Stephen Krasner discusses Failed States and the American National Security.
This event was part of the Hoover Institution's Fall Retreat 2007.
Stephen Krasner is an international relations professor at Stanford University and is the former Director of Policy Planning at the United States Department of State, a position he held from 2005 until April 2007 while on leave from Stanford.
Mr. Krasner's reply to the last question of "why can't we live and let live?" is very telling of his political bias in favor of US hegemony. He paints a picture of the USA being attacked by terrorists as if there is absolutly no context to the attacks. This is the fundamental problem of academics in so-called "think tanks" who refuse to think beyond hteir preconceived assumptions. Krasner's assertion that there is a direct line of terroist aim from Beruit to 9/11 is ludicrious because he pretends that the USA was and is sinless throughout the process. The primary sin of course is that we did not "live and let live" or follow "the golden rule" of doing as we would be done by. So Krasner's argument boils down to saying a "live and let live" policy doesn't work because when we havn't lived and let live they attacked us. That type of circular thinking is the best we can get from university academics in internationally recoognized conservative think tanks? Give a break!
That opening quote on encouraging democratic states throughout the world as the way to provide enduring national security is a laudable goal, but to hear that it came from a Bush national strategy plan shows that it is the empty rhetoric of neo-cons. Clearly the Republican and Democrat rulers in Washington (with the half-way exception of the Carter administration) haven't given human rights and democracy any real role in foreign policy.
Krassner's adoption of the three types of modern states: modern, post-modern, and pre-modern has some snalytical charm. But the category of "pre-modern" states is not homogeneous and can lead to misperceptions of both security and threats to security.
Krasner makes some good observations about the inconsistency of the case-by-case calculated responses to situational "bads" such as humanitarian crises occuring in other nations, but he doesn't provide much of an evaluation of that proplem of situationalism.
Krasner focuses on so-called "transnational terrorism", WMD's and potential oil crashesor cut-offs. His observation that "religion and politics is a very bad thing" is spot-on, but he fails to point out how the Bush administration is the world's most threatening source of this nexus of religion and politics.
He says the scenario of viewing scarce oil as a "world resources" to be managed for international access would be a new response. This view is misleading because what is going on now is doing exactly that with a transnational cont rol of oil using sattelite nations as surogates. The only question when the surrogate collapses would be how to rebuild the managerial structure, not the surogate nature of the current management system. In orher words, academics like Krasner put forward these types of speeches in which they present a misleading picture of the current conditions of AMerican foreign policy as if our foreign policy is what it claims to be, rather than analyze our current foreign policy based on what it is.
Saying that there are no formulas for how to support developing democracies is another example of a failed premise. In fact there is a formula, not for other countries with their unique concitions, but for us with our institutional conditions.Currently the formula is to treat all countries iwth duplicity and power in order to maintain our US hegemnony, and the alternative formula would be to treat developing countries openly, fairly, and honestly. But this is the last thing that foreign policy "experts" will consider. Instead, we base USA foreign policy almost entirely on subtrefuge, manipulation, and pressure directed at issues that do not encourge democracy at all, only cooperation with US hegemony. There is not one state, modern or per-modern, with which the USA deals where encouraging democracy trumps the self-perceived "national interests" of the USA. We only encourage democracy to the extent that the leadership of that country will support the USA. IF it doesn't, then we do what we can to undermine the democracy in ways that we would never tollerate another country doing to us. So, basically the preferred alternative formula for today's foreign policy would most simply be stated as following "the golden rule." But this is something that no amount of restructuring of civil-military resources will touch. Since Krasner's main object in this speech is argue for rebalancing "state-building" from military budgets to state department budgets, because he doesn't address any aspect of what makes "democracy building" succeed or fail, overall this speech is pretty worthless.
To introduce our next speaker Hoover senior fellow Stephen Krasner. Steve is also a professor ofInternational Relations at Stanford as well as the senior fellow at the Freeman-Spogli institute. From2004 to 2006 Steve served as director of policy and planning at the US state department. He is theholder of PhD in political science from Harvard. He is the fellow of the American academy of arts andsciences and his research interest include market failure and distributional conflict in internationalpolitical economy as well as the historical practices of sovereignty. He is a member of thetask force on national security and law at Hoover and may join other task forces as well. Steve'stopic this morning is titled 'Failed States and American National Security'. So please welcome Steve Krasner.Thanks for that very nice introduction, you know one of my goals in life for those of you that were hereyesterday is to get as many titles as Dave Brady has. I am still working on and haven't succeededyet on becoming a lower pessimistic but I figure I have a couple of years to go. I know that - I do know that, I have knownthat for a long time, the quote in front of you, let me read it "In the world today the fundamentalcharacter of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them the goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic well governed states that can meet the needs of theircitizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provideenduring security for the American people" this is a quote from the national security strategy of 2006the less famous of the two Bush national security strategies - not the preemption prevention nationalsecurity strategy but the one that followed it. I think this is an objective which is unassailable and it'san idea which we all ought to aspire to. The major challenge of American foreign policy now and Ithink in the foreseeable future will be how do we get from here to there and all of the ambiguity,uncertainty debate that we have had I think has been related not to what the ultimate goal of our policyshould be but rather to how we actually implement that policy. Yesterday when Daniel Alfredssonspoke, he basically said "prevention was wrong and we ought to go to a policy of retaliation" point ofthe message of the talk I am going to give today is that retaliation is not enough. And if you - I want tostart this discussion at a kind of stratospheric level, discuss the nature of the international system as it'scoming to being at the beginning of the 21st century and end the discussion at a much more specificlevel in terms of what the united states government needs to do not only with regard to its thinkingabout what its foreign policy ought to be but how it ought to organize itself.So this begin sort of a 50,000 feet and end someplace inside the beltway. If you look at thatcontemporary global system, one way of thinking about it is this and this is from a kind of - a mappingout that was developed by Robert Cooper who is the chief foreign policy advisor of Solana, who isbasically the European Union foreign minister. There are really three kinds of states in thecontemporary environment. There are set of states which Robert Cooper called the modern world about85 countries, there are 30 plus countries that he called the post modern world and there are somethinglike 37 to 73 countries which Cooper referred to as a pre-modern world. What's the distinction here?The modern world, the set of 85 countries that are about 200 countries altogether are basically statesthat we can think of as conventional sovereigns, these are states that are internationally recognized inthe international system, there are states that effectively govern more or less within their own domesticboundaries and there are states that are autonomists, they have what is conventionally what lawyerswould refer to as Westphalian sovereignty. They are states which are autonomists, they are notbeholden to any external actors. The United States is the prime example of a conventionally sovereignmodern state it's certainly got its own sovereign prerogatives, it's leading accurate in theinternational environment and it's actually willing to engage on kind of transgressing on the sovereignprerogatives of other states, when it sees it as being in its interest to do so.It's not the only state like this so obviously China has been very explicit about the prerogatives ofsovereignty has made nine intervention in the internal affairs of other states, one of the - now one of thebut the kind of tag line of its foreign policy - is very explicit about not having other states inference onChina's prerogatives. Russia is certainly under Putin retaining to a kind of conventionalistconventionally modern state sovereigntist perspective in which - there Putin is trying to assert Russia'spower as a great power, Putin is limiting the role of NGOs that pass the - modernly constraining NGOlaw in Russia last year on trying to constrain the impact which external actors might have within Russiabut this notion conventionally modern states would also apply to Brazil, to India, to south Africa, to theStates, the other states of Latin America and the Caribbean who are always kind of anxious about the intrusions of the united States.So there is a big world of conventionally modern states out there, the way in which we basicallythought about how states should be in the international environment. There are states that governeffectively, that are internationally recognized and that are autonomists. There is a second set of statespost modern which which Robert cooper called the post modern world. Most of these states aremembers of the European union and what we need to recognize about these states is that the Europeanunion is a new new thing in the international system, is a different kind of organizationalenvironment than anything that we have seen before. It is not a federal state there are big areas ofactivity which member states of the European Union still control themselves. So it's not like the unitedstates when the federal government passes a law, it applies to all of the states in the united states, notethat we fought a civil war over this issue, so it wasn't a foregoing conclusion, and that's not true in theEuropean union, there are big pieces of activity which were still under the preview of each memberstate. The European Union that was also not a conventional international organization which statesjoins and may decide not to join. It's something different which right now we don't even have a namefor, it's characterized by two things which critically distinguish it from anything that we have seenbefore. One is the creation of super national institutions which have prerogatives which dominate insome specific issue areas, the national political institutions.The European court of justice which was set up when the European Union was founded has supremacy- its rulings have supremacy and direct effect. What that means is that its rulings have supremacy overnational court rulings and they have direct effect in the judicial systems of every every member stateof the EU and for those of you that - took governmental political science long ago and use to talk aboutBritain and parliamentary supremacy, in which the parliament was supreme in Britain and made thelaws that is no longer true. A ruling of the European court of justice trumps decisions or can over turndecisions that are made by the European parliament, now that would be as if there was someinternational court that could trump decisions that were made by or the Supreme Court in the UnitedStates or the American congress.So this is a really big time radical change. Secondly the most obvious in terms of super nationalinstitutions although there are a number of others is the European monitory system, the Europeancentral bank. Most of the member states of the European Union are now members of the Europeanmonitory system, there is a European central bank which is in Frankfort or the board of governors atthe bank is appointed by a complicated formula but these guys are there for a long period of time. Theyare relatively independent and they set monitory policy for Europe, I mean that is why we have theEuro now. So an area of - which is always being for a sovereign state under the control of individualstates that is monitory policy is now for most members of the European Union under the control of theEuropean monitory system. In addition to these super national institutions, there are also a very largenumber of issues trade issues most notably in the European Union that are decided by qualifiedmajority voting of the members states or by a complicated formula that involves population weights aswell as just giving each member of the European union one vote.So that trade issues and trade policy for the European union is done collectively for the Europeanunion, individual states do not negotiate separately in the WTO and the policies that they are choosingare the determined by qualified majority voting, so they can't be member states of the European Unionwhich in the area of trade are more obligated to obey policies which they themselves might disagree with.This is absolute invariants with our conventional notions of what sovereignty means, so here you havea situation in Europe where the states of Europe are not autonomists. They have used their internationallegal sovereignty, there ability to sign treaties in contracts to basically give up their Westphaliansovereignty that are in this sense, they are fundamentally and absolutely different now than modernstates and The United States China, Russia, Brazil. We also have situations in which they are obligatedby qualified majority voting in some issue areas to obey rulings which they themselves disagree withwhich is a fundamental departure from conventional notions of sovereignty. The conventional notion ofsovereignty is that a state for international lawyers, a state can enter in to any contract they wants but ifit doesn't enter into that contract it's not obligated, in the case of the European union the member statesof the European union have agreed with regard to certain policies to obey decisions which theythemselves might disagree withAnd so EU is a really new new thing in the international system. Let me say it quickly, I do not thinkthat the EU is going to be replicated in other parts of the world. The European union and its uniquesuccess and it has been an extraordinary success depended critically at the outset on two things, onewas a support of the united states, the united states after the second world war was very interested inEuropean integration mainly but not entirely because of the threat from the Soviet Union. The unitedstates insisted in the marshal plan that the Europeans kind of get together and figure out what theywould do, the united states was a strong supporter of the precursors of the European union, Europeancall on steel community and the European payments union and the United States is basically over thecourse of the post war period, that is since world war two have been very supportive of the Europeanunion. Not only was it supportive but the United States also provided a security umbrella for Europewhich basically took security issues off the table. Europe came close to committing suicide in the firstpart of the 20th century. Two wars killed tens of millions of people in both of these wars, extremelycostly and wasn't as if when you ended the war end in 19 - world war two in 1945, there was anykind of foregoing conclusion that France and Germany would become allies in fact they have beenbitter opponents for 75 years prior to that.Taking security issues off the table was very important in allowing Europe to go forward in creating theEuropean Union, so American support was critical for Europe's success. Secondly Germany after theSecond World War wanted to basically burry itself in Europe. I think the Germans recognized after theSecond World War that there was no solution to Germany's security problem unless they couldsomehow transcend the conventional European state system. Germany's traditional problem was this,too big but not big enough. Too big in the sense that Germany was always threat to its neighbors or hadbeen since German unification in 1870. Not big enough in a sense that it could never really dominateEurope as the first and second world wars had had demonstrated.So in the sense, it's unlike north America I mean in north America the united states is plenty bigenough and there is a soul Mexican saying "so far from god so close to the united states" Mexico andCanada are stuck with us and well we can't dictate outcomes, we can do pretty well in establishing astable environment. Germany was never able to do that in Europe so I think that Germans for strategicreasons were anxious to actually constrain their own freedom of action and I also think a lot made thisargument actually many times in Germany, usually I get silence, usually I - I never had anyone reallyarguing with me but I think that not the experience with the Germans was also one which led them ifyou wanted to recover a sense of German pride. What exactly could you do was very hard to appeal toconventional German nationalism and was possible to appeal to a larger European history. So I thinkfor the Germans in terms of both national identity and in terms of their strategic interest, for theGerman's it was very attractive to be very strong supporters of the European Union. So you had this insome ways quite odd situation in which the strongest state in Europe was very anxious to tie its ownhands and limit its freedom of action, so I think these two factors of the fact that they had a bigexternal power of the united states, that was very supportive of European integration and the fact thatthe largest country in Europe, Germany was actually anxious to constrain itself and tie its own handsled to a situation where you have the success of the European union. I don't think those conditions aregoing to be replicated in other parts of the world if you look at Latin Americas, south east Asia orAfrica, you don't have a big external power and you don't have the largest state in the area trying toconstrain its own freedom of action.I would finally then, we have this world a pre-modern state and the numbers there these are fromseveral different studies which have been done by the US government, by the UK, by academics, butbasically this world of pre-modern state say 37 to 73 countries, it's a world in which you don't haveeffective governance, it's a world in which the authorities within a particular state are not able tocontrol effectively activities which are going on in that state or at least not able to put that state on anykind of path towards effective development or effective governance, this is also a historicallyunprecedented situation, in the past you had sovereignty and basically sovereignty if you went backbefore 1960, sovereignty worked in most countries. You had decolonization you had one availableform in the international environment which was this notion of sovereignty.People didn't want to go back to empires they didn't wanted for instance for instance replicatedtraditional Chinese system. If you go and look at china any time before say 1900, the Chineseconception of the international system was, it was china at the centre and everybody else at theperiphery. All other states were vassal states. If you look at the Chinese imperial records which go backto the Roman Empire, every visit to china, every visitor to china was not described as a sovereign statecoming to negotiate with china, every visiting delegation to china was described as what as a vassalcoming to pay homage to the Chinese emperor, so it is in fact this idea of sovereignty which is sofamiliar to us now that we forget that anything else was available, it isn't that that the idea ofsovereignty is the only way to organize political life but by the end of the 20th century, it was the onlyway to organize political life that people were familiar with, so if you look at the conventional - onceyou had, decolonization in 1960, the only way in which you could organize all of these new states wasby making them sovereign states so they got some attributes of sovereignty, everybody became amember of the united nations. Countries all have their national anthems, they all have armies andmilitaries and foreign ministries, but they didn't necessarily get effective governance and they didn'tnecessarily get to autonomy because many of these states which are relatively week have often beenintruded upon by external actors.So you are in a situation in which if you look at the contemporary global environment, we really havethree kinds of countries, modern countries, conventional sovereigns, post modern countries which haveactually given up much of their Westphalian sovereignty, the European Union in a voluntary way and apre-modern world in which you have some substantial number of states which suffer from bad or weekgovernance. The major threats to American security and the global stability and the contemporary ordercome from this world of pre-modern states and there are several of them. One other conventionalnotions of global bads - I mean we look at globalization, there are lots of global goods, there are alsoglobal bads, criminality, disease, humanitarian crisis. There are also the conventual anxieties ofweapons of mass destruction, conventional now and and threats actual terrorism and something that Ithink people haven't paid enough attention to but is a potential danger, larger wrap cuts in oil supplyand I want to talk about each one of these and say a little bit about how we might deal with them.I am a little bit skeptical about the idea of global bads being a deal breaker that is creating a situation inwhich the fundamental nature of international relations and the international system would change.Criminality is a real problem, it's kind of managed by you know conventional law enforcement andintelligence, in some ways it's tolerated, those of you that have been in Florence, if you kind of look atall the kind of streets around them around central Florence, there are people selling all kinds ofstuff, selling including lots of knocks offs of Italian luxury goods. Alright you have seen this I amsure, the police come down the street, there are guys that either enter the street and they blow a whistleor something and these people pack their stuff up and they are gone in about two minutes. Now wehave all seen this, if the Italians really wanted to make trouble for these guys, they wouldn't comeand mark police cars that either enter the street, right that wouldn't be that hard to about 20 policemenin the middle of these guys and compescate their stuff and may be put them in jail.So criminality is there, it's problematic and it's always problematic in more ways than than just[0:20:51] ____ of luxury goods I mean there is trafficking and people use drugs, there are a lot ofissues which are more serious but I would say all of these issues are manageable, if you look at issuesof disease, I mean we have one major example of this now AIDS, but could easily have another one inin the form of Avian Flue. Yes really big problem, but if we are thinking about managing thisproblem, management of this problem is going to come mainly from domestic health care systems andwe can see for better or worse, the industrialized modern and post modern world will be able to handlethese issues relatively well and the pre-modern world is not going to be able to handle these issueswell, so I mean AIDS has become a manageable disease in the industrialized world, than it's atremendous devastating horrible problem for Africa.If Avian Flue breaks out - and we are kind of due for another major influenza epidemic, the same kindof situation would develop, I mean the issue here would be how well can individual countries managethese kinds of threats and the answer is that many countries in the world can manage them relativelywell, some countries will not be able to manage them well. Humanitarian crisis if you look at forinstance tsunami in Indonesia, more even the genocide in Uganda, these are very uncomfortabledifficult problems which sometimes the modern and post-modern world has decided to try to dealwith in an in a kind of forward leaning way and sometimes has ignored and I don't see why that kindof pattern making calculated choices we did we were very active in the case of this tsunami and notactive in Uganda. I don't see why that kind of calculated pattern will change.So I don't think if we are looking at the contemporary environment that these global bads are the bigproblem. I think the big problems are trans national terrorism, weapons and mass destruction and thispotential of a larger broad cut in oral supplies and I want to talk about those and say what we may doabout them. The kind of linty now of WMD, war on terrorism, weak states, fail states, states sponsorsof terrorism are something that's very familiar since 9/11.I just want to step back and and underline that what is unique about this situation is that we now havea number of weak actors, sometimes extremely weak actors in the international system that couldReykjavik on even the most powerful states in the world, north Korea almost certainly as nuclearweapons. We know that they have missiles that can reach to Pam, Russia and China. North Koreacould kill millions or tens of millions of Japanese, Chinese or Russians. You can actually get the G&Pof North Korea because no one knows exactly what it is because there is really no documentation but itcertainly lessen one percent, very less than one percent of of china and and Japan and probably lessthan five percent of the G&P of South Korea.So this is a very small weak country with very limited underlying capability which is now in a positionbecause of its possession of nuclear weapons and missile technology to do serious damage to verymuch more powerful states. We know that Al-Qaeda and transnational terrorists are interested ingetting weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical, possibly less dangerous biological possiblyequally dangerous, we know that their calculations about what they want to do are now limited in asense that they are going to make conventional cause kind of supply in demand or cause benefitcalculations of whether it's worth doing something, if you are thinking about saving your soul or youare thinking about creating heaven on earth, conventional calculations about what the cost of doingsomething are out the window and it's why if you look back in Europe, if you look at Europe in the 16thand 17th centuries, the English civil war, the religious wars in France, the 30 years war in Germany allof which were in formed by very bitter conflict between France and some Catholics were extremelydeadly. Two and a half million people died in a 30 years war in Germany which ended in 1648. It wasthe most costly war in Europe until world war one.Religion and politics is a very bad thing because it basically eliminates any calculation that you mightmake about how much are willing to pay for that. What's the cost you are willing to pay to save yoursoul, you know that's infinite or incalculable, I would see you are in a situation now in which you arevery weak actors either states or transnational terrorist networks possibly with access to weapons ofmass destruction, certainly they would like to have access to weapons of mass destruction capable ofthreatening the security of even the most powerful states in the international system. This is a big timehistorically you need threat, it's something man man have only we but that the world hasnever seen before, -- in 1910, Liechtenstein could have threatened Germany, you know it would havebeen adhocracy but it is a situation that weren't in the contemporary environment.Secondly and this is something I think has been less in order or at east not not been discussed soexplicitly, the possibility of precipitous energy supply cuts. About 20 percent of what comes in thePersian gulf region, there are a number of scenarios where you could imagine some big piece of thatbeing cut very quickly. You could have radicals taking over one of the regimes in the Persian gulf, youcould have terrorist activities sinking ships in the straits of Hermosa, you could have all the depots inSaudi Arabia blown up. If that happened it would be very devastating to the global economy, the globaleconomy is done very well in in kind of dealing with oil prices which have gone from $20 to $90over the course of the last decade, it would not deal very well with the 20 percent cut from one day tothe next in global oil supplies.And what would happen if either of these really bad things happen, that is if you had a number of megaterrorist attacks in which tens of thousands or one has to say even millions of people could be killedor what would happen if you did have some precipitous cut in energy supplies. Alright this is a kind oflittle thought experiment that I will give you. I think all the conventional war rules of theinternational environment would be out the window. If you had this precipitous cut in oil supplies, Ithink you would get a conversation and the would go something like this. We areabsolutely dependent on this oil, these states in the Persian gulf relatively badly governed of not beingable to provide this resource which is critical for the well being and success of the world, the wholeworld, not just united states or Europe but developing countries as well. We have to find somealternative way of managing this resource, perhaps we should think of this resource as part of thecommon heritage of man kind. Have it managed by a new international institution and use part of theproceeds for the World Bank to contribute to international economic development. This could be akindof throwing out the window or conventual rules of sovereignty.If we have another mega terrorist attack and we can kind of trace it back to Al-Quada which we knowis operating out of the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan, all of this kind of conventionaldiscussions that we have had about see what should we do about this border area which is a very bigproblem I think would go out the window on a second and you would have military activity at a scalewhich we have not seen and a set of assertions about lets say a trusteeship for the tribal areas ofPakistan which would last for a long period of time, if these things happen, if these conventual rules ofsovereignty went out the window and we went back to some kind of trusteeship system or thoughtabout some global organization who are taking over the oil supplies of the middle east, this would beextremely costly, not short term, it would be costing in terms of money or it would be costing in termsof personal, it would be costing in terms of the way we operate the master claim and the debate aboutthe patriot act which has been very intense, now I we know that if there was a nuclear even a dirtynuclear attack on a major American city, all of these concerns about our civil liberties which peoplehave articulated real concerns would be gone.And the American elector would be screaming, for a higher levels of control and I think if thinkingback to Neil Ferguson's discussion yesterday, if you ask yourself vitalization is not an adequatestrategy, it's because if you wait for one of these things to happen, it's going to be really-really bad andnow really bad in just in terms of the number of people that would be killed or the economicdevastation, but really bad in terms of what it would mean for the way the international system operateswhere we have rules which haven't been great but it work pretty well and in terms of what it wouldmean for domestic liberties in liberal democracies now. Both of those things, both the nature of theinternational system and the way in which we operate domestically would be radically affected.What can we do about this and how should we address this problem? But the first thing I could Ishould say is I don't have someone to philander to this and it's striking and this is is striking thatmore than six years now after 9/11 we have no grand strategy for the united, we have no agreement onwhat our strategy should be and that's why we are still debating, should we have prevention,preemption, retaliation as a grand strategy. We don't have an agreement and I think that Neil Fergusonwas very-very accurate in pointing this out because what we know is this, we know that these threatsare out there, they are real that as he pointed out yesterday, the chances of this happening are notcalculable, we don't know what the chances are of having a mega terrorist attack, vanishing these smalltwo percent, five percent, ten percent, 20 percent over the next ten years, we don't know and that is anextremely difficult situation to operate it.But here is what I think, I mean we have to begin thinking about doing, we have to think if we arelooking at the United States government and the way in eh it's organized and this is something we cando by ourselves and this is my down the inside bell the bell way discussion. The Americangovernment now is basically organized to deal with state to state relations, the state departmentengages in diplomacy with other foreign ministries, for - Secretary Rice a little more than a year and ahalf ago made a speech at George Town in which she talked about the idea of transformationaldiplomacy, the idea that the state department had to organize itself to try to influence domesticauthority structures in other states, not just have conversations with foreign ministries, but basically thestate department has conversations with foreign ministries.The department of defense and our military, an extra ordinary institution is basically designed to fightwars against other states. What we need at least in the American government and this is the inside thebell way discussion which will take place after the next election is this, we have to think about ways ofintegrating our civilian military capability better than we are doing it now, we have to think about whatthe right mix of military and civilian allocation of resources is, right now the defense departmentbudget is 600 billion plus dollars, the budget for the state department and AID is 40 billion plus dollars.If you look for instance at the new counter insurgency would generally portray us help to write thegeneral consensuses that the civilian military mix should be 80 20, because our civilian military mixnow is 10 90 and it's a wrong way around.So we have to think about ways in which we can reorganize the American government, ways in whichwe can integrate our civilian military capability better, ways in which we to think more effectivelyabout how we allocate resources within the American government, so we are in a situation andultimately if we look at what the policy challenges are, the big policy challenge is how to deal withthese badly governed, weakened fail states and the objective of the national security strategy to createeffective democracies is the right ultimate objective. But to accomplish this, we need better integrationof civilian military capacity, we are going to have to except some substantial cause over an extendedperiod of time and we are going to have a have a tolerance with failures. There are no formulas forhow you create effective democracies and if you look at the effective liberal democracies now, theyhave all had their own unique historical trajectories.So if we are going to accomplish this, we have to recognize that something many of you will befamiliar with, it's more like venture capital. When it is like investing in an index 500 fund, if it works30 percent at the time, that's great but you have to except the fact that it's not going to work 70 percentat the time and and keep at it, so I think if we look at our situation at a global level now, theobjectives are clear, getting from here to there is very hard, there are some things that we can do withinour own national government to make ourselves better able to do that but we have to recognize even ifwe do the best that we can do, this is a very big hard challenge this idea of trying to improvegovernance in where are now badly governed in failed states, so let me stop and I think we have a bettertime for questions.