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So I have been asked to talk about securing nuclear stockpiles around the world, one of the steps that The Wall Street Journal Op-ed piece laid out. So let me just mention a couple of facts and then make some suggestions and pose some questions. First of all unfortunately it's not as hard to make a nuclear bomb if you have the nuclear material as many people think. It is very possible, that it's if the terrorist could get Plutonium or Highly Enriched Uranium that they could make at least a crude nuclear bomb. The bomb that obliterated Hiroshima was literally a canon that fired a shell of Highly Enriched Uranium in two rings of Highly Enriched Uranium. An implosion bomb which would be required if what they have is Plutonium is much more difficult but its still conceivable, particularly if they got knowledgeable help. There is widely varying security material around the world. This is the picture is a little bit unfair, since this was 1994, I can assure you that building doesn't look like that today. But no in fact this is at the Kurchatov Institute at Kurchatov really for those of us involved really warms the cockles of your heart. It's a very different place today than it was in 1994 in terms of security. But there are more than 40 countries in the world with either Highly Enriched Uranium or Plutonium. Security for these stockpiles varies from excellent to appalling. It is not just a Russian problem. It really is a global problem. In fact the problem is much better now in Russia than it used to be. There are research reactors of Highly Enriched Uranium in the United States that in my view are significantly less secure than the one that I know of with Highly Enriched Uranium in Russia at this point, partly because of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations are quite weak. So it really is a global problem and we need a global approach to address it. Next point is that we can't rely simply on radiation detection borders after the stuff has been stolen. The stuff is small. This is the guy carrying the box with the Plutonium for the Trinity nuclear tests. It's small. It's not so radioactive that it requires special handling equipment or radioactive enough to be especially easy to detect. We fail at stopping many, many turns of drugs coming into our country every year. We shouldn't expect that we are going to have any significant probability of being able to stop this stuff coming into our country. Once it's stolen all of the subsequent lines of defense which are worth investing some in but they are all variations, I am looking for needles in haystacks. Now we have programs in place that are making very significant progress in reducing the threat of nuclear theft. I am not going to go through all of these bars. I have copies of I put out an annual report on this topic, I have a few copies of them. The most recent with me just trying the most recent one, so ask me if you want a copy at all. So we got along the web. The reality is there are still a lot of white space on that chart. And that's after a dozen years and more of work to get this job done. So there is a lot that has been done. Security in Russia in particular has very dramatically improved compared to what it was a decade ago. But there is a lot yet to be done. And the threats out there are big. I mean the reason to be still be worried at all about Russia is not that there are any longer gaping holes and fences that where you know, one guy could just walk through and break a padlock on a building and take HEU and stuff and backpack and walk back up, which happened at one facility, that Bill Parker has written vividly about in the 90s. Rather the reason to be still be concerned is that there are large insider conspiracies stealing almost anything that's not nailed down and there are occasionally terrorist attacks with you know, a couple of scores of heavily armed guys showing up with no warning. And those are hard things to defend against anywhere in the world. A lot of US facilities would have a hard time defending against those kinds of threats. Similarly Pakistan has probably a fairly heavily guarded stockpile, but huge threats being Al-Qaeda's world headquarters insiders that demonstrate willingness to sell sensitive technologies. So there is a lot more to be done. So what do we need to? This sort of boils down the recommendations into the paper into sort of a five point plan. First of all I think in the United States and in several other of the leading countries we really need to have someone in charge. Within the United States we have literally dozens of programs that are dealing with some aspect of the problem of reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism and no one who wakes up every morning worrying about how to move the overall project forward. It needs to be fulltime, it needs to be senior level, I think it needs to be in the White House. Secondly we need to launch an urgent global campaign. This needs to be sort of the thing we raise with at every opportunity with every country that has stockpiles just pure or resources to help. That's not where we are right now. Thirdly we really need effective global standards for security for nuclear material. Right now it is really largely up to the decision of every country where this material exists, how much they want to do about securing it. But the reality is given that it is possible to transport this stuff across borders and so on, that nuclear security is really only a strong asset we can still make. I think UN Security Council Regulations 1540, which many people haven't even heard of, creates a new binding legal obligation on every country, or at least every UN member state essentially every country to provide appropriate, effective security and accounting for their nuclear stockpiles. But nobody is bothered to define what on earth an appropriate effective nuclear security system or an appropriate effective nuclear accounting are. I think we need to work together with a number of the other leading likeminded states, including the Russians, but also the French, British, Germans, and so on till they are. What are the essential elements of an effective nuclear security system and then begin leaning on countries to put those elements in place and saying, we will help them. What? It's a Bush Administration initiative. It was April 2004. It was