, or maybe, a misleading term specifically as we hear a lot about at the moment, a lot about transpacificism. That is a very hard word for a German because it is easily translated to transpacificism, which is a bit different. But to have the balance between the two words will be maybe also part of our discussion today. The relevance of the existing alliance is intrinsically linked to its ability to contribute solutions to problems. The old slogan of 90s, 1990s out of area or out of business reflects this insight. How do we translate this in the language of today and where do we stand? Today we face the most challenging security environment probably since the end of the Second World War. Asymmetry is all over and we constantly witness the reality of 21st century threats. My first trip in my new office as German Minister of Defense brought me to Afghanistan also just a week ago, first the troops and then the partners. And we are in the area [INAUDIBLE] of German soldiers are heavily involved in combat operations and we are heavily involved at home to explain that to our public. What I tried to do in the last couple of weeks was finding a new style of explaining that to the German public and we'll see how this turns out in the end. But Afghanistan is not the only but perhaps - and regarding its complexity only one of the most challenging problems of international security. Others may and will follow and the quick look at the agenda of the United Nations Security Council brings more problems to our attention. We have heard a couple of those challenges today already, failed or failing states, fight against piracy or terrorist attacks remind us of unfinished business just to name a few. And it goes without saying that not all of these problems can be dealt within the alliance. If you want to continue to see NATO as the only organization that permits the U.S., Canada and Europe in a legally, mutually binding way then the alliance has to find answers to today's global security dilemmas and underline the word dilemma as well as to our understanding of the consequences of collective security. The Washington Treaty of 1949 enabled the alliance to bring the Cold War to its end and surprisingly might even today serve as strategic guidance when knowing the limits of this viewpoint. But its core values are still valid, face and the principles of the United Nations, I pronounce the term principles, a desire to live in peace with all people and government and the will to work collectively for peace and security in the transatlantic area. Sounds simple. Sounds somehow romantic and sounds maybe archaic, but these principles might explain the attractiveness of the alliance for those who are not members yet and at the same time might underline that there are alternatives to membership. The open door policy, the definition of the relationship of the alliance to Russia to controversial debates on the possible membership of Georgia and the Ukraine and many of those discussions specifically at the GMF Forum are just examples for the clarity on its geographical dimension and the definition of the relationship beyond membership go hand in hand. The lessons of the past can here be helpful, too. NATO established many valuable and mutually beneficial partnerships. They reach from Eastern Europe to the caucuses in Central Asia, include Russia with all difficulties and chances and even the Mediterranean region and gulf countries. A close knit, reliable and mutually beneficial network of partnerships helps addressing the challenges and regrets of the 21st century. NATO's partners of growing importance for the alliance and especially valuable in the times when the alliance own resources are stretched [INAUDIBLE]a prominent example is NATO's submission in Afghanistan where 14 non NATO nations are engaged alongside NATO countries amongst them, for instance, New Zealand and Australia as especially effective and reliable partners. For the moment I would like to concentrate on what we used to call contact countries because so far is the partnership framework which is least developed. The global partner's increasing relevance to the alliance goals and operations and security cooperations should be reflected in the strengthening and institutionalization of our partnership. Flexibility is key here. Don't get me wrong, we must never force ourselves upon our partners. They might want to cooperate with us in some fields but most of them certainly don't want us to permanently settle in their regions. Cooperation must be, of course, mutually beneficial. Ive used the term before. For NATO the advantages could be to first make relationships more reliable and predictable, dialogue within various meeting forums will lead to regulate field share analysis and assert the [INAUDIBLE] Secondly, cooperation will be more effective and efficient. Relying and establishing relationships is much easier to creating ad hoc coalitions. Certainly the alliance would get further support as working with the alliance becomes more attractive, current partners might be motivated to do more, and new partners can be one. Ladies and gentlemen, change is the solution and the transformation of the alliance is a continuous process. The relationship with partners is only one element. The lesson we currently learn in Afghanistan is also of utmost importance. NATO can fulfill its mission only and the relationship between the United Nations and the alliance works in practice. NATO has important capabilities to offer. I only mention the Security Sector Reform which help the United Nations global missions but I underline that a clearer vision of the relationship between NATO and the United Nations in many operations is crucial for a successful outcome and it will probably also help us to avoid discussions about sublevel code [INAUDIBLE] from wherever they may come and whatever they may do. Against this background it is clear that both reforming the United Nations and reforming the internal structures of NATO serves a global transatlanticism. The alliance of tomorrow would no longer be in its political organization a Cold War organization but the waiting stovepipe system of specified committees and bottom out reporting structures has disappeared and new procedures for funding operations have to be developed. I'm mentioning that as someone who hasn't even been in one of those committees and meetings, but I have the impression that it could be like that, ladies and gentlemen. Thus, the alliance would preserve its transatlantic links and respond to the security challenges of today all at the same time hopefully. In other words, global transatlanticism fully in line with an emerging European defense, question mark or a dot, which remains to be a challenge as an incentive for more efficient and effective United Nations as enriched between Europe and America and as a guarantee for the Atlantic alliance as the most successful security alliance not only for the 20th but also the 21st century. Thank you very much. MR. CRAIG KENNEDY: Thank you so much. Now, we're just going to take a second, move the podium out and then we'll get into what for GMF is really the central format for our conferences. For those of you that have been at our Brussels forum you know that we put high emphasis on discussion. We ask our moderators to go to the audience as quickly as possible. So be prepared to ask some good questions. Wow, that was quick. So now it's