George Shultz: Two and three quarter hours and here is the way I suggest that we precede. We had a discussion before at last simulated by Jack on North Korea and Iran and related matters, and I have a lot of people who want to speak and I have got the list here. I understand that Sid has been to North Korea, not to long ago and may have some special insights for it, some of we want to get that, but I thought we might start by asking Max to give his overview and then we could hear from Sid, then also in going through my list. But I would regard this as a kind of an overall session where we are trying to report on all of the things that we heard, and see how to put them into perspective, how to pull them together. And what we are going to do here is; number one, ask all the people who have contributed paper, I believe in discussing who to look them over in the later of the discussion, and have them back here by November 25th, so roughly a month. And well last going on we will try here Sid and Jim and I to develop some sort of a summary. I just how do you summarize this I don't know exactly, but some sort of a statement that tries to pull things together in one essay. And that is having and learned in petrifaction that has that has we have thought about this different that we all are involved in. We think that the next step should be having a meeting in some other country, and inviting people from around different countries and hear their perspectives. And as it happened we have an invitation come to us from Norway, from the Foreign Ministry. They want to host a conference in this sort, and they seem to be quite ready to do work with some and and they they have to listen and so on. So it could perhaps serve that purpose or at least part of it. And then we probably want to have another one, we thought London as a place in part because the Prime Minister is very interested in this subject. There have been comments around the table from time-to-time that when this group might meet again and, at least from my stand point I do not know how you feel about it. But I have found this in a day and a half and so far to be really extraordinary, and I have learned a lot. I am very impressed - I was very impressed with the papers as papers and then getting to know the people who presented them a little better makes me the more impressed with the learning that can come from sort of reunion ourselves in one way or another. So at some point I am just speaking from myself, at some point on the road, I think with perhaps some background of what feedback we get and others think the other people who might do that and in a sense where we got from here and something like that So that's sort of proceed what we have in mind and and then in terms of where to go and so on, and we are of course very interested in everybody's feedback, we regard this has a joint effort, and as I said last night didn't really never kind of managing these here Hoover but its become a Stanford what project and we have fortunately a great university here to grow on. So it's that kind of an effort I would have to say in terms of the organization of this meeting, finding people to do the papers and so on I have to give - and Jim could be he had done a fabulous job in bringing us together, thank you Jim. So with that may be thank you would make a few comments to us in the overall picture, then you will turn to Sid, I wont straight going to and by list and I think what we are looking for is broad recollections on what have going on here and I haven't in my mind also Henry your comment about the importance of some sort of a global overview and at some point when you raise your hand I am inspecting you will get a start on that and I might say Harry and the paper that we put in for the book try to get some part on that, so Max
Max Kampelman: Thank you George, for me this morning's was really a humbling experience, and I think perhaps many of us who have not have the training that was reflected here in this morning finding necessary I think to consider all of these considered issues that have been raised here and that are directly affecting the kind of goals that we all seek, and yesterday I spoke about the opening of our conference on the importance of the "ought" - the emphasis on the "ought" to achieving a world without nuclear weapons. Now how to turn that "ought" into a realized joint enterprise is the subject that I think we will try I will try to address this afternoon briefly The drive for international sanity which I think is an appropriate word to use, it is an international drive and we know that our goal requires the talents and the leadership of this group and off those individuals like the members of this group who had an intensive and excellent experience with the world of of weaponry, that's been the subject matter so much of what we are talking here. And in order to addresses it will require a kind of a coordinated effort and leadership by the scientific community which after all give birth to the technology, and in the hope that this can give us an understanding of how best to assure the result, the result that the technology itself can indeed be honest to become the salvation of the human race rather than an instrument towards destruction of the human race, which is concerned - which concerns us. I don't believe that we should that we should think of our goal of zero as some far off or unrealistic position, and its clear to me from this morning session no more should we think of it as simply as symbolic gesture. And I think really as I considered this morning that we should consider the danger that Martin Luther King faced when he made a statement saying that one of his threats to what he was achieve turned to achieve is the "Paralysis of Analysis". And we have had a lot of it analysis this morning and I hope that it doesn't paralyze us and and lead us to a kind of defeatism or over sensitivity through the problem. Depending threat of world catastrophe, I think gives us a historic opportunity to achieve all a goal of zero by attempting to create a joined enterprise of science and politics. In the paper that we are discussing that we have distributed though I am distributing this afternoon, we put forward three options. For how it will work with the world of leaders in order