George Shultz: Very well this is Raymond, morning at least the first part of it. So we will start out with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and what has been happening since last time it was considered. Raymond -
Raymond Jeanloz: Thank you very much. Could I have the slide please? So according to instructions I am not supposed to reiterate all of the arguments and I want - indeed I want to start off by making that the the main point for the present conference is that the CTBT is in fact in broad global security interest and more specifically in US security interest and does not threaten sustaining all that is the United States deterrent and so in the context of this conference if the CTBT cannot be ratified, then possibly it's hard to imagine going anywhere very far, very quickly in the domain of reducing nuclear stockpiles. Also I would like to remind you of the comment made yesterday mentioning the upcoming new NPT review conference in 2010 and that does indeed gives some urgency to talking about and trying to push forward CTBT ratification and entry into force. The recommendations presented and summarized in my paper are listed here. I will not go over them in any detail. But I want to give you a little bit of background to highlight in particular why the recommendation is strongly endorsed to ratify the CTBT and for one such done for the US to take a leadership position in bringing it into force entering into force. Among the key findings is that several events of the past decade illustrate how CTBT is in fact in the security interest of the United States and of the world at large. Perhaps the most recent is the North Korean nuclear explosion test of October 2006, which clearly demonstrated the capability of both the international monitoring system stations and non IMS stations in characterizing what turned out to be a low yield test. There is a strong international incentive to avoid further nuclear explosion testing by North Korea and current diplomatic efforts appeared to be accomplishing this goal. However there is little doubt that international pressure would be impossible to initiate where any of the major nuclear powers testing at present. The current moratorium on nuclear explosion testing is thus playing a key role in constraining the actions of North Korea in particular and other nations more generally in developing more militarily affective nuclear arsenals. Such cases illustrate why major and nuclear powers must expect to maintain the current nuclear testing moratorium for the indefinite future. International pressure is to be sustained to dissuade all nations from undertaking nuclear explosion testing. This norm is effectively accepted by the global community of nations. The need for it's on going observation means that the current moratorium is as constraining as a CTBT but without the potential benefits of such a treaty. The current test main moratorium is in fact a weak reflection of the international norms as it makes no formal commitment to partner nations intended to stand with the US against those attacking a regime of international law and here I would describe that community as spanning nuclear proliferators to terrorists and other criminals. The existing moratorium even when violated has demonstrably played a role in constraining nuclear explosion testing and therefore the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons designed so far. But the continued threats of nuclear proliferation do call for a stronger system of international constraint and a stronger commitment to international norms is exactly what the CTBT offers. And highlights not only the US interest in ratification but once ratified in taking the lead bringing about the treaty's entry into force. So there have been there has been enormous progress on key elements of the debate that took place in 1999 when the US senate considered ratification and I wanted to highlight some of these political international developments that give stronger positive motivation for the CTBT. I will spend very little time going into details that I do touch on in the paper dealing with some of the negative concerns regarding the CTBT. For example, there were legitimate concerns in late 1990s as to whether or not the United States could indeed maintain its nuclear deterrent under an ongoing no testing regime. And I think it's clearly documented that the evidence from the accomplishments of the recent past as well as future activities now being considered clearly establish the US is indeed able to sustain on nuclear deterrent without the need to resume nuclear explosion testing and here is a list of some of the specific topics I described in the paper. On monitoring when we just say that the treaty is effectively verifiable, the CTBT organization's international monitoring system, the IMS includes 50 plus 50 primary and a 120 secondary seismic stations. That's to a total of 170 seismic stations for monitoring ground motions world wide. 60 infrasound stations for sensing pressure waves in the atmosphere. 11 hydro acoustic stations for monitoring sounds in the oceans and 80 and an 80 station radio nuclide network for monitoring diagnostic gases and particles in the atmosphere. This total of 321 stations and 16 laboratories is due to be 90 percent completed by the end of next year. That's not why we have such confidence in the ability to monitor a CTBT however. The fact is that there are non IMS capabilities that clearly validate, compliment and expand the capability of the international monitoring system. I give some examples in the paper but let me just remind you of a few, making reference to this map of the IMS documented capability of under a 100 tons nuclear explosive your resolution or sensitivity through out Africa, Asia, and Europe. But let me point out that, this has been tested through the North Korean test when non IMS station show lower than four time sensitivity. And also the earlier Indian and Pakistan test of about a decade ago showed sensitivities down in the 10 to 20 ton range, far lower than the IMS capability, that is one can do much better even than the international capability that's documented. And indeed one can even monitor explosions in totally unexpected areas. For example, the Nairobi, Kenya embassy bombing was well recorded with the sensitivity in the four ton range. And finally, I want to point out, that's not just a matter of sensitivity but of location capability and so the famous or some would say infamous Kara sea earthquake of August 16th 1997 documented that even close to a nuclear test site, one can get special resolution of just a few tenth of kilometers was certainly well enough for on site inspection purposes or that ever needed. Now, this was indeed an earth quake close to a test site and could be discriminated or determined as such. Finally, I want to make reference to a very tragic event that happened offshore namely the sinking of the Russian submarine Kursk in the Barents Sea just to highlight that offshore in the ocean region, the sensitivity is enormously higher. We are talking about 20 kilograms sensitivity, not tons of sensitivity, not 1000s of kilograms. So with these few examples I just wanted to highlight the incredible enhancement and capabilities that have taken place over the past decade technically in the area of sustaining a nuclear arsenal to the degree that the nation feels we must have one and to the degree that we want to monitor these treaties. So I have listed here some of the key objections to ratification that were presented that were listed by Senator Lugar almost 10 years ago. And in fact every one of these has been addressed and there has been an enormous progress on verification, on sustainability of the US deterrent and on establishing the utility of a CTBT for constraining nuclear explosion testing. Enormous progress except on the last point - the question of too little time for debate. And there is no excuse for this. An informed dialogue leading to ratification and entry into force should start now. Thank you very much.