my pleasure to turn the floor over to the moderator for this session, Pamela Wallin. She is a Senator here in Canada but she's probably best known for her role with CBC news here where she had multiple roles. Most people remember her doing the nightly news for a number of years. And she was also a diplomat in New York shortly after 9/11. So I'm going to turn the stage over to you. MODERATOR: Thank you very much. I'm going to say excuse my back for whoever it is currently turned to because we are going to try to integrate everybody into this as quickly as we can. You know from your books who your participants are. You just heard from the minister, Mr. Guttenberg, Minister of Defense in Germany. We were in Afghanistan at the same time. You probably know that he had a slightly rougher ride than Minister MacKay and I. We didnt quite get shot at. We are glad you are here and alive in one piece. Dr. Ilter Turan, a prominent Turkish academic, Professor in Department of International Relations at Istanbul Bilgi University And we also have with us Mr. Yukio Okamato, I hope Im saying that correctly, a former diplomat with the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, a career diplomat and advisor to the former prime minister, and now a businessman. Also pleased to have a fellow Senator, although across the border, Jeanne Shaheen as a democratic Senator and also Chair of the European Affairs Subcommittee of Foreign Relations. So we have people who care about this issue, who have thought about this issue. Reminds me of the words of Winston Churchill who said the only thing worse than fighting with allies is fighting without them. And I think that that's part of what we've got to discuss when it comes to NATO, to global transatlanticism. We don't want to spend our whole time talking about NATO and Afghanistan in the context of this topic but it is the lens through which we are going to look at some of these issues. And the minister, in particular, has put a challenge out there. I will say to you what I said to a couple of my colleagues privately that when I was involved in looking at Canada's future role in Afghanistan a couple of years back and we met with the UN bureaucracies and we went to NATO headquarters, what was said by many people was NATO, N-A-TO, Not At The Office. That the bureaucracies have become too large, too unresponsive to the kinds of things we're dealing with today: the failing states, the situation that we have in countries like Afghanistan where you need a military operation but you also need to have an ability to create civil structures and government structures. What gives you your optimism, Minister? Do you think it is possible to reform these, to make these organizations relevant and real and responsive? THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: Certainly optimism doesn't come from the fact that we are planning to use the subcommittee [INAUDIBLE] - plannings of such are not enough for optimism. But the fact that it is just within the same timeline as this biggest challenge upon NATO in history probably at the moment, it gives a chance to go and support those necessary steps. I think the discussion I can only report from Germany that has started in the light of, first of all, how we are going to maybe reassess our commitment in Afghanistan, but at the same time, also imprints for a new strategic concept for the conceptual work of next year is at least hardly optimism I just raised. Pessimism is certainly not the right answer. PROF. DR. ILTER TURAN: I share the Ministers feelings but I always feel that when we get to Afghanistan [INAUDIBLE] that if we fail here it is going to be the end of it all. And I think in most other human undertakings and enterprises we don't think of things that way. I mean, If we are not getting what we intended to get done one way we try other things. I think this is the spirit in which we should try to approach this rather than thinking that it is going to be the end of it all. It's a particular challenge and already there is evidence that we are maybe not doing certain things right. I will give you one example. In Afghanistan we are trying to build a working democracy there. What we have ended up with is a fraudulently elected leader which we have to back up now. So we have to constantly phrase what we are trying to achieve and how we should achieve it but certainly not accept it as defeat. MODERATOR: Is it winnable? Senator, I will put it to you in that sense. Many people say there is the capacity, there is the capability. The question is: Do we have the will to do it? THE HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN: I want to back up and address what Dr. Turan said. And that is that I don't think that Afghanistan thought of as a huge challenge for NATO should be the be all and end all of whether NATO continues or not. And so I agree with that. I think I disagree when you say we want to make Afghanistan a working democracy. I think the goal, while we would all love to see that, the goal is to see stability in Afghanistan and the ability of the Afghans to take over their own government and their own security. Obviously that's a huge challenge. It's a challenge that we're debating in the U.S. I know that certainly as you point out in Germany you're debating that. You're debating that here in Canada. The extent to which our publics will support that effort, I think is something that we're still determining. MODERATOR: Minister, do you want to jump in? THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: Two footnotes. I question how helpful it is to constantly talk about a litmus test for NATO when it comes to Afghanistan. I think we have to be - if you talk about a litmus test and it is a litmus test for the international community that may be right but it would be concentrated again and again on NATO. We will have clear difficulties to [INAUDIBLE] within NATO, as well. That's one point. And the second point, I think we have to be absolutely open and frank about deficits in our strategies we have met so far in Afghanistan, for Afghanistan. We have to probably reformulate from time to time whether it was right to dream the dream of a western style democracy in Afghanistan and probably forget at the same time certain cultural elements we probably wont change in the future and just a very brief foot note to what you've said. MODERATOR: I want to go to Mr. Okamato. Let me say there are four people in the room with microphones. One there. One there. One there. We have a fourth and one back there. And when you have a question please indicate. We want to encourage you to participate starting now. We're not going to have a long discussion up here so it's a little awkward for me so I will just keep turning around and if you put your hands up the folks with the microphones will go to you. Comment while we wait for that to happen, Mr. Okamato. The general comment that you would like to respond to here that youve heard. MR. YUKIO OKAMOTO: I'm not very familiar with the works of NATO. So all I can say is that I attended another international security forum in a few months ago. And there the commander of NATO, I believe it was, had to say that what we need to combat pirates is a ship, equipment and an angry captain. And I thought that was a remarkable comment. We have proliferating organizations dealing with the economy. And for Japan it is almost a relieving sensation to be exposed