to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons and the "ought" into a joint enterprise of those of us emphasizing the "ought" and the world of science which created the problem and which is also making the series effort to try and deal with the problem. Now it's our impression that unless our government has a change of heart, it's going to be a while before we can start this this process of moving toward the goal that requires the dedication to to peace. My original hope was that this process could begin with this president and number of us has made serious efforts to reach this administration because this is our administration today, it is it is our government today. And without going into detail, I simply want to say that the responsible decision makers in this administration are aware of the issue, aware of the activities that some of us are making to constructively deal with with the problem. But I cannot in confidence today say that I expect any response from the administration, other than the response of listening which I have had, politeness which I had, interest which seems apparent and nothing further coming from it so that realistically in my head, I think in terms of 2009, rather than 2008 as a forum and an opportunity to move toward with our with our but with other side, which I have I have expressed. I think we have to utilize the process that allows for both the substantial latitude at the outside for the United States and for Russia. But in my view I believe the early involvement of other key states besides Russia and the Americans that is also indispensably necessary for us. I think and I say I think rather than I know because we are in a situation which is breaking new ground as as I observe it And my own view and the view of some of us with whom we have been working in Washington on this, we believe that the president of the United States ought to be the voice of sanity and responsibility with respect to the goal of zero. This does not mean the president of the United States should not consult with lets say, the leadership of the United Kingdom, the leadership of this of Russia and try to repair before the united nations with some background and may be an open invitation that says, join us in this in this effort that we are making to try to get zero results there. And actually, certainly in my belief, meetings in Europe, I found interest in this. And I think I indicated earlier that I received interest also in the part of Russia at least when they designated and they asked, their radio or television to come and interview me about the subject. I think it it is there. In any event, I do believe the president of the United States ought to appear before the United Nations general assembly. Speak for the people of the United States to the people of the world and the general assembly is the only body I know that can make any claim to be the people of the world. And I believe really, tactically, no that's not fundamental. I really think the importance of the issue should be highlighted we are just calling for a special session of the general assembly in order to make that that declaration, that offer, that that commitment, that aim to go to zero. Now, obviously this brings the mind President Reagan's trust but verify. It would be totally naïve to simply be talking about the peace objective the commitment to peace. Asking the world to commit itself the peace without understanding the vital, the indispensable questions of verification. I can say that where ever I have gone and talked about the concern is the concern with verification, how do you know they will cheat? The Chinese won't tell you or what ever else might be related. It's what at least has to be dealt with and we all know and certainly with the discussions we have had here at this meeting, we all appreciate that verification is a difficult task. And we have to look to the scientific community before the question of verification. And my own fault is and those of us who have talked about this tend to agree that what we ought to be doing and I would translate this now into the president's resolution to the United Nations general assembly speaking to the people of the world and then the people of the United States. You better recognize the difficulty of verification and assigned to the security council of the United Nations, the task of coming up with adequate verification that can satisfy the understandable doubts about its practicality. And that at least is I would perceive to be the skeleton around the objective of what we were trying to achieve. It therefore is if I can use other words it strikes me that the "ought" that we were achieving or trying to achieve requires a; getting other countries and forces of other countries to be associated with us, and also secondly to ask the world of science to prefect the Inspection system and the Verification system. Its after all the world of science which has created the weapon, and having created the weapon lets invite the world of science in order to deal constructively with the world that that weapon has created at least that's the way I look up on it, and in an event we know this is some thing that affects the world and then I think the after effect should be presented to the United Nations and I certainly hope that a a President, our President should accept the leadership role and represent the leadership role, and I make this recommendation, we have a number of us who have been working on this subject, not out of any undo optimism, but also as a conviction that the absence of a serious effort to achieve this goal could turn out to be catastrophic for the human race, giving what some answers produced for us in the realm of destruction, and I guess in some ways that the challenge to the world of science to say, we created this instrument of destruction makes now help in creating an instrument which will give the bad consequences that have flown, that are flown from it. And I guess thought about summarizes where we are - it's a great deal of work to be done and we should not believe that we can perform the service in this assignment easily, it will there will be great deal of effort and great deal of thought and a great deal of International co-operation, and I guess that summarizes I think the the situation for at least our group work in the area.