then renewed in April of 2006. It was pushed through by John Bolton. There is absolutely no doubt about it. But then it's essentially we created a wonderful tool and then we haven't used it, that tool very much so far. You need we need to focus on more than we have on building sustainability and security culture. If all the equipment is unused and broken five years after our assistance programs phase out, we will have accomplished what we wanted to accomplished. Were if it's not being used properly now there was an absolutely remarkable article in 2003 by the Security Chief for Seversk which is probably at that time the world's largest Plutonium and HEU processing facility, rivaled only by Mayak, where he described for example guards routinely patrolling with no ammunition in their guns, which makes perfect sense if you want to avoid accidental firing incidents and you don't expect there are going to be any attacks on that launch but obviously it creates a security problem even if you have got good security, and he described a large number of other problems including massive corruption among the guards. He said they become the most dangerous internal adversary. So we need to do a lot more on that front. And we need to expand and accelerate efforts to just remove material entirely from as many places as possible, especially the most vulnerable places. This means converting research reactors and the use of Low Enriched Uranium rather than Highly Enriched Uranium. It means giving reactors that aren't really needed an incentive to shut down. It means giving people incentives to give out the HEU at their site and let it be shift away. That way we can achieve prior security at lower cost, by defending a less smaller number of places, and it's not just research reactors. I mean Russia for example has a massive number of places where nuclear weapons are stored still. It's much smaller than it used to be. But it still many more bunkers than you could possibly actually want to have from the long hall. At the moment we are busily trying to secure them all and there hasn't really been enough I think of a focus on you know, let's really talk to the Russians about putting them in a smaller of places as the United States. So that just show you that security culture does matter. This is a security door that was propped open even when the general accounting office investigators were coming by and with that about -. So how do we overcome the obstacles? There are lot of obstacles to moving this thing forward. Its not that you know, people have been idiots and haven't been doing anything. People have been doing as much as they possibly could figure out how to do and running into obstacles. There is fundamentally a lack of belief in the threat. There is a huge number of people around the world in our country, in Russia, in many other countries, that just don't believe it's plausible, that terrorists could make a nuclear bomb. I am prepared to stipulate that it may be a relatively low probability threat, but given the immense consequences, we still have to worry about it and do something about it. And we need to get that message across. There is complacency about the existing security measures. I think a lot of Presidents and Prime Ministers are told by their nuclear minister oh don't you don't you worry about it, everything is taken care of. And then as I am sure the President of the United States thought until August 29 and noticed that may be not all the control measures were as they should be. There is also an immense concern over national sovereignty. Each country says I don't want you telling me I am going to manage my nuclear security. There is also almost total secrecy about nuclear security. And that makes it very difficult to co-operate. One of the things that UNSC 1540, for example, requires is that every country has to file a report on what it has done to implement the resolution. And Pakistan's initial report on the subject of security for nuclear weapons and material says, and I quote, "Appropriate effective measures are taken." It does not provide a lot of information. Indeed. So, I think that the first and the most important key is convincing political leaders and nuclear managers around the world that this is in fact a real threat and it's a real threat to them, even if the bomb goes off in New York, the implications are going to be worldwide in a way that will affect everybody, in a very profound way and its therefore worth putting in significant investments at the earlier time in research, just to do something about it. In this report and in my paper, I laid a number of ideas for trying to to convince you know, make that case to people around the world, joint briefings on the threat by experts on the United States and experts from the partner country that you are interacting with at that moment. Nuclear terrorism, war games and exercises which can sort of get you in the gut more than a briefing or reading a report or what have you helping countries to do their own fast paced nuclear security reviews, where they where their leaders designate a team of people that they trust and say are our science defended against X, Y and Z? Go out and take a look. We have done that at DOE sites on several locations after 9/11 being an obvious one, and come back with a lot of vulnerabilities that needed to be fixed up. Realistic Red Team Time tests where you actually have people trying to break in as outsiders or trying to smuggle stuff out as insiders, can be very convincing to high level people, that its not just the security people always wanting money, that there really is a problem with that that needs to be addressed. And shared incidents shared databases of nuclear security incidents just as an example in 2003, there is a Russian court case that involved a Russian businessman who had been offering $750,000 for stealing weapon grade Plutonium and had made contact with a couple of people who lived in Sarov, to try to close such a deal. Fortunately for the world he made the contact with scam artists, who ripped him off. But I have yet to meet anyone in a Russian nuclear side who had ever heard of that case, including security managers in Russian nuclear site. If they are businessmen offering a century's worth of the average wage which was true at that time isn't true any more - $750,000 for stolen weapon grade Plutonium, that's something security managers