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Paul Wolfowitz, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, agrees with the assertion that the biggest mistake the United States made in the Iraq war was maintaining an occupation government for over a year, missing the opportunity to empower Iraqi authority immediately after major combat ended.
Douglas Feith, author of War and Decision, reveals that even though Saddam Hussein did not have active stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, he had a dormant weapons program that could have manufactured the stockpiles within weeks. All the while, he maintained to the world that he did have a stockpile of weapons.
Dan Senor, former advisor to the Presidential Envoy in Iraq, names the biggest mistake in Iraq as the lack of a counterinsurgency strategy, which left the Iraqis without security and protection.