George Shultz: Thank you very much Max, you have always been an inspiration on these things to all of us. Let me say an alternative way of going about it with the United Nations at least as I would see if I were President and I decided that this was something I wanted to do, what would I do. I think the first thing I would do is go to my counterpart in Russia, and discuss. And if on the basis of that discussion we had agreement, then I would go to the British, the French, and the Chinese, and see if I could get them on board. And with them on board I would go to the Indians and the Pakistanis. I wouldn't go to Israel, and having done that and with people agreeing to go forward then I think I might go to the United Nations Security Council and having the P5 in my pocket it wouldn't be so hard, and try to get and I would get a kind of UN Mandate that way. On the basis of that I think there might be benefits from something in the General Assembly, but I think that has to come after the main players have figured out what they want to do I don't think it's going worthy other way around. So I just - I think I respect your vision a lot, I just put of in a little different way going about it and as I would see what these from my standpoint I have said before what we were trying to here is having as inspiration, the vision that you have laid out so compellingly. We're trying to say to ourselves what steps do you need to take if you are going to get this. You have been discussing them, and we try to get this under our belts the best we can. And I am sure we are going to have to have some iterations. This is not going to answer all those questions. And then a lot of people around the world get an idea of what we were doing, and I am talking to people, I am talking to people, sort of our peers, so to speak, around the world. And get some sense of how this is viewed in other countries, and have that often to the President of the United States. That we have here an idea, we have some support, we have the beginnings of buildings, understructure of this house, and some papers describing it, some people who have worked on these steps, who are willing to work, and people from varying political backgrounds who were willing to stand up and say if you make answer I am willing to standup behind you and say we support it. I think I would go about at that way, but I think we are long ways from that posture, and one other thing that strikes me all in time and particularly strikes me is when I get a letter from somebody that I respect who writes and says I think your overall vision is never going to get achieved, but I think these steps that you have outlined are very important to take. And I think Sam has noted once or twice during our conversations is it's not as though nothing is going on, there is a lot going on in many of these areas. And we want to encourage and this is who I think the building examining what we are doing and building some sort of consensus, I think that I just want to state that out, it's a little different way of going about it than what you outlined but I don't want to I don't want to get in an argument with you Max because you beat me every time.
Max Kampelman: No, no, no, as a matter of fact I am going to agree with you. I also, within this room, state that one of the reasons that I didn't quite go your way but the other way is because I recognize that the current President of the United States is in serious political trouble and I was thinking of appealing to him this way by letting him try to be the the public hero but it hasn't worked for him but I think your plan is a much more efficient one.
George Shultz: But that now we had - what I continue on my list here a little bit and I think Sid had some comments about North Korea that I would like him to make and then I am going to start Graham, Bill, Sergio and so on to my left so that if you hold your hand up I will. And I always call on Sam out of turn, so, Sam?
Sam Nunn: You know, I have a very modest proposal. I will wait my turn George.
George Shultz: You have your turn right now, go ahead.