to such word, anger, and NATO is certainly one of the very few organizations where beliefs for security and freedom are the guiding principle. And there may be some [INAUDIBLE] and I think I really hope that NATO will be an example of the organization for reading. The world without [INAUDIBLE] MODERATOR: We've got a question right there. Go ahead. AUDIENCE: Thank you. I would like to ask the question about the role of the New York - MODERATOR: I forgot to say this. Please identify yourself. AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE] I would like to know - we saw in the first European foreign minister last night. How does this fit into the whole pocket of events in terms of the transatlantic relationship? MODERATOR: Do you want to take that, Minister? THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: There's one person that is well known in Frankonia and part of Bavaria that is the international security advisor in E.S. also prime minister and secretary of state in the E.S. and who constantly denies that the sentence comes from him, that we keep quoting him and this is the phone number in Europe to call, Henry Kissinger, I think, denies that he has ever said that sentence. I think a phone number is certainly not enough to bridge the Atlantic as such but it offers chances. And it offers chances for a certain amount of coherence when it comes to formulate the European foreign policy as such. I have had as one of my first experiences in the new office the pleasure to attend a foreign and defense minister's meeting last Monday in Brussels. And I think the modest phrase I can find is still a certain curiosity that introductory remarks came from and but also [INAUDIBLE] - followed by a statement of [INAUDIBLE]. And despite all intellectual substance, introductory remarks, it was time that could have been used much better, actually. And just a very simple example of what amount of coherence with the future policy could be reached. I cannot say anything about the person that has been chosen so far. I met her twice, three times during the last capacity as economics minister. I have not seen her so far in foreign affairs and security community but she will definitely quickly learn. PROF. DR. ILTER TURAN: Just one sentence. There is often confusion to the statement. Europe and European Union are not the same thing. So when you respond to questions it would be better to say European Union rather that Europe. MODERATOR: That is a good point. THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: From the Turkish prospective a good point. Thank you very much. MODERATOR: Go ahead, Senator. THE HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN: As an American watching that choice I was surprised that it was not a higher profile choice. And I just wondered if you wanted to speak to how you think that happened. MODERATOR: Or not. THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: To be very honest I think that the commissioner that has been chosen is high profile because the Commissioner of the European Union is as such high profile. And the only surprise was that it is an experience in foreign affairs is overseeable to a certain extent but a commissioner should always bee seen as such. The discussion within Europe was we would pick someone from the smaller countries to bigger ones. I think the question about influence could be seen in quite a positive way after a while. And I just admire the strategic and tactical elements of the Brits during the last couple of days. MODERATOR: We have a question back there and then a question here. We'll start there. Go ahead. AUDIENCE: I am from Portugal. [INAUDIBLE] is much bigger than Istanbul. MODERATOR: It's Canada. We're very nice. AUDIENCE: And so what I'm trying to ask you is in what lines are you trying to explain NATO in its traditional roles and new roles, in its political and defense dimension and military and nonmilitary dimensions. MODERATOR: Is it both? THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: I wish it is both but it is the military dimension and I think we should find a path to resolve the still existing question to how to provide both and this would be part of the discussion we would be having and we have already the reflection phase, not the strategic [INAUDIBLE] How to describe the role of NATO and the future role of NATO to the German public but only by encountering demonstrators or anybody in front of the door by explaining, first of all, the role that alliance in its most important mission at that time. This is what I have said before. I think it is a matter of communication at the moment, what NATO, for instance is doing in Afghanistan, what the aims are, what the benchmarks are, how the communication lines are functioning, where they are not functioning, talking, as Ive said before, about the deficits, also about the downfalls, talking about the role of such an alliance in the mission. In Germany we had a tendency here during the last couple of years to somehow maybe to not to be open enough regarding this commitment in Afghanistan, our role within NATO and regarding the role of NATO as such. I think we have to significantly change that attitude. MODERATOR: That's one of the issues with all of the caveats, your country included, although you are trying to talk about what your troops are actually doing and you used the word war and you are trying to change the mind that a lot of countries have caveats. Can you have a military alliance if many of the members can't fight? THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: You have to have it and you will still have it. Not only a lot of countries have so-call cavets, all of them actually have it. And the question is whether we still use the term caveat or talk about conditions to send troops. What is the alternative? Not sending troops. Although we have been discussing about caveats and conditions for a couple of years, and I am slowly getting bored in respect of the discussion not about your question here, is even Germany came to the point of being [INAUDIBLE] - for Afghanistan is 4500 and so much about conditions of caveats. AUDIENCE: I'm Congressman [INAUDIBLE] of the United States. And being just old enough to remember that when we stood with NATO for all of those years we stood at a border in which there was no fight. So the test of NATO was there was no war. I guess we passed that test. Now the test of NATO is a war. And during the decades in which NATO was standing at the gap, realistically the only caveat there was, were you willing to stand there and be killed? If the answer was yes you qualified. If the answer was no then you werent part of NATO. I think that is still the caveat ultimately that is not acceptable. If you are engaged you have to obviously be willing to die and every troop there even with all the caveats is in harm's way. Maybe I'm answering your question but Im answering it through an American perspective. Everyone who has come and is willing to be in harms way is, in fact, qualified. But when it comes to the test of NATO for all the decades in which we didn't fight but we stood ready to fight that was the test. Now we're fighting. Is there really an alternative? But particularly for you minister, is there after alternative to every participant demanding there be a definable end and a definable victory so that, in fact, NATO can achieve its goal and leave? Is there any alternative to that or is that ultimately not what the United States needs to set but NATO needs to set in a way in which every participant can tell its home country this is the basis under which we're there and this is when we'll leave and if we have an arrogant, corrupt mayor of Kabul, maybe that is a standard under which if that is not changed we won't stay and we will end? So it is primarily a German question. Senator, I would ask you but I can ask you back home. If you would like to answer I would love to hear it here. My question is: From a German perspective you are in harm's way. You have a large troop. You know that I wont ask you to say it, but there is a corrupt president and you have not been setting the conditions under which NATO will be considered to finish a victory. And up until now our president has been doing it, as our president decides, how will you view NATO and the future of NATO's success by defining what will for Germany be a success and a departure? THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: Thank you very much. I think first significant step to any success is what we now see as a concept [INAUDIBLE] regionalization in Afghanistan that may somehow answer my assessment of what we from time to time get as answers, what kind of answers we get in Kabul. I have specific experience last week as what kind of answers you get and how fast all the deficits will be resolves and how fast corruption will end in Afghanistan. So the first step is regionalization. The second step is how do we get close to a strategy some call, I think, mistakenly an exit strategy because with the exit strategy if you tie that to an end date then you open another discussion nobody would like to see. So the term we have found that I think makes sense is not the exit strategy but the strategy of handover responsibility. And it also describes a process. It is a process which you probably differently shape in different regions in Afghanistan. And what I'm still missing is also from NATO's side is other criteria, how to get to that goal and how to get to that aim. What we have heard just two weeks ago from NATO is that they see possibilities to hand over certain regions in responsibility already next year. Then my next question was how will we do that and what are the criteria. The criterion are not there so this is what we have to work with. But I think this is the - this is also a good strategy to explaining the next steps of the public, for instance, in Germany. If we have certain benchmarks in that regard, criteria we can fulfill, criterion which are much clearer than the ones we have heard so far and we could probably also combine it with certain timelines, but not timelines that define the end but define the start or a certain process then I think we could be more successful. PROF. DR. ILTER TURAN: I will go back to something that I am trying to communicate. The way the Congressman puts it overlooks some of the ways in which NATO was successful initially and what it is facing now. Let us remember the entry was clear. And secondly it is also the case that United States was the only leader. Now we have to work by trying to do a consensus. It is a very different world and we are searching for ways. And these are threats and dangers on which sometimes the nature of which we have different opinions. And when we sort of try to constantly count the argument in terms of failure it is not a good idea. I mean, it brings it. MODERATOR: Question. Go ahead. AUDIENCE: David Coleman from [INAUDIBLE] does it not seem paradoxical that as we talk about NATO's commitment and challenge in Afghanistan we also have powers in the region who have both deep interest in capabilities, for example, India, Russia and China. There has been considerable discussion, for example, of getting India involved with training [INAUDIBLE] manpower material but to hunt elements. The Russian world and Afghanistan is terribly important. It is very difficult to imagine resolution of that situation without the cooperation of mutual powers. Is that a NATO or does that come down to the United States as a major power doing this diplomacy while the rest of NATO sits in power and leaves it to the United States to get the job done? THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: [INAUDIBLE] sitting in the corner because those are things that we are constantly addressing under different umbrellas as well as one of the umbrellas I have been talking about before which is the United Nations. I talked about the difficulties they have with finding coherence between those as well as the umbrella [INAUDIBLE]. The second part talking about regionalization does not mean regionalization within Afghanistan but also taking into account central Asian states. You have mentioned India. I think India is a German discussion underestimated so far as I recall it at the moment. We are talking about India and that also means talking about the possibility of leading [INAUDIBLE] the conflict as quiet as possible and not producing two fronts for Pakistan because Pakistan still remains one of the keys for any stability down there in the region. So we certainly try to find ways to implement those aspects in a strategy not sitting in a corner with NATO but seeing NATO as one element significant to future success in Afghanistan but to [INAUDIBLE] MODERATOR: I think we will ask Senator Shaheen to come in on this because there is an awful lot of pressure, the President saying today he would make his announcement sometime after U.S. Thanksgiving, the end of the month, but a lot of people saying if there are not increased troops, I know you dont like the word surge but if there are not more U.S. troops this isn't going to work. THE HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN: Well, we'll see what the President has to say. And I think it's important to go back and remember that we're actually in Afghanistan because of the threat that was viewed by many NATO members of terrorism and of giving al Qaeda, Afghanistan as a country from which to operate to make attacks not just against the United States but against all of Europe and other parts of the world. And to go to your question about who should be engaged in this diplomacy in a multi-polar world I think that is one of the challenges that NATO is facing, that we are in a global world now where there are threats from not just traditional military threats but terrorism, energy security, cyber security and we need to address those, I think, not just as the traditional transatlantic NATO relationship but we need to address it in a global way and develop partners who are working in other parts of the world. As you say regional partners sometimes, but partners other places. So that should be part of the discussion that we're having as we're talking about developing NATO's strategic concept. How has the mission of NATO changed as the world has changed? MODERATOR: Question there. It's right behind you. AUDIENCE: My name is George [INAUDIBLE] I have a question for the panel. It has to do with expansion, the most [INAUDIBLE] and so that expands this transatlantic relationship and the regions become quite a bit larger. So my question has to do with the effect on capacity and on the relationship itself [INAUDIBLE] What does a continually enlarged NATO mean for that transatlantic relationship? MODERATOR: Who wants to take it on? THE HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN: Well, I think one of the things it has meant is greater stability and greater security. And I think that open door policy continues to be important to NATO. But that also needs to be part of what we look at as we look at this new strategic concept and what its mission is going to be in the future. And I think one of the things that we should be comfortable doing is having an open debate where we engage on some of these questions because clearly one of the challenges that has resulted is one that was referred to earlier and that is that different NATO countries have had to boost resources to put towards Afghanistan, towards the missions of NATO and how we are going to continue to deal with that in the future is, I think, one of the questions we've got to resolve. THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: Just a quick word. It's always good news if we find partners who will comply with the consensus principle. That answers the question the other direction, as well. And I think that also gives us [INAUDIBLE] we need to discuss that very question rather intensely within the new because it gets harder and harder specifically on the sublevel of discussion and other things. That principle is [INAUDIBLE] as it is at the moment. And every new partner who is willing not to be a part of duplication procedures when it comes to capabilities and other things is also very well. AUDIENCE: My name is [INAUDIBLE] member of German Parliament. During the Cold War obviously the center of NATO was of the Washington Treaty. My question is will it remain so even after the Cold War has ended and if so which I think should be true what would we regard as an attack compared with the obviously clear-cut attack during the period of the Cold War? Time has changed. And how will we be able to get a consensus about this is an attack by looking at the attack on Iceland, on Estonia. This could have been regarded as an attack, but we didn't. 9/11 we regarded as an attack and we are still in this stage of the alliance. So I think I wonder what the people up there say we regard as an attack in a time when challenges are so different compared to the time of the Cold War. PROF. DR. ILTER TURAN: You know the assumption that this was very clear under article 5 is, of course up to debate because you often choose to decide what you consider to be an attack. [INAUDIBLE] So I think the same is going to continue with regard to the new contingencies that we encounter. We will evaluate them and decide which we consider to be so challenging that we that requires a sort of unified action. And so an attack is, in fact, so precisely defined as you aspire to you turn to strategy of unpredictability. We will continue the same way, I think. MODERATOR: We have a question up here. THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: Could I just for a second? [INAUDIBLE] Well, we have to leave the question for the academic but I am not quite sure that we are not so [INAUDIBLE] but it will be as I recall it at the moment it is one of those discussions that are being led right now also in the group that is forming the new concept. The second point is it really brings us to the question we have discussed again and again during the last couple of years is how to deal with those asymmetries [INAUDIBLE] and the energy question is all of the things we have debated in context of what has happened between Russia and the Ukraine. Are we getting closer to article 5? I think the key message has to be article 5 has to remain the core element. And I think we have to agree with that. THE HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN: I agree with that. Ill be short. AUDIENCE: One of the areas that people have looked at was closely security policy and your personality and your background triggers importantly there that changes may come from your thinking and your work. One of the questions for - you use the word multi-polar world about three times in asking you a question a little bit earlier. I notice that you didn't accept or disagree with him on whether the world is multi-polar or not. About two weeks ago Mary Anne Slaughter who is director of policy and planning in the state department said she very strongly disagreed with the use of the word multipolar. The United States does not agree that there is a multi-polar world. She sees a multi-lateral world and I wanted to ask you where you came down on that rather significant from the [INAUDIBLE] MODERATOR: Can I ask people to wait until you are recognized because we are having a hard time hearing the microphones? We have people all over the room. THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: First of all it is not about a [INAUDIBLE] any longer. And the question is whether you can agree when someone says we are living in a multi-lateral world because my description of or my definition of multi-lateral is tightly linked to, for instance, institutional thinking. There I would tie the word to multi-lateral. Multi-polarity would mean that in my understanding that I define significant form of such who could be defined. And I think in a world that is in constant change at the moment where we see volatile movements of certain developments I am very careful with this very academic discussion and this is the reason why I am not correcting nor approving to any attempts of defining multi-polarity or multi-lateralism. I wonder whether we come to a solution of any of those questions if we agree with multi-polarity or multi-lateral. MODERATOR: Go ahead. AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE] I would like to come back to the question of regional approach in Afghanistan and I was just by your comment, Mr. Guttenberg that NATO has not established criteria how we define a status that you can hand over security in the province. I ask the question of the United States Minister of Defense just making this assessment province by province that we don't have a national approach to the whole country of Afghanistan but a province by province approach that might lead to very different answers and replies to the regional situation. So this reminds me a little bit of the strategy to get out of Iraq. That is the question to Senator Shaheen. Is that the example of how to deal with Afghanistan and the exit strategy approach and then province by province approach and then handover? Yes or no? And Minister Gutenberg if you think NATO [INAUDIBLE] but can you tell us about after your visit what would be your assessment or what would be your criteria or what to handover at a certain time and your personal criteria to handover security [INAUDIBLE] MODERATOR: Thank you. THE HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN: I want to answer his question. I'm only being slightly facetious because I think, in fact, that has been one of the challenges in Afghanistan that part of the mission has been the challenge of coordinating NATO forces in a way that needs some work, frankly. And something that hopefully will again be addressed as we look at how we are going to enter these joint defense missions in the future with NATO. I was in Afghanistan in May and had the opportunity to visit the RC south region where Canada was taking the lead and doing a wonderful job just as we heard that the various provincial reconstruction teams were doing throughout the country. But one thing that was clear is that there wasn't a pattern or a similar standard for how each was operating. And so it was very much depending upon how each team decided to handle the situation. And I think as we're looking at NATO missions in the future we've got to address that. With respect to the U.S. and whether we're going to look at province by province I think that's part of what we're looking for the President to announce as part of his new strategy in Afghanistan. So I wouldn't presume to preempt what he's going to say. THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: And I still don't know whether we can comply with that strategy because we have to see how it will turn out. Asking me what are my criteria for handover responsibility, simplistic terms I would say stability but that would be too easy. It is to a certain extent successful training and as we keep repeating training, training, training is one of the key elements to get to success there. It is part of it. Successful training means at the end of the day the ability of the Afghans in the region together with any sense of a responsible government, but specifically in the region to take the responsibility for the security in the region. And that's I think a very significant part of any - a very significant criteria. Others we are working on in the moment. The question is and this is probably the difficulty of the moment, as well: At what time can we say that they're responsible enough to take over this responsibility? And do we have to watch that for the next 5 to 10 years to come? Do we have to stay next to them? Is there a possibility that others could take over the power in the region again and probably not only the good guys? I think the history of Afghanistan tells us that this is always a possibility and now you can say this is close to cynicism what I'm saying here but I think we have to leave that discussion here, as well. MODERATOR: I'm wondering if we can go a little broader and hear from Mr. Okamato and also from Dr. Turan. You sit here and listen to this discussion and the focus on everything from how do we define success or exit strategy or what will the President do and at the outset it is very much the mission in Afghanistan and the role of NATO is kind of the lens through which we are looking at this, but how do you see? I mean, we see incremental increases in commitment to global defense and security from Japan. Youve got your own restrictions in your own country, but youre moving forward. Youre becoming a player. How do you see it from someone who is looking at the discussion between Europe, America, North America, how do you see it from your vantage? MR. YUKIO OKAMOTO: I have been sitting here being afraid that I was going to be the first panelist without speaking any words so thank you very much for the question. You know, Japan is going to unfortunately withdraw our fleets from the Indian Ocean. One of the reasons is that there has been decreasing demand to our [INAUDIBLE] services. I regret that personally but that is going to be the case. Instead we are going to contribute 5 billion U.S. dollars to Afghanistan over 5 years such as to pay for the salary of policemen and we have already created 550 schools in Afghanistan and so forth. Of course, [INAUDIBLE] nothing compared to what, of course the United States, U.K. sacrificing. But one thing I want to say in terms of who should be responsible for expanding the cooperation to non NATO members. We have been basing our decisions mainly on the conversation with the United States or on the military ally but that also has been sending a signal to the Japanese people. Of course we have to listen to the United States since this is a war they started and so forth. So in addition to that whatever NATO has to appeal to Japan will generalize and widen the plateau of our discussion why we should really participate in Afghanistan because NATO is an organization we represent. So at least be seen by the [INAUDIBLE] public representing our wider political value transcending a national interest. So I really hope that there will be more dialogue between NATO and other non NATO members in this regard. MODERATOR: And from your perspective when you're dealing with issues that are in your backyard, Taiwan, Korea, in this world of global transatlanticism and back to that point about what constitutes a threat and when do people rally and come, is it working for you? MR. YUKIO OKAMOTO: I think so. Global security is really indivisible. Just take an example. North Korea is developing a nuclear arsenal. [INAUDIBLE] They to possess an [INAUDIBLE] capable of hitting California. But if shot westbound it will hit central Europe, not to speak of nuclear weapons of China which is capable of covering the entire globe except for some parts in southern South America and Africa, the military expansion in the East Asian countries really is something we have to take as a common threat and transcending as Secretary Gates spoke of earlier we have a wider agenda outside of military cooperation for which Japan and other east Asian economies have potential to contribute. MODERATOR: And Dr. Turan and just the separate point, the Muslim country and the role, we just had Secretary of State Hillary Clinton saying you are going to be an important actor on the stage. They want your participation in the Middle East. At what price? PROF. DR. ILTER TURAN: Actually, you pointed that that Turkey was a Muslim country. I would like to say that it is a country whose population is mainly Muslim. MODERATOR: Fair enough. PROF. DR. ILTER TURAN: I think the distinction is rather important. Of course, as indication of all NATO members, specific members have their specific areas of interest and I think it is to the help of the organization to rely on the skills and the connections and the resources of individual members to help address problems that are of concern to the alliance in general. I mean, this is a good thing. From that perspective one has to recognize that in this redefinition of the problems NATO is encountering many of those that are now identified are much more linked with Turkey than with Germany. In the old days Germany was the [INAUDIBLE] - now it seems Turkey is sort of taking the place of Germany in the alliance that most of the threats that are allegedly coming toward the alliance somehow are at the Turkish origin. It is drug trade and arms smuggling. And our neighbor is presumably trying to develop a weapon of mass destruction. Essentially I think when we are reorienting NATO's strategic considerations this is to be kept in mind. And from that perspective it is important to recognize that individual members have particular contributions to make and they should be encouraged. This means, among other things, NATO should do a bit of in-house problem solving. There are outstanding problems within NATO and we should not ignore them. In fact, [INAUDIBLE] and I said there should be no confusion in Europe and the European Union. And there are other problems. We have to have a clear understanding of expansion. I think we have to move along and incorporate these new countries into our network. And we have to find new ways of dealing - for lack of a better word, like formula for coalition of the willing to have their specific problems but not necessarily stimulate good feelings. Using it as a descriptive term, maybe. So these are the things we have to do. And let me say one other thing, sort of global transnationalism is maybe a word that would [INAUDIBLE] or transatlanticism would undermine atlanticism all together. You have to recognize that different parts of the world and the community broadly defined as one. So rather than talking about global transatlanticism, global cooperation being the transatlantic allies and others might be a better way of putting it. MODERATOR: Go ahead, please. AUDIENCE: I am member of Ukrainian Parliament. I enjoy very much the comments of all four panelists. I would like to say that nobody transatlantic unity, a transatlantic link then the key members of this transatlantic link in not so long ago. But my comments is to minister. Minister, you refer to controversial debates over Ukraine and Georgia membership. And I would like to say I'm not talking about Georgia but about Ukraine is which is to all NATO operations [INAUDIBLE]. Ukraine is inseparable of transatlantic. So my question is: Is this change in the position of the newly formed government of Germany because back in 2006 German government supported providing Ukraine membership action plan and last year the government of Germany and the chancellor [INAUDIBLE] was one of the author of the phrase that Ukraine and Georgia will be members of NATO. Is this because of Russia? Thank you. THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: It is certainly not because of Russia and we have debated again and again about the question whether we could allow Russia [INAUDIBLE] yes or no. I think we have made it absolutely clear that we cannot allow Russia outside of NATO a leader. We have to decide ourselves within NATO. And we have to make our decisions within NATO again and again what criteria have to be fulfilled to become a member. And this phrase that has been found is one phrase that is surprisingly far reaching for some and for some it is not far reaching enough. I think that phrase is still a remarkable one for the Ukraine and for Georgia. And the amount of homework which is ahead of us is a question I cannot simply give back to the Ukraine, probably to Georgia, as well. It means that we all have an interest, that members of -- potential members or those that come into the process of accessing NATO have the stability to be a stable factor within NATO, as well. And what I would also like to see is still a certain amount of approval within the population of those countries seeking membership. And this is a question I cannot answer at the moment, but the last answer Ive gotten so far was that the amount of [INAUDIBLE] within Ukraine was at least limited still when it comes to NATO membership. MODERATOR: Go ahead. Sorry. I thought you had a microphone there. AUDIENCE: International affairs, Rome. The problem of the coalition of [INAUDIBLE] includes an interesting commitment to discussing with Washington the future of U.S. nuclear weapons. THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: Wrong party of the panel here. AUDIENCE: Other countries may be interested in this discussion, not only the outcome but also the process. My question is: Would you consider involving other countries in this discussion especially by using the NATO [INAUDIBLE]? THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: Certainly yes. And my understanding of that very interesting phrase in the coalition treaty. My hint to those who have not read the coalition treaty yet is just don't read it. But my reading of the sentence is and this is my understanding and this is the understanding of the new German government that the question about American nukes on German soil and German ground, whether there are any, a question mark behind there, has to be discussed and resolved within NATO and with the - within the alliance and not unilaterally but bilaterally. And this is actually just a clear answer. And I have understood our foreign minister just the same way when he was in Washington just two weeks ago he addressed that quite clearly and [INAUDIBLE] MODERATOR: Gentleman here and then the gentleman there. AUDIENCE: Director of [INAUDIBLE] Paris, France. My question is very close to the previous one which is: Given the nature of the new threats that you have all identified, what is -and given also the President Obama position in his speech in Prague about demolishing the role of nuclear weapons, I'm not suggesting suppressing nuclear weapons. But from your perspective, from Germany, from Turkey, given the problem of Iran, what is today and for the coming years the relevance of nuclear weapons? And my question also goes to Mr. Okamato because depending on the way the NATO alliance will consider in the future the relevance of nuclear weapons it will have an impact on other regions, especially in the case of Japan. Thank you. MR. YUKIO OKAMOTO: [INAUDIBLE] To hear Mr. Obama's speech. Japan, of course, has a very peculiar experience. So the world without nuclear weapons is our ultimate goal, of course. But we realize that there are some intermediate steps to be taken. And for Japan the public is here to recognize that certain priorities have to be introduced in abolishing nuclear weapons eventually. Of course, we have to start with preventing new acquirers. And then we have to ideally go back to NPT and eliminating those people who acquired nuclear weapons in violation of the NPT. And for that the United States action on North Korea is going to be a decisive landmark. If the United States would allow ninth member of nuclear club which is North Korea after the 5, India, Pakistan, Israel and to try to set an absolute demarcation line between ninth and tenth which is Iran, that will not be a very convincing argument. And so the United States seemingly generous [INAUDIBLE] approach to North Korea's already acquired nuclear weapons is a big concern for Japan. Whatever the most important thing is for the United States really to stick to the principle you once set and not deviate because of your experiences. MODERATOR: Senator, do you want to comment? THE HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN: Well, I think your point that the first priority ought to be to try to keep those countries who don't have nuclear weapons from getting them. That is why there was so much focus on North Korea, why there is so much focus on Iran and how important it is for the international community to get together in helping to make sure that we can avoid a nuclear armed Iran. Obviously, North Korea it is a little late for that at this point but to continue to work with North Korea to eliminate their nuclear weapons I think is going to be important and a commitment that the United States has. MODERATOR: Dr. Turan, everybody is looking to Turkey. PROF. DR. ILTER TURAN: Of course, Turkey is disturbed by the fact that some neighbors may be in the process of developing nuclear weapons although the evidence so far does not confirm that that is the case. Turkey at the same time is puzzled by the fact that it seems all right for some countries to have it and not all right for other countries to have them. I think there is a comprehensive program to denuclearize countries that already have these weapons. These weapons are going to proliferate whether we like it or not. You know the dangers are for countries that have these nuclear weapons, not the United States, not Britain, not France, but some others, to get to a point of using them in the process of trying to prevent others from getting them. And that is a highly problematic situation. But the problem - I mean, if I may reflect the discussion and debate in the Turkish public - is that there is a - it has sort of taken naturally there are some countries have developed nuclear weapons, I don't mean the original possessors, but latecomers. The United States have India, Pakistan, Israel everyone knows has it. [INAUDIBLE] So the credibility that - so there is a comprehensive and persistent effort to prevent proliferation is not found to be particularly correct. THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: I think we have moved away a bit from the question from the gentleman over there. The question was on Obama's speech in Prague and whether we all share his vision. I think we all share the dream and we all probably share the aim of the nuclear - I think we are in the process here and the process still means for me that, for instance, NATO still has [INAUDIBLE] but also the terrorist measures and at least within the process and talking about the process at the moment most principles still count in my [INAUDIBLE]. Within this maybe just to add a little footnote what I said before to the question of possible nukes on German ground wherever they may be is just what will be the possible result out of removing them from there. And then we get close to [INAUDIBLE] NATO because I would like to see a Polish or a Czech answer but such a movement. I would also like to see the Turkish reaction when it comes to such a movement. And so it still remains I think part of the over all philosophy. I hope that we come closer to solutions now when it comes to redefining start. I think those are necessary steps and other things that have been started now when it comes to disarmament. In that regard I think we still have to count on deterrents also with [INAUDIBLE] - MODERATOR: Final question there. AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE] Turkish Parliament. As the Senator stated, the object is to reach peace and stability in all the conflict areas. However, the transatlantic alliance has failed to get the solution in not all of Pakistan but in many other regions whether it be [INAUDIBLE] or it be the corpuses. The best that we can achieve is maybe cease fire in [INAUDIBLE] and not the solution. So all of these problems and conflict areas we have failed to reach peace and stability, dont you think that we should rethink transatlantic alliances whether it be the United Nations or NATO or [INAUDIBLE]? Thank you very much? THE HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN: Well, as I said we don't have said - MODERATOR: We don't have time for everybody so we will go to the Senator. THE HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN: As I said I think what we have now is an opportunity for the first time in ten years since we looked at the strategic concept for NATO to revisit what its mission is going to be going forward. And I still think that is at its core security. It has been as has been pointed out on multiple occasions this afternoon, the premier alliance in the world. But the question is: are there other ways in which NATO should engage not just in missions in the [INAUDIBLE], for example, is there a stronger civilian component to that that we ought to be looking at? Is there more coordination of the mission that we ought to be looking at? But also in other parts of the world, how is NATO going to partner going forward with organizations like OSCE, like the United Nations, like the EU, like other global alliances or other alliances in Africa and Asia? So I think those are all questions that hopefully we're going to have a discussion about and find some resolution. MODERATOR: Final quick point. AUDIENCE: I am a non expert. I am a judge in the American Supreme Court. I was encouraged to ask this. Particularly Mr. Yukio Okamato and the defense minister and the Senator - you have just spoken to two problems, Korea and China, major problems, certainly for Japan. What does NATO going to concretely and how much do they have a significant role to helping Japan in dealing with the problems. Same question in respect to the Arab role, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel. What does NATO have and to what will concretely NATO contribute of significance to them. And to the other two I just leave the remaining part which is obvious if you listen to this that NATO has an enormous role in respect to Eastern Europe but what does NATO do beyond that as concretely as possible? MODERATOR: I think we should end with this point which is ending where we began which is: is NATO the answer to the problems that you have laid out? Or as the Senator most recently suggested that we will have coalitions of the willing including NATO to answer the concerns some of which we might not even yet imagine. So why don't we have a quick concluding thought from each of you? MR. YUKIO OKAMOTO: North Korea I think it is predominantly the American rule especially within the [INAUDIBLE]. But China NATO's influence is utterly important to alleviate them from their insecurity conflicts, tell them that no further military [INAUDIBLE] is necessary and to tell them that it is the international consensus to make their defense policy transparent. PROF. DR. ILTER TURAN: The question requires lots of time to answer. MODERATOR: We don't have time. PROF. DR. ILTER TURAN: I have to be brief. Let me just say that there are quite a number of problems surrounding Turkey. Some of them NATO has taken an interest in and some of them have not been treated as NATO matters. Sometimes it is better not to treat all problems as NATO matters because sometimes they may turn out to be more [INAUDIBLE] but the major purpose is NATO is to achieve some kind of predictable, peaceful environment of human rights where people can enjoy some prosperity. So I think NATO countries have many opportunities is a community to cooperate outside of NATO as well as to get things done. So I think we should not sort of rely on NATO for everything but also try to devise other channels so that we don't reach to NATO by giving it too many responsibilities and then say it is unable to do. MODERATOR: Too many opportunities for failure. Senator? THE HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN: Well, I think NATO is going to continue to be a very important part of not just the transatlantic relationship but transatlantic globalism as we have said on this panel but it is not going to be able to do everything. But to your point the specific kinds of commitments that we have seen that I think will continue are obviously continuing to look at conflict areas and what is a threat and continue to address security, to look at things like the earthquake and Pakistan, natural disasters where it is important for NATO to take a role in helping to provide assistance to people. So I think all of that is going to be important but we've got to clearly redefine what its future is going to be. MODERATOR: Final thought. THE HON. KARL-THEODOR FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG: Many of the structures of NATO still reflect the observations, realities. [INAUDIBLE] how to construct [INAUDIBLE] and kind of result in securities to the question all over the world. But there is a redefinition in reality already but certainly not in structures. MODERATOR: Ladies and gentlemen, please thank your stellar panel. MR. CRAIG KENNEDY: I want to thank our stellar host. Thank you so much.