Tom Graham: If we hope to proceed towards zero, we have to first prevent things from getting worse. And my judgment anyway, the NPT is in a fragile condition. As Bill Perry said, last week, we could be on the edge of a new wave of proliferation.. In addition in dealing with this, in addition to enhancing cooperation with Russia we must, in my view repair the political basis for the NPT and its central bargain. Since 1965 a sizable number of non nuclear weapon states have asked as political compensation, this eventually vaguely became article six. As political compensation for giving up nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test ban, a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, deep reductions in nuclear weapons and security assurances. Here we are 42 years later, very little of that is been accomplished and it's been the same all through the years that all the review conferences but number one among these has been the test ban. It's in the NPT preamble. The view of these countries as we understand in today's world, particularly the cold war, the events in the post cold war. We understand that the five nuclear weapon states are going to have nuclear weapons for a long time but at least they could stop testing under a legal regime. If the US could ratify CTBT, China would follow, the P5 world would have adopted it and we could press for entry into force. This would put us in a strong position at the 2010 review conference and it might think - might make other things possible. So in my judgment at least among all these steps, to the possible exception of the increased and better cooperation with Russia, the comprehensive test ban has to be far in a way than most important objective in terms of at least in terms of saving the NPT.
Sid Drell: Yeah just, can we emphasis something beyond what Raymond has already said. Ambassador Tibor Toth was in town last week and Jim Goodby and I had a chance to talk with him and the the following three statements I think there, first of all since the system detected and analyze the North Korean test. It has been an increase of 20 percent in the number of seismic stations and brought into effect in a CTBTO, that may - Raymond said, over 90 percent had 20 percent increase already in one year. The number of state stations to detect the noble gases is going up by 70 percent, they are getting they of course firmly get out. So that's the good side, the other side is that the United States, I believe I have the correct number is is supposed to pay 22 percent of the annual cost of the CTBT organization, the one that operates and builds the IMS international monitoring system, that would be something like $20 million a year. We have just agreed to raise this year's payment from 10 to 14 cumulatively we are almost $50 million behind in our obligation to getting into CTBT organization fully funded to all that they did together and have all the stations there. These few numbers which I think are are relevant and just and the third one was as we go to top, 34 of the 44 designated nuclear capable nations has ratified the treaty. We and China and a few other countries are the ones who haven't Russia, Germany, France all the other P5, Japan, they have all ratified
Speaker: UK We are in a small group with DPRK among
Sid Drell: I am sorry to say that's true.
Graham Allison: Okay that I thought this was a great paper, Raymond so I thank you for the advance. I think here I agree with some of the proposition that this is really most important first steps but we are pretty much the choir so it would seem to me it would be useful to see who would speak up for an alternative point of view and what that what would be the substance of it.
George Shultz: Richard would you care to be this skunk at the picnic?
Richard Perle: Well, I have the question that I suppose is skunk-like in character. I was puzzled by the statement that CTBT is playing a key role in constraining the North Koreans that seemed being contradicted by the fact not withstanding they they conducted a test but but I had a question and I don't recall the earlier debate in any detail - is there not a level perhaps close to zero at which we do not have verification capability? - and if that's true wouldn't it make sense to make the treaty relevant to test above the level of verification that it would seemed to me would make it a lot easier for the for the US to ratify -.
Raymond Jeanloz: So let me let me just touch on your initial point I did not presume claim that north Korea was constrained from testing by the moratorium my point was that the responds to the test was only possible, the international response was only possible because of the ongoing moratorium if we Russia, china and others were engaged in in testing a nuclear explosion testing program it would have been very difficult I would even saying possible to marshal the international consensus to push back on Korea to constrain them to that one low yield test.
Richard Perle: So it's the moratorium rather than -.
Raymond Jeanloz: Exactly and I think that and I made that point as that moratorium and then if you follow that logic that means we have to stick with the moratorium for an indefinite future and then we are in a position of having all of the constraints and obligations of the CTBT without several of the benefits and I elaborate on that in the paper but we can have a ongoing dialogue. It is indeed true that as with any scientific measurement, there is both uncertainty and limit of sensitivity in our solution. From the technical point of view, one of the reasons that at least I or many of my technical colleagues are not enamored by the idea of establishing a baseline level in saying anything below that we are not going to worry about is at that baseline just keeps on getting pushed down year by year so what was considered ten years ago the a reasonable baseline is in fact reflected in those IMS sensitivities. Lets call it a hundred tons or a half a kilo ton and now we are doing ten or hundred times better and in ten years we got to be doing even better so to identify a basement level now, from the technical point of view seems extremely artificial and in fact I would even say that there are completely unanticipated approaches have come to there, I allude to one but there are many, allude one in the paper for example I don't think it was fully appreciated 10 to 15 years ago the impact that commercially available high resolution over head inventory might have and the fact is that eyes on the ground now have been multiplied many - many fold. Don't get me wrong and in the paper I am again very clear in saying this is not to say that NGOs or university students and professors will replace the professionals working for our governments and others but they surely provide a compliment and in fact will - many of them will become future members of those government community. So that's more of the context in which -.
Richard Perle: How about the in inner laboratory testing is that may be I misconstrue that issue will
Raymond Jeanloz: - that for say - you mean for example the sub critical experiment and the like?
Richard Perle: Zero - I think we recall zero -
Raymond Jeanloz: Yeah sub critical those those are in my view those are very well defined and again I have a statement in the paper that I think we the US would benefit by sharing more information about exactly what what it is we do and how we do it in the following sense. The details of the test how there - what the result time is on may be sensitive and there is no reason to reveal that but there is a very formal and robust system for first evaluating these test ahead of time to determine that even by accident they won't become - they won't become critical or become nuclear test and then actually making measurements and if you think about it, making a measurement of zero is actually very challenging thing so there is some really interesting measurement strategies to document that during a test in fact there has been no inadvertent violation of the moratorium. This is an area in which I have not a fair amount, I headed the committee for the department of energy that actually reviewed these pretest examinations and then the post test evaluations and I think it's actually a fascinating onto story that we could take a lot of credit for and clarify that we really mean zero yield when we say zero yield -.
Matthew Bunn: But the other thing about setting a threshold, it's actually very much like your argument for zero in INF context. If you set a threshold and then you detect some very small explosion that you might have thought that I can't detect until that level but you succeeded detecting it any way, then you would have to resolve this ambiguity of was it above or below the threshold where as if there isn't any threshold that you detect and explosion, you have got a violation on your hands.
Richard Perle: Well does this, the treaty that is now written allows subcritical test?
Raymond Jeanloz: Absolutely absolutely yeah actually there is there is a - for the aficionado there is actually another very interesting little twist twist. It actually does allows certain kinds of thermonuclear test, mainly laboratory fusion experiments okay - such as where the - the national ignition facility will conduct so there are some very clearly defined - I don't want to call them exceptions because that might get the wrong idea but very clearly defined to mean what's allowed and what is not allowed and in our discussions now I am speaking with among technical people from the US talking with our technical counter part in china, in Russia, India, Pakistan. Our sense is that it's very clear what we mean by zero yield but at the end of the day, there is nothing clear than actual demonstration rather than just words. Words are great and the words in my view demonstrate that there is a clear understanding on both side on all sides but we would like to see a little bit more demonstration that's why I advocate enhanced transparency and there are actual detail process.
George Shultz: I don't know that how many people visited this so called NIF the national ignition facilityover at Livermore labs, I get taken over there by Sid once in a while. This thing is two foot ball fields in size, it's really quite impressive than it seems to be wondrous as they describe it and I think there is some relevance to this.
Sid Drell: Just a quick remark on the national ignition resorting. When you talk about -
George Shultz: And this incidentally was a screwed up construction job, the last time the treaty was under consideration - And it's now gotten the
Sid Drell: The point here is that in terms of the laboratories capability of maintaining confidence in the arsenal without testing, the national ignition facility is going to bring those to conditions of pressure, temperature in the laboratory much closer to what goes on in a in the bomb itself in various stages which I won't go into here and this means that the stimulations that one does the analysis that one does with the super computers and what now those codes are retested under closure, much closer to bomb conditions and so the analytical are going on as we as we follow the bombs in the laboratory has has - it can be developed with more specification closer to the actual experiment and that in my mind acts considerately to the confidence that we have at over time we are not going we are not getting blindsided or we are not following some thing that we don't understand. So for research in the laboratory twelve years of a test moratorium with extensive work on on the doing diagnostics on the weapons have added confidences as Raymond said and verification itself as a confidence, so these are two major developments since the debate of 1999 that should be revisited, taken up again to say it wasn't a mistake there, but that we have learnt enough now, we have more confidence so we can have a CTBT. That's my view.
Graham Allison: Would some body if the labs doesn't seem like a a counter argument, who would who would give the counter argument and what would be the best version?
Sig Hecker: Here we go I am almost going to rise to Graham's first challenge but I did want to weigh in on this point also, the issue of what's zero and what sort of experiment so Graham, during during the early 90's when I had responsibility for a good part of of the US nuclear weapons stockpile, I made the counter argument that and I argued for some low threshold because at any lower threshold, we will be able to learn more and I would feel more confident than being able to actually certify certify the stockpile. So we had - we wanted one kilo tons and we tried half a kilo ton - you know then a hundred tons and we lost all of that, then we said we we will go back to 1958, the 1961 moratorium where we had four pounds of TNTA club ones, often people confuse those with what I now call sub critical experiment but those are called hybrid dynamic experiments and they have a little bit of yield and during that time period we learn the lot particularly about safety aspects of nuclear weapons and we perform those tests first at Los Alamos underground and then out of the Nevada test site but all within what we considered was within keeping of the the three year moratorium so anyway we thought that all of those things would be important to allow us to do the job better. However then the decision was made zero yield and I tried to explain to Secretary O'Leary at the time that well we can't get zero, you know if we are talking about a fusion yield plutonium just sitting there, it don't make neutrons and so can't zero but we eventually round up defining that we would do the sub critical experiments, you should get normally great yields. However it's important to recognize that the other countries don't necessarily have the same interpretation of that and so there is nothing with this specifically that defines that and in my discussions with the Russians you know they have a somewhat different view but having said that, let me say that there is a substantial benefit for us by going in that direction and that I got from my Chinese colleagues who said you know well look you guys, you can go down you know through that deal yield or sub critical experiments because you know how to do those experiments with such sophisticated measurement capabilities, we would never be able to duplicate that and so in the end what was frozen in is actually such that I am not thoroughly concerned about that aspects at all. So having said that, let me just go to rise to Graham's first challenge iin terms of where we are now and that is what is the other side in terms of having the comprehensive test ban. Now what what Raymond point out in his in his very very good paper and you know as I am sure most - you know Raymond and Sid Drell are two of the few scientists from the outside world that have been able to peek in sufficiently inside this nuclear conflicts to understand the situation and be able to speak of the - the authority. However again since since I was there having to take care this stock pile and sign the first few certifications, there is no question, there is a cost associated with that testing. When we talk about maintaining the stock pile, I sign the first two certifications that said that you know I in essence guarantee that the nuclear weapons that we produced at Los Alamos are safe, secure and reliable without testing at this time but I could not say that in perpetuity and so we in essence that you have to ask us every year and that's where the annual certification came from and so since then what we have being trying to do is to figure out a way to either extend the life time or to remanufacture the weapons without nuclear testing. As Raymond pointed out, we have done that so far. However the cost that's associated with so far what is taken us to reestablish the capability to remanufacture at los Alamos cost us a huge amount of money and took us much more time then it would have if we would have been able to do nuclear testing. Also in the lifetime as Raymond points out in his paper is it's general believed in - in the overall scientific community that plutonium will last 80 to a 100 years. As Sid Drell and Raymond knows I don't agree with that judgment and so I think we need keep looking at this issue, then again if you if you were able to do nuclear testing, you could answer those questions much more definitively today but however without the nuclear test, there will be other cost is sort to be - is if you wanted to design a new modern weapon with new capabilities, in my own opinion in spite of all the computers we have, in spite of all other great new experiment tools we had, I would - I would not be willing to certify such a weapon without nuclear testing, one with new capability and so that's the cost that you have however you have to weigh that against the benefit and Tom Graham already has pointed out part of the benefits, to me the most important benefit is we have a history of a thousands of nuclear tests -.
Raymond Jeanloz: No not some nuclear a thousand nuclear test -. So I am sorry thousand some -.
Sig Hecker: Thousand got nuclear test do you know the Russians have not quite that many but very close, so in the end the Russians and the United States know as much about nuclear weapons, both of them about the same. The Chinese have 50 or so nuclear test and one of the most important aspect is not only to freeze our capabilities for new weapons but to freeze the Chinese capabilities for new weapons. That's a substantial benefit. Also, if you look at India and Pakistan, the innovators have a very few tests and it's questionable as to how successful some of those tests were? So you are freezing in their capabilities at a very primitive level. You look at North Korea, they have got one partially successful test. In my opinion, there is no way they can mount a a war head on a missile with that test. They would have to test again to be able to do so. So of course more three and might break out of the box anyway. But but this certain group, they can freeze us it in. So as I look at that as to what it does to restrict us compared to what it does to restrict the others, I I must say I think it's a good deal.
Raymond Jeanloz: Okay. I think we are in we we approach it along different routes but we are in a wild agreement and it seems to me and - and at the bottom line, from various perspectives is again very much from a self serving US Centric point of view, let alone the global rationales that a world of nuclear explosion testing is not in our own self interest, very you know provocatively speaking and then in addition I think there are the very important points that have been raise by a number of people and I alluded to at the beginning namely the upcoming NPT review conference and the international regime that we have a vested interest and I would say more so now than ever since 9/11 more so now than ever.
George Shultz: Now let me interject into my list, General Dvorkin you wanted to say something.
Vladimir Dvorkin: I am afraid you know I will I will sound this really too different from everybody else. But I am not sure about the thrust of this discussion. Our goal was to get down to zero. It's impossible to get there without strength strengthening the nonproliferation regime. CTBT is a key element of NPT. It's a key element which connects the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of nuclear proliferation. We you know the the sensitivity of measuring equipment is the a key factor for our attitude to the treaty. Here we are talking about the US which has the most powerful laboratory basis for For modeling the processes of nuclear explosions. Russian Nuclear scientists don't have such capabilities. My conversations with Soviet Nuclear Russian Nuclear Scientists show that they can model, also stimulate all factors of nuclear explosion - it is well enough known as you know the the gamma rays, the neutron emission, the X-ray everything Yeah. Could we just separate the questions of ratification of monitoring? We would you know, ratify the treaty and then would gradually you know improve the you know, monitoring equipment. Thank you. Okay. Thank you. I have Rose, Scott, Bob.
Rose Gottemoeller: All right. Since General Dvorkin has begun on expressing Russian points of view; I thought I would talk about an idea I have for beginning a conversation with the Russians on ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty. I do believe the given continuing concerns about what the Russians are doing elsewhere will be important to have a very straight forward and intensive discussion with the governments. 2008 will be the 20th Anniversary of the joint proliferation experiment what was a very important to facilitating the ratification of the previous test ban treaty, since get essentially was important in raising the confidence level on both United States and Soviet Union at that time of the other for ability of the perceiving test ban treaty. So, I would like to suggest as a practical idea and a way to begin a conversation with the Russians, a a kind of two step process. First would be a simple conference to commemorate the 20th Anniversary of the joint verification experiment where we could engage the Russians intensively in discussing how the JBE once succeeded in its goals? And then the second phase after 2008 would be to consider a a second joint verification experiment, it could not of course involve the explosive testing as the first JBE did but would instead, perhaps focus on a joint calibration experiment involving non-nuclear explosion at either the US or Russian test sites. So this is something I have been talking about with Russian colleagues, with Victor Mikhailov who was the Chairman on the Russian side of the Joint Verification Experiment in 1988. He is not known as particularly soft on US-Russian Relations. But he does remember JBE he very fondly and very I would say, with with a great deal of respect as a joint technical activity that was very important on the Russian Side - on the Soviet Side as well in raising confidence in the viability of the previous test ban. And so, I lay that out as a practical idea, a way to being a conversation with the Russians; I think we are lucky that we have this jubilee coming up because the Russians love anniversaries. So, it's a very natural way to engage them in conversation but I think would also have some significant technical benefits.
Sid Drell: I have a good question to you, Rose and to General Dvorkin. For a while there was a lot of talk about having monitors at each of the each test sites. Both at Nevada and Los Alamos. What's happening to that? What is the state the prospect of of agreeing to have monitors at these sites just - to get seismic signals, to confirm that nothing is going on.
Rose Gottemoeller: Some of my colleagues who are in Washington might have a better sense of this at the moment. My understanding is that it has become a hung-up on the diplomatic a kind of in diplomatic impacts, that is the United States invited the Russians to come to the Nevada test site, the did visit the Nevada test site. But we have not yet been able to engineer a visit by our Ambassador Will Burns to the Russian test site at Novaya Zemlya. So the whole exchange of monitors question, I believe has been hung-up in this diplomatic impasse. But Bob Einhorn or some others might know more about that than I do.
Speaker: On that on that issue, if I may, Rose - I I have discussed that with the Russian Lab Directors several times the issue of of the exchange visits to each other's test site and they made it very clear that we would not be allowed at their test site at Novaya Zemlya. You know, initially it was this they looked at those places, they are still unfriendly. And we said, "Well look, we can bring in a ship. You know we leave off the ships back. But but it wasn't clear that there are things going on Novaya Zemlya that they did not want out in American's presence. So that that has gone no-where.
Rose Gottemoeller: I think it's clearly a political decision to I I really believe that, at this point they just haven't been ready to to do the political heavy lifting to permit that kind of visit. We did visit Novaya Zemlya, you know in the past. So, I don't see any reason why that couldn't or shouldn't happen down.
Speaker 2: Yeah. I think I heard from the same people in the Russia. They said, "We made so many confessions in the process and now we have to stop. That is the only reason -
Scott Sagan: I have two points I want to make, the first has been referred to already that what we really underscore the importance of the role that the CTBT could play in reducing in arms race between India and Pakistan it is interesting yesterday that when we are talking about physical security measures and what really could harm the united states we are focusing on the threat of someone stealing or being given a terrorist organization stealing or being given a weapon. When we talk about potential constraints on other countries testing, we should therefore consider which are the countries that we should we worry about in that regard and clearly Pakistan would be number one and number two depending on what you think about the the or a soviet arsenal. In India because we know so little about their safety and security would be up there high on the list as well and it strikes me that we tend to minimize this because the Indians and Pakistanis will say " we have a minimal credible deterrent policy, we're not going to engage in arms race and yet if you look at what they are doing, you should underline the credible credible argument not just the minimum argument because they are very interested in keeping up with one another and the Chinese though they have argued in favor of having a triad, they are getting the military involved, they are talking about potential tactical weapons and imagine Sig Hecker as the Indian or Pakistani lab directors speaking in Hindi or Urdu trying to say "well if we are going - go there but we have to have testing otherwise I can't certify that that we actually have tactical weapons at work" we wanted to encourage political leaders in those countries to put pressure on those particular individuals and I think this would would have would help the power a lot. Then my second point is a more cautionary note especially for this group about how we talk about stock pile stewardship in the RRW in this context of getting to zero. It is very tempting when talking to a domestic audience to say we can get the RRW without testing have reliable replacement warheads that will last in-perpetuity or to say the stock piles stewardship program means that we can keep our current weapons, that we don't have to worry about - thus we can keep them for ever without testing. Isn't that great for a domestic political audience who is concerned about that that may play well. Put on your 2010 NBT review conference act or your south African or whoever it is that we are trying to influence on the nonproliferation front and that's exactly the wrong message to be underlined so I would just encourage whenever we talk about this that we talk about the customer reliable replacement warhead and strap up stewardship program that we could reliable and safe warheads at smaller numbers on the road to zero, not underline that in-perpetuity aspect of which unfortunate as to often time.
George Shultz: You want to interject that?
Richard Perle: I do and this is partly a question from saying that our stockpile today is very much safer than the first weapons we produced and my my question is could it become safer without testing along the way and what are the implications if if we accept that whether we like it or not, there are some recent and there will be future nuclear weapon states. We have an interest in discouraging that but we also have an interest if if we are unable to stop it in in the safety and security of their weapons. I think we have an interest in the safety and security of the Indian and Pakistani weapons if they are going to face each other. I would feel a lot better if each of them had a secure second strike it for example. So how does how does this relate - would a comprehensive test ban actually interfere with the making of existing and potential future stockpiles safer and more secure and if the answer is, it would than how do we figure the trade off between two desirable outcomes?
Raymond Jeanloz: Yeah I I can address that, it's hard to talk you know in in grand generalities about these subjects because it quickly become very specific and very technical reality though as argued as very much in line with which Sig Hecker alluded to and a number of experts, former lab directors and although I can't speak for them, I believe actually the current lab director share this as well. The reality is for both India and Pakistan, their capabilities are quite limited. They themselves describe in that way and the incentive for testing is not really to enhance a safety and security, it's to understandable the weapons physics better and actually to improve the military capability and for potential bringing new military capabilities. So I actually think it's possible to do much to enhance safety and security and probably the single most important thing that they can be done is that in fact to have enhanced dialogues between technical experts in the US military and technical experts in the US and some of these other countries and as you may know to some degree it's already happens and this is actually very much to be encouraged so rather than focusing on the testing which I can argue that would never play a role but it doesn't play a very obvious clerical definitive role on the one hand, on the other hand I do know that enhanced technical linkages are hugely beneficial, the information of the issues that that another country is worried about, they enhanced confidence enormously and here I would refer again to the conferences that Sig is very much responsible for these plutonium conferences that are become internationally in character, they don't deal with classified details but they still involve the communities or the fusion science communities involve many of the people from the national laboratories not only here but in France - non well different kinds of national laboratories in Japan and else where. this is what technical communities get to know each other and get to know what are the issues you are worried about and so now these is next level of generalization but having that understanding is hugely important in really being able to peel the way what exactly are the problems that keep people awake among the technical experts in India or in Pakistan and so I would advocate and I try to elude to this in the enhancement of transparency not only increasing our laboratory, to elaborate on your actions between the US and Russia. Rose eluded to this, more transparency not just plutonium but many other domains but also having enhanced transparency between the US and other countries and as you may know, notably one of the areas where we have some difficulty in doing that these days is China. That's not a technical difficulty, that is a political difficulty and many of us feel that an enhanced transparency or communication between the US and China is to our benefit very much, exactly again coming to some of these issues in end of how exactly safe and secure are the various arsenal big and large on the world. So I very much resonate with the point you you are reaching but the answer seems to be much more in the direction of enhanced technical communication rather than testing.
George Shultz: Henry, you have a point you want to make.
Henry Kissinger: In all of our discussions, we have talked about India and Pakistan and China as if they shared our interests in achieving our objectives and that is absolutely not the case or at least highly unlikely to be the case. So one has to discuss in connection with any of these discussions what would be the impact on the international situation if systematic pressure to exercise on India and China to achieve some of the desirable objectives that we could talk about in here and how to do it, that's what have the system of intensive depressions and secondly it could run unintentionally create a situation in which a nuclear program that was started to make India strategic alternative to China leads to India and China being brought together on the nuclear issue may be included Japan and this would be an ironical result of of these discussions and I am simply suggesting that as we proceed down the road we make some analysis of what way would way that is to bring India and china into central system and failing that what are the consequences of not having them to do so.
Raymond Jeanloz: Could I briefly response to that? I will try to be briefer.
George Shultz: I want to get down my list.
Raymond Jeanloz: I am going to try to make them
George Shultz: One point, there is somebody in the room who probably understand incentive that is anybody else here kind of be interesting to hear what Sam thinks that is -
Raymond Jeanloz: I just wanted to offer a quick suggestion of course I am a technical person and I want to offer the suggestion that we in the technical community can serve at least as an initial point of contact, then this is what I was alluding to in terms of technical communications. It's not that theses issues are ultimately technical, see the other way around. We can begin the discussions at the technical level and indeed have a quick advertisement. I chair a committee for the national academy of science, this committee on the international security and arms control that is dedicated to exactly this, and that's the starting point where we can talk about the technical constraints and issues before one faces a much more difficult political one, so it's a starting point and that was the only suggestion I have to make.
George Shultz: Okay I have Bob, John McLaughlin, Joe, Pavel Raul, and Matt, and I think probably I should close the book there so that we have time for verification.
Sam Nunn: George if you want me to say a word, I will be glad to at some point on the listing.
George Shultz: Okay I we have time down there on that list and I got you as the finale.
Bob Einhorn: Thank you Ellen Tauscher is a congress woman, her district is near here, she is a chair of a very important congressional subcommittee responsible for nuclear weapons issues. She heard she heard that a number yeah many scientists or labs thought that it it would be prudent to develop this reliable replacement warhead that we have various means of insuring the long term reliability of this stockpile dock pile ensuring the long term reliability of this stockpile involving light - extension programs and stockpiles endure ship and everyone believes it's so far these had been successful I mean everyone believes we have safe and reliable nuclear weapons today, the concern is that overtime we may make small modifications for a variety of reasons and you know 10 - 15 - 20 years in the future we won't have confidence anymore without testing, so the idea was to design a new not a new warhead to to use existing concepts but put it together in very conservative design, no more military missions, no need for testing and so far so congress woman Tauscher said okay if you can design a warhead probably a reliable replacement warhead that doesn't need testing. So let's fund that and let's also ratify the CTBT at the same time and it - but she got no support for that idea because her proponents said the reliable replacement warhead wanted the RW without a CTB, her proponents said the CTB wanted to know test ban without the reliability in case of warheads so there is no self war at least, no support at least for that. I think - I guess it's Sid are you - are you still among the Jason group? The Jason's campus is a is a high level scientific advisory group said that they are not convinced that the design chosen for look reliable replacement of warhead would be more reliable of that of long term than the legacy warheads and
Sid Drell: No no, their conclusion was enough convincing, you can get to the goals of RNW without testing, it's not for a general thank you statement.
Bob Einhorn: You know my point is that this is it's an open question that requires a lot more debate and I think it's going to be very difficult to move ahead with CTBT ratification until there is more resolution on this - in a critical question and in the mean time I would - I will suggest that while this is being examined, it could be possible to convert, you know the current multilateral voluntary moratorium into something more durable and I I too would suggest that the seven countries that declare themselves nuclear weapons states and have already tested, I now - I would exclude north Korea from that list should do - should agree a politically binding, not a legal agreement that none of them will be the first country to resume testing. There is a concern I don't know of the other - India for example was asked to commit not to carry out with the test connection with the US indeed there. They weren't prepared to do that but they said we have a voluntary moratorium, we have no plans to change that but if we had some kind of an agreement with the other six countries, no for it's test basically - I won't be the first one to resume testing, I think that could put a lot of pressure on those seven countries not to resume pending - you know scientific examination of this concept of reliable replacement warhead relative to the legacy warhead and that's going to maintain long term confidence in this stockpile.
John McLaughlin: Yeah I have a technical question for Ray and it possibly says say on verification that might actually play out in a congressional debate it's a question some one would ask you were very clear in saying the technology for detecting seismic advance has dramatically improved and we can look to the outer years for further improvements. Would the same be true of the ability to determine the characteristics of the seismic event? You know man may versus natural, conventional explosion versus nuclear explosion, are we making the comparable progress on that aspect of detection?
Raymond Jeanloz: Let me give a short hand answer as I can. The answer is no, the advances in sensitivity have been dramatic in the past ten or 15 years that is in lowering the threshold, the advances in being able to determine whether a source as an explosion, an earth quake or a collapse as one characteristic or whether it's nuclear versus conventional have improvement much much more than even the dropping down of the floor level of sensitivity by orders of magnitude more and I will give you a quick example, the radio nucleate stations being put off by the international monitoring systems etc alluded to these as well, that's just - I would almost say a brand new capability world wide and it's a qualitatively different world in terms of being able to get those diagnostic noble gas isotopes or aerosol particles that really proved that was nuclear versus conventional. I don't think any one would have predicted and I can show you the figures from the IMS yielding plan that it would be so, I don't want to say easy but so feasible to see the signature of the north Korean test and don't forget it was picked up, a prediction was made from the initial analysis in south Korea, a prediction was made you will see this in about ten days in Canada and indeed within about a dozen days that the C9133 signature was picked up in Canada. It's just a different world from from ten years ago. So it's a much better improvement that was expected -.
John McLaughlin: So the role of one sided affection follow up the seismic event is can't diminish -.
Raymond Jeanloz: Let me just say it's very strongly complimented and I I was reminded of - by another tragic event that you may recall several weeks ago, the mind collapse in Utah, the - the people on the ground - so to speak and how this onside inspectors were convinced that was an earth quake, it was actually the seismic sensors including many of them developed for treaty monitoring including the scientists who have being working on treaty monitoring capabilities who were able to proof prove from remote measurements that this was a collapse, it was not an explosion, it was not an earthquake, that was actually a collapse and you may remember the second collapse - the first one dropped the minors, the second one killed some other rescuers and one of the mine inspectors even that very small one can be determined with these new capabilities, it's truly a remarkable accomplishment from the community.
Josef Joffe: One highly technical question and one general question. Technical questions is this. How does a CTBT deal with nuclear powers that don't test like Israel. Currently they have acquired a very sophisticated arsenal without apparently testing except for the famous or infamous flash in the south Atlantic. What's that technique called? The question is that you have a CTBT and Israel like highly sophisticated countries with the sophisticated technological base base acquire nuclear weapons and the other question is a political request to anybody, if as we have argued here it is good for the United States to stop the testing because so far ahead in other words if the US does what great powers have always done which is once you reach the top, pull out the ladder and you keep tired as you why you are jumping and why what what makes you so sharp that lesser the laggardness, you are losing this game and and I announce this correctly as an imperialist ploy by the great powers.
Raymond Jeanloz: So I I - since you you put me on the spot, let me sound the second one in fact a few months ago I had discussions with distinguished Indian colleague so India would be a good example of a country that would not have incentive, would you understand meanwhile our discussion was in the context of the I'll call it evolving US Indian nuclear deal. So there are incentives that come from a different domain.
Josef Joffe: But that's different.
Raymond Jeanloz: Well I - I am not sure that's different - that so all I am saying is that issues having to do with CTBT and nuclear testing are not in a vacuum either internationally or in terms of other relations - with with
Speaker 2: Very integrally linked now the debate with India.
Josef Joffe: It is with CTBT as an important break and then when I raised it first round this is in your typical forensic lumbering here are saying well may be the CTBT is not the real issue, the real issue is other things of political relationship or then the CTBT is not that important.
Raymond Jeanloz: No no no so let's be clear the CTBT plays a role, it doesn't do everything for everyone and one of the points that I make in the paper let me clarify this actually goes back to the threshold question as well. The fact is that we the US feel that as you well know our first atomic weapon with no testing that's a ten to fifteen kiloton gun type weapon. In some sense any one can do that now fifty years later. The point is that technology as we heard yesterday the materials are out there so at some level that you could say you know the 10 to 15 kilotons are some it's actually one definition of a baseline that is achievable any way whether or not you have a CTBT let's stay realistic and realize that because that cannot be constrained, it doesn't mean that the CTBT has no further role and in fact again we can go into gory details to that you want but you know including for Israel, including for the United States the test ban moratorium does constrain further developments for new military applications, the kind of modernizations that were characteristic of that cold war developments and we can go into that in more detail but there is a constraint there.
Speaker 2: But Israel is a way beyond that, I mean way way beyond that and and
Raymond Jeanloz: The way beyond the gun type I agree.
Speaker 2: Way way way beyond that and well they may have tested with the double flash, they included them other flashes at least some believes that and further more some believe that they also were observers at the French tests so I think Israel's especially.
Raymond Jeanloz: Let me also say that a lot of this ambiguities from the past the double flashes and so on. That it can't happen any more and I give the documentation in my paper that the the observations even from the non IMS capability, from the university community alone now is enough to far and see what was possible at that time of that double flash, it will not happen again because people are observing meteors and comets coming into the atmosphere in the real time.
Pavel Podvig: Great thank you one would actually to what extent the this whole discussion about the reliabilities for vocation and need for tests are is it purely American phenomenon because if you look at other countries Russia for example the the Russians designers, they seem to be very confident in their ability to build new weapons without without nuclear tests and actually I I had an opportunity to ask it directly as I know we- we have all the information we need from all the tests that we done and as a matter of fact Russia is actually seems to be at building at least one new warhead for its SLBM and its developing developing ICBM as well. So it's it's not an issue in some way then on certification their in reliability well its its not one hundred percent reliable anyway so what you do and actually if you extend the life of a system, you say well we extent it by ten years but instead of having 99 percent reliability, it will have 98 percent reliability this is what what is done, this is what I know has been done with Russian missiles for example and I am sure the same thing is done with the moving warhead as well. So then you get to the point when what's what's reliable, what kind of reliability do you need for this missions and I would suggest that many kind of possible if you have can imagine missions in the future may not need a weapon with the reliability of the ninety nine percent, this is something that you would need for counter force first strike kind of things which were I hope way back in the cold war. So that's I think we should keep that in mind when we talk about reliability and final very small point on Novaya Zemlya, if there is a concern about that wouldn't be CTBT allow actually a legal inspections of the Novaya Zemlya site, if that was in force?
Raymond Jeanloz: Yes there is a process for that and they are built in penalties for making frivolous request for on site inspections.
Speaker 2: Yes quick reaction to Pavel's remark about Russian approach. Very simple, they believe in the Russian roulette - on the reliability I would like to go back to question which was raised by Richard about tradeoff if we will completely close the loophole for tests would we should be more and more involved security and safety of warheads in the second tier of the nuclear powers and I strongly support what Raymond said. It brings me back to 25 years ago. Actually 25 years ago I was Russian Raymond I was chair of the Russian panel of so what was happening at that time, we had lots of confidential discussions, was governance really using these scientist channel for interesting exchanges. I I remember very well that Americans were extremely enlightened in entire solved safety and security of soviet warheads and we were approached several times - we would like to lure in little bit more about the remissive affection and so we made that all context from the Russian on the soviet side. So that the answer from professionals like General Dvorkin was we already have every changes and that was very interesting story when actually Russians, not soviet then felt extremely confident immediately following dismantlement of soviet union, you remember part of nuclear weapons were left in Kazakhstan part in Ukraine and Belarus and Ukraine for certain short period was considered as a trouble spot because there were a voice in there that may be that they should keep nuclear weapons and so on and there was a confidential classified working group in Moscow, so I know only indirect information made tell me more about it. That the Russians started to sink out how Ukraine can use it Can they throw it to Moscow for example in case of complications and then also experts said - no the electronic code security such it would never provide nuclear detonation whatever your claiming would do so that - actually works and I think journal philosophies if we should understand that we are hostages of illiteracy to some degree of all these Pakistanis, Indians and did go beyond nuclear weapons preset also. For example I am in force of part of helping Indians to build nuclear power stations, we don't need new Chernobyl's in India because of there are a lots of companies competitive experience. So final finally I think it is almost as important to talk to these people about helping them, this is in - permissible seems as for example to have pep talks with kids about contraceptives. thank you.
Matthew Bunn: I was actually also thinking of - you mentioned the questions about safety and security. And I just wanted to make the point that the the safest and more secure warhead is the disassembled warhead and as far as we know that we think is the day of Indian and Pakistani warheads today and so and in in fact the that Pakistanis have said that they keep their warheads in such a way that you know, some parts of the warhead in one building and other parts are in another building so that, by breaking into one building you wouldn't be able to get you know all working of warhead and so, I think rather than focusing on testing, we got to be focusing on convincing them not to shift out of that mode than safer than our mode. And one of the ways we can do that getting back to Bruce's paper we had yesterday is starting to follow their lead as supposed to convincing them to follow our lead and moving our forces to a mode that's more safer in that in that way.
Henry Kissinger: Why they are safer? Why is it safe?
Matthew Bunn: It it can't be detonated if if it's not assembled.
Henry Kissinger: Then but, whom are we afraid of detonating it? Who are we afraid of? It is the Government detonating it?
Matthew Bunn: Indeed well, there is there is no possibility of an accident and it's more secure if you have have to break it into two separate buildings. So, in order to get the
George Shultz: Well, great. That was John Abizaid said yesterday.
Matthew Bunn: Right. That it that it doesn't help us on.
George Shultz: When we are on the in side and know about the two buildings and so on. The don't steal what they haven't.
Matthew Bunn: But but additional testing won't help us from that trouble of monitoring.
George Shultz: We have nothing to do with a testing. Sam, can you say that?
Sam Nunn: Yeah. Just in terms of certain ratification, I don't expect it to happen in the next in this administration. So I think a president would have to champion that to get two-third's vote. The key would be looking very closely at the people who are in favor of it, that's one group. They are likely to remain in favor of it, the people who are adamantly opposed on an ideological basis are likely to remain adamantly opposed on ideological basis and the swing boat will be in-between and the key there and would be the approach that I would take is take is each legitimate argument made against it and show how changes as Raymond has done this morning in his presentation have taken place since that vote, so that you basically can say to a Senator, you are right, when you you could possibly been right when you were guessed it before. But you now can be right in voting for it at this stage because of the changes. That that will be an important element.
Matthew Bunn: I think the retirement of Pete Domenici is going to be a problem because I think if he could have been convinced, then he would have brought a lot of votes with him and with him not in the Senate anymore I am not sure there is anybody who has the same level of credibility on these issues that that he had because he was representing both the state with labs
George Shultz: Mike and Dick want to get in this
Speaker 3: What the is there any change in the JCS view?
Sam Nunn: Well, I believe that JCS were for it before. And in of course, General Shalikashvili did a comprehensive study after the fact and laid out a whole course toward ratification. And I think many of his points are still very relevant. Bill Perry, she was very familiar with that. So there is a blue print for dealing with these matters including one of the suggestions General Shalikashvili had was that we put a condition in there that would require a review I believe every ten years and so, I think I think the path is there, the conversations I have had I have have testified several times and the the numerous comments was that couple of senators, after I had talked about this as one of the many steps that I thought were essential in the overall preventing of catastrophic terrorism and gave all the reasons and connected it and two or three of the Senators asked in a Public Hearing, "Can you remind us why we were opposed to the CTBT?" So, it it is not looming large in their consideration now in terms of opposition or our support on voting.
Bill Perry: George let me add with that. The original debate with with the military was not 1999, it was 1996 and at that time, the majority of the members the joint Staff who opposed the CTBT and we had an extensive study of it. A combination of study would appearance before myself and and the joint staff Sid representing Jason and the lab reps including Sig and they gave and an enormously sophisticated and comprehensive analysis as to why it would be safe. That presentation completely turned the situation around and we had a and now is they going to take the president a unanimous agreement of all the members of joint chief of staff that we should proceed with CTBT given that qualification that that General Shalikashvili supported that time. By then, before that presentation the best way to go now that was alone was limited with the yield and the - and the argument you hold should be a kiloton or half a kiloton or what? But in that presentation you completely won, won over the day. I don't know what they are having between 1996 and 1999. But in 1996, that's what turned the time.
Speaker 3: Okay. Sam, I would like to hear a little about what means to be ideologically opposed and hear about duration of this the change to Senate in the time since you were there to get out the the shifts that are taking place now and they will obviously take place in the future, such as the departure of of Pete Domenici. But what is the real meaning behind ideological nuclear
Sam Nunn: Well, I guess different people have different meaning for it, my meaning for it is that they basically are group of people who opposed almost any treaty on the theory at arms control, is almost by its nature negative. And that never works and that agreements don't work and so forth as well. And that's what I mean by ideological, what I believe - they should be given right perspectives those people who had a number of legitimic reasons that they were opposed to it not simply opposed all treaties and they are a number of people who are opposed to almost any change.
Speaker 3: But in view of the rapid and progresses that had been made is now in verification of our ability to determine what actually what is going on down to a very minute level isn't that just then more a function of educating and use the word reaching out to those who would be opposed on the principles to any arm control agreement. It seem to me that it's been a almost a sea chain shift in the added tools of of people toward terrorism and talks concerned about nuclear weapons and Port Security and things we all of those things combined contributed to more rational and stable dialogue.
Sam Nunn: I believe there are lot of people sitting around this table today in around both rings here that it could could make that argument and be very persuasive even to the ideological committed. You know the thing this is the way the politics works. A Republican President if this President decided he wanted to get a ratification, I think he can get it. A Republican President has a better shot in getting ratification if they afford than a Democratic President. Just like a Democratic President has always got to a better shot in reforming entitlement programs than a Republican. It's just the way the system works.
Speaker 3: Could I just add one P.S. on that remark I would put a bit later. But wouldn't that argument or a a presentation by a representative group such as this representatives of this group to leading candidates for election next year?
Sam Nunn: Absolutely. I think that would be one of the strongest things that could be done even if it didn't result in ratifications in the next 18 months. I think it could have a huge effect and what they say during the campaign, if it does come up, it may may not have even come up. But also what the attitude in early '09 but I don't discount completely I mean, I think for instance Dick Lugar - if he thought he had the votes and if he though the White House was anywhere from neutral to favorable, I think he he would be willing to bring it up. Now, I don't speak for him but that's my feeling but I would think right now he believes it would be a major battle and it would not be likely that it would pass and they have too many irons in the fire to basically make us a top priority. That, we had conversation going on and I am pretty sure that's his view right now.
member. 