ought to know and are to be documented in some database that they are required to look at and keep up on. So, the final question that I would pose for people in addition to how do we overcome these obstacles is how much difference would have re-commitment to the vision of eliminating nuclear weapons make in changing the context for these kinds of national discussions and helping to convince states to sign up to things like an effective and stringent global standards for how would all these be materials should be secured. I am on two minds on that subject myself and I differ from what other people thing. So that's my intro. I have a simple question related to the first issue of simplicity of making the bomb. What is your view? What went wrong with the North Koreans? Why their explosion you know, did not succeed with yield? The short answer is I think we don't have enough data. I would make the point that there is a big difference between an unsafe unreliable, uncertain yield bomb that a terrorist might want to make and a bomb that even a state like North Korea wants. One theory that I have heard about their bomb is that they were attempting to make one small enough that it would fit on a missile, so they could actually deliver it. And that's totally different from what a terrorist would be happy with. A terrorist bomb doesn't even a terrorist implosion bomb doesn't have to be as complicated as the Nagasaki bomb, and I shouldn't go any further than that. But it doesn't have to be as complicated as that. It wouldn't necessarily have a huge yield. But it might have the yield that would take out you know a whole bunch of blocks of a major city. The other think that's important to understand is if a terrorist bomb does go off anywhere, whether its that group or some other groups, somebody is going to come all up and say, I've got 10 more and they are already hidden in cities, and I am going to start setting them off unless you do X and Y. And that's going to be on the TV and people are going to start fleeing the major cities and we are going to have just really chaotic and disastrous situation on our hands. It's much more than just you know, this particular zone of this major city went away. Its it's really going to be its going to change America and the world for ever, if that if terrorists actually manage to pull that off. I have a question. Who is the partner that is on your chart? It says you as end partner will have these discussions, whom do you have in mind? I have in mind pretty much every country where these stockpiles exist, and that's about 40 countries. So you know, Russia is an obvious one; we have been working with them for a while. China, there is only just beginning to be some cooperation with China and its solely on their civil side of the house so far, and of course almost all of their fissile materials are on the military side of the house. India has totally stiff armed us so far. I disagree with Bob. I do worry about nuclear material in India. They have some significant terrorist problems in India; they have some significant corruption problems in India. I worry about nuclear material in Japan and in various other developed countries. I worry about nuclear material at some of the research reactors in the United State. I don't think they are the highest threats in the world, but they are not as well secured as they ought to be. My question is always gets to the same point. How do you get countries? I mean when you have a partner, that's one situation. But supposing a country that should be a partner doesn't become a partner, then what do we do? I think again that's part I think one possible answer to that is this effort to convince countries of the reality of the threat, and the threat to them, not just the threat to us. I think global trade for one thing, something India is very dependent on, would be severely affected, if there were a terrorist nuclear attack, especially if it happened you know, a container in a port. That would be just a huge impact on global trade. So I think we need to focus on convincing countries that its in their national interest, not just that we want them to do it, that its in their national interest to do something more about that. Yeah, couple of points one I thought Matt's paper and also Bob's in some way, provide a very important answer to Richard Pero's comments about good guys and bad guys, because good guys and in betweens we have to worry about these kinds of problems as well, especially as the growth of nuclear power occurs. And I am struck we have a tendency in the United States to say we are looking at proliferation worm saying what's ambiguous, what that country's intent is? Are they going for the bomb, are they going for nuclear power, how do we know? When many cases it's not an ambiguity, its ambivalence, countries start programs and they could go either way in the future. I would count France, I count India, I count South Africa, as not starting their nuclear programs with a bomb in mind but eventually going that way. So we have to be very cautious in thinking about it's all the way through. Second point, the reason to push on FMCT and fissile security is so hard now, is not just because of the enormous problems that we have here, it's to avoid future problems like the ones we have. So when Henry Kissinger says well, what about the all the unaccounted for materials, that's a real problem. If we don't get the security culture right and the rules right, and the procedures right for new countries developing nuclear power, we are going to have many more problems like that in the future. So as the growth of nuclear power occurs, these kinds of issues are crucial to get right for new states developing power. And the last one I want to make this echoes your final comment, Matt has a very nice quote of Kofi Annan's in his paper, in which he says that trying to convince Global South, that you should be more concerned about nuclear terrorism than you are because a terrorist incident will harm the development of the developing world in great ways that you are not truly anticipating right now. Steve Steadman, our Stanford colleague, was very active in pushing that line when he was Assistant Secretary General in the United Nations. I think it's very, very important for many other countries who aren't active players and they seem to think, oh this is a problem for other people. We don't really