Sam Nunn: Okay, well one thing I think is the pragmatic thing to do, and Sergio thought a year I think, I would like to propose it I could find it in Moscow was Senator Lugar, but there is a UN Security Council Resolution 1540, and 1540 requires states to enact and enforce laws to prevent the WMD proliferation by non-state actors, Monitory Control System, Technologies, Materials, states must report to the UN on how they comply with the resolution. Committee was established to receive the country reports, but there is no mechanism for evaluating effectiveness of states' measures, there's no mechanism to help states implement their obligations. Sixty of the countries in the world haven't even filed reports, and this has been a resolution for the last two years. It goes to the heart of of controlling and preventing catastrophic terrorism. The countries, a lot of the countries that have filed reports basically admit they didn't really know what they were filing and have done a very inadequate job, at least that's my impression. So, I mean, here we have a UN resolution dealing with this subject that clearly is being largely not implemented - at least successfully. Now if we're going to use the UN under anybody's approach, Max's or George's, at any point down the line in this process, then the resolutions have to be taken seriously. Also combining that that challenge with my view that the US and Russia need to move to another plane of cooperation, we have had the Nunn-Lugar program for 15 years. I think it should continue, but in my view it's it's going to gradually erode and unless the Russians do a lot more themselves and unless Russia becomes a partner on a global basis, not the only partner but a major partner. Now we have had 15 years of experience of working sig, lab to lab, military to military, all sorts of cooperation is going on at very key levels both in the Military and Departments of Energy and State Department. What better way to try to take Russia with the United States and have us move together as global partners, then to offer expertise from Russia and the United States based on our 15 years of experience to the IAEA and to the Security Counsel for any country they would want our assistance, and trying to implement resolution which is called for already by the UN. So what I am suggesting that this group could perhaps endorse, at least consider, is calling on the President of United States and the President of Russia to appoint, they could start off with ten people, it could end up at 20. We would we would have highly trained specialists who have really done work together already, be available, to any country that would choose to use those experts under the auspices of the IAEA. The IAEA should technically be able to do some of this themselves and they can but they are woefully underfunded and in effect we'd be supplementing the IAEA. So that's the modest proposal, it doesn't have the grand vision that Max is talking about and it's not in any way in response to that, but I think it's a way we can begin to make Russia a global partner and also to address a critical need and countries that have all sorts of nuclear materials out there, including mostly dirty bomb material, thankfully not the weapon grade material, but nevertheless they are being called on, this is a serious resolution but it is not being taken seriously and most countries don't have the capability to deal with this, so that's that's my proposal, that we think of doing something like that.
George Shultz: If you want to comment on what Sam I am just said -?
Speaker 1: I will just I will just get on the on the list.
George Shultz: Okay.
Speaker 2: I think it's a very appropriate moment, after Sam spelled the idea of bilateral approach to tell that this morning from the podium of United Nations, Russians and Americans jointly invited the rest of the world to join INF treaty. This is a response to Putin's complaints; I think it's very important.
George Shultz: You say joint US-Russia-
Speaker 2: From the podium of United Nations this morning.
George Shultz: Okay now let's just hear one comment on North Korea. Sergio Duarte could you tell us what you have in mind there?
Sergio Duarte: George Shultz the way this came about it is Henry and I had a lunch time conversation about North Korea and I started it by saying to Henry that I disagree with the fact that one shouldn't do bilaterally along with sixth party. But my own experience with working with the North Koreans is that the bilateral is a very good adjunct to this sixth party. One of those examples is for is that we've had access to the North Korean facilities that no other countries have had, and for example you know I was I was in Yongbyon the Nuclear Fissile in 2004 that was by 2005, six, and seven. I was taken there by my colleague John Lewis who has had a long standing relationship. My nuclear colleagues in China, in Russia, South Korea, Japan are all extremely envious that I was able to get inside the Nuclear complex when they were not able to get inside the Nuclear complex and the bottom line is that the North Koreans really do look to talking directly to the Americans, in addition to the sixth party process. And so that led us to Henry then asked me Sergio what did you learn? And I'll try to summarize that for you quickly that in 2004 when we went there we actually got into Yongbyon, and Henry asked so why would they allow you into the facility and the bottom line is that they wanted to get the message to the United States is look - we have got we have got plutonium, we have got nuclear weapons, that you need to pay attention to us, and they used my visit to be able to demonstrate that. That's one of the not only did they show me the plutonium but I held it because I didn't believe that it was plutonium. I had to make sure that it was heavy and warm and it and it was both. And then in 2005 and '06 John Lewis and I went back again and in 2007 just two months ago we were back there again. And so when I asked Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan so why did you let me in this time and it turns out he again let us into the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. And I crawled all over that place, plutonium facility, uranium fabrication, reactors, everything. And he said, well, look you know, we shut this place down and we have got it locked and sealed from IAEA, but you still have so many skeptics in your country. And I want you to go and tell them that we really have shut this down. And so then again Henry asked me so what's your assessment? And so what I told them on the basis of what we have seen and what they have told us. The combination is such that as far as I am concerned at this point that the North Koreans have really - they have made the decision, they are not only willing to shut down the Yongbyon but in essence to eliminate it. And so that means that whole plutonium production complex, they are ready to eliminate it. So you might ask well, why are they willing to do that at this time and again on the basis of these four visits as we have looked that what their capabilities are is the way that I would assess them is they they could continue to sort of limp along and make one bomb's worth a year of plutonium. But for a whole bunch of reasons they are not able to ratchet that up the way they could have done in 1994, because if they go to next reactant which makes ten bombs or they thought of next one which makes you know, another 50 bombs' worth. So they actually have a serious industrial limitation, their industrial capabilities have declined substantially from 1994. So they are not able to ratchet up the program and they apparently have made the decision that they are willing to trade in what they have. Now what they have, the best assessment we had is sort of 40 to 50 kilograms of plutonium that they have not only made reactive but reprocessed. So that's weapons-grade plutonium. I believe that you know, they may have that's about six to eight bombs. They may have three or four bombs' worth built and rest of the plutonium they are keeping in reserve for when they have the better design. And now that the question is it worth while to shut that place down, and in my opinion it's very unfortunate to shut that place down because what we get is no more bombs. Because they cant make any more plutonium. And no better bombs, because as I said yesterday I don't think they can put one on a missile trip on unanimously on the basis of that one rather limited test. And so no more bombs, no better bombs, that's a pretty good deal. If one can get one more piece of the action that is no export, that you know that's that's the most important aspect is no export of their nuclear material, particularly. Hopefully this is not their nuclear technology. So then Henry asked the next question, what will they do about declaring or about the bombs that they have. My view is in declaration this next time around they are going to declare what's there in Yongbyon. And they will probably at least do or not for what they think is important to get the US off its back as far as uranium enrichment. In other words they will admit something was going on in uranium enrichment. They will probably not fess up to the weaponization activities which I believe now that they had outside of Yongbyon. And I don't think that they have made the decision yet as to whether they are going to get rid of the plutonium and the bombs that they actually have. And I think that they are going to wait and see you know, for each one of these steps what they told us they want compensating measures along the way. And they will wait and see because in the end you know, that's their major insurance policy. So so I think you know, that's sort of my assessment on the best of what we can put together from the visits and the discussions that we've had with them and if you allow me one more minute is Henry also asked me, well you know, what about the regime and and its sustainability, and I told him you know, that's not my specialty, being a scientist, but I do like to go these places with open eyes and I particularly I like to watch people. And so I have been all over Pyongyang and I have being out there at Yongbyon, and I watch people and they let me take photos, hundreds and hundreds of photos of North Korea, most of which is not like anything that you would expect North Korea to look like. But I told Henry, you know, they are loosing the grips slowly but surely. That outside world is creeping its way into North Korea. And one of the best examples of that is in November of last year John Lewis and I were going around and we walked down to the subway because I wanted to see whether they are as terrific as the Moscow subway is they're certainly as deep as the Moscow subway, for similar reasons, and as we were coming out I saw a little boy about eleven years old, about like my grandson, and you know they all wear the blue school uniforms, and then they have the red handkerchief for the revolution and this young man had that, in addition he was wearing sort of a light-colored jacket because it was pretty cold out. So all that is pretty normal, but then I noticed that on his headnd I'll pass this around. he had a baseball cap. And this is Pyongyang now, a baseball cap sideways with a Nike swoosh in the back, and so if you just think about a kid in Pyongyang wearing a baseball cap with a Nike swoosh you know, that world is changing, and that's exactly the way that the South Koreans view that. They say, look, eventually they are going to go down but just give them enough time to go down, and I think what our job is to make sure they don't blow the place up in the meantime. And for them it's important to make at least some technical assessment and - and for interesting reasons they allowed us to do that, and I must try to get a plug in for the two organizations that sponsored this meeting, namely MacArthur and MTI since I am not a university guy and I need support to do these things. They supported my activities to be able to go over there in the first place. So anyway that's the lunchtime conversation that we had.