want to spend the money to get rid of the HEU in our reactor, because it will be a danger to you, not to us. So we don't want to spent money on security guards, over our developing program, because that will be a problem for you, not for us. We need to reverse that view, because a serious nuclear terrorist incident regardless of who start where it came from, is going to harm us for all throughout the world. And most people don't recognize that to the degree that they should. I would like my that's report not surprising and I this annual report card that he does according to the eye is worth to read for anybody seriously interested in the topic. And actually there is a piece of good news. So we should have some good news here. If you look at the rate in which weapons and materials in Russia has been secured Rose said something about that earlier. Since Bratislava, where Bush and Putin took some personal responsibility for the first time, appointing someone in charge of part of it, for the first time. It's Bodman on the American side and Kiriyenko on the Russian side. And then actually both of them will be held accountable for giving a report, how they are doing every six months. And the rate of securing has gone up significantly. Bodman is confident that before President Bush leaves Office at the end of 08', they will have secured all the weapons and materials that they have agreed to secure, to comprehensive upgrade standards. So I would say, overall this is a good story. Certainly if you if you look at the trend, the trend is up and the elements of it are not very mysterious, mainly the President taking some responsibility even though he is not calling up about it everyday, a person like Bodman does think about it almost every day, hence some accountability. So I would say that's the first element. Secondly to the question Henry refers, I would say that the issue is how to get this to be an issue for the President of the Countries that matter and the thing that I have recommended for that would be some version of an international club or alliance, they call it different ways, but a meeting in which each person who got to sign up and sit at the table guarantee to secure all weapons and all material on their territory to the highest standards. And they do so in a way that's transparent enough to the other people sitting at the table. If they can assure their own citizens that they are not going to be blown up by a terrorist bomb from the other country. So you need a portfolio of transparency arrangement were a number of those we have experimented with and again go back to Rose's statement earlier, the amount of cooperation about securing Russian nuclear weapons would knock your socks off. So the things that are the goals absolutely the goals would be a very good concentration about and the thing like trusted agents and sampling, so I would say this is not a hopeful situation which you would like as a club in which Musharaff who would so much want to be a member, that he would sign up to guaranteeing of doing some hard things inside Pakistan and ditto of course, India. So that's the second point. The third point is that direct to Matt's question. If one is trying to motivate this agenda, what you would need for motivating, and how and then to what extent and you said, you are two minds about it would a commitment to deep reductions, even to zero as what would then be a long term program, because its obviously not going to be quick. How would this add to this? And I hope we come back to that because the question is, yes for sure that this is a good agenda, that if one nuclear bomb blows up in any of our cities this is going to be a catastrophe is a pledge that we've got to eliminate all American nuclear weapons, a significant factor in terms of leverage with respect to the things that we know we need to do for providing nuclear terms. And if you takes a pledge to get rid of all American nuclear weapons to get agreement to, then we are in pretty bad shape. My question is how would this how would this pledge the pledge that I can imagine people making is that all weapons and all material in US will be secured as good as gold. I can imagine that as a pledge. And I can imagine Putin saying the same thing, because as Matt says, he has got more interest in a weapon or material getting lost. The Chechens get it, they are going blow Moscow first, not not cease it. So there is a basis of real national interest in. The question is whether, from Presidential commitments, you could get leverage on this issue, and I don't know what the answer is. And I thought that Bunn in his presentation said, he was unclear how much more leverage or how much more or otherwise you get, from the further pledge, to start a program that would eliminate all American nuclear or all nuclear weapons everywhere. Well I hope at some point we get back to that question of how much leverage you get or what why not. I think there are two separable questions. One is how much political oomph to get out of the pledge, and the other is how much sort of technical benefit do you get by actually implementing the various stages of the process. Obviously if you got to the point where all nuclear weapons had been disassembled, nobody would be able to steal an assembled nuclear weapon anymore. If you as Bruce was pointing out, if you got to the point where you weren't relying on nuclear weapons anymore, and therefore had no requirement to maintain them anymore, then you wouldn't have a lot of nuclear weapons on the road all the time, going back and forth to the maintenance facilities. And that would be a benefit in terms of security for nuclear weapons. But all of those are fairly far down the implementation road. Those benefits are starting to arise at Stage Three or Stage Four. We really need some big benefits now to get this get this agenda. If you think the two together Allison or Graham thinks its inspiration, or an incentive also could provide an alibi for not cooperating until well it's completed and it seems to me we ought to consider as we go through all of these things, that we don't defeat what can be done - by setting a goal that is that none of us agreed we can able to do describe exactly out of reach. Right in terms of the alibi, it's already sort of happening in the sense that Bill Potter will tell you, there is a meeting last year in I can't remember, Stockholm or Oslo? Oslo where the technical people more or less agreed that conversion of research reactors to low enriched Uranium, that couldn't be used in a bomb, was sensible, could be done, we should move forward on it, etc. And the political people, especially the South Africans were sort of in the lead, were saying wait a minute, why should we do anything about our HEU and research reactors when you nuclear weapon states haven't done enough on your you know, giant stockpiles of HEU for nuclear weapons. And to me it was sort of you know, why should I do this good thing if this other good thing isn't happening. It seem to me it didn't seem to add up. But that was the that was sort of the political reality at that meeting. William Potter I have William Potter, Sergio, John, Abizaid, Raymond, Rose, Richard, Sid, Ash, that's well it. Thank you. Yeah, and I think you know, you and many others have observed what seems to be a disconnect between the Russian concern at one level with nuclear terrorism, in which they share our concern. And much greater concern when you are on the ground, talking to the folks of the facilities in over radio active sources as opposed to just material security, and in fact if one goes back to the last major document that the Russian government produced, which was their June 2006 White Paper, they are almost dismissive of the threat posed by terrorist seizing the material and fabricating an improvised nuclear device. Now it's possible that this is its changing but it seems to me it's a fundamental problem if you really want to get to the nuclear terrorism threat. They have the government appreciate the dangers posed by HEU by terrorists who might be able to participate and they provide nuclear device. So I am curious one way we can materialize by assessment and how it might go about changing that mindset and may be if there is a limited folks there was a seminar to start the direction that a part that I know Roosevelt was among with among those testified and the mind staff never anticipated hardly enough that it was a defense ministry which seem to recognize the problem far more than and that it seems to be a fundamental issue we can get going to a that we were talking about I think you are absolutely right and I think again I don't want to be unduly negative about our Russian colleagues because they are at that same level of lack of concern in a lot of other places including and and in much of the United States and indeed the director of MIT research reactor which has twelve and a half kilograms of 93 percent enriched state its core, just about a year before 9\11 wrote a big paper about how silly it was to be worried about HEU and you know, this whole effort to convert research reactors to LEU was a lot of nonsense and we really worked a lot better we gave up on it entirely and so on and so on. And his successor that director is a MIT research reactor after getting up upset with me about something I said about research reactors security and the press, we were discussing the security of the reactors so I will get off this great security one of the things we have you know we have set up so all power goes out and there is an intrusion, and I will be in the dark. I said you don't think that guys will bring a flash light. And so in the Nuclear Industry Air Force have been trained about safety from day one through out their careers, but almost none of them they had really had any serious training about security and so they make functions about security and we just be the level of the analysis we just be left out of the room if it was about safety because they really understand safety and we need to get to the point where we take security as seriously. I think if you think about sabotage I think there is a largely a bigger probability that there is some catastrophic accident at the nuclear power plant because somebody wanted that to happen and internally by accident. And which case our resources are still their whack and there is a lot on safety and almost nothing on security at a lot of power plants around the world. So it's a hard problem that I do share your assessment of many in Russia but there are others who feel the opposite way its there been several quite high level statements in Russia of strong concern about nuclear nuclear weapons terrorism not just meteorological terrorism just in the last two months, and in July said you know we have evidence that terrorists are trying to seize nuclear materials and nuclear facilities in order to make a nuclear weapon and we can look in to briefing up security at our facilities and complement at the cooperation of the United States which for attention that was quite remarkable and the Deputy Foreign Minister the other day just said that we have facts and hard evidence showing the terrorists are trying to get those stuff. He was referring to Milan in the US government I have talked since but I agree completely with you that in many parts of the world and especially the north equator where I come from these issues are not taken seriously almost at all and it's a pity that it is directly its hard to convince these countries including the bio weapons that these are problems that touch us than anything that happens, any any new major disaster that happens due to terrorism with that as not in the sense of people dying, but in the sense of the disruption of many of the ways in which we operate putting to coming and into everything but there is little conscious. My office has done that even before it was there, several - since the 1540 by sponsoring with the funding mainly from the UPN Union, seminars in Africa and Latin America to try to raise the awareness the consciousness of that I think much more that should be done, but I agree that we deal with this is a big problem that must be overcome. And for the last question of my my answer was simple as the last question how would we recommend that, I think it would help them a little because there been commitments before and fortunately they have not been pursued and people are very of recommitments, I think recommitments would be useful perhaps there were the continuation of the work of this group. But this is something I turned to touch up on tomorrow when we come to the some sort of wrapping up our discussion thank you. Sir I think that the situation has already become a huge. The situation once regarded the security of the Pakistani Nuclear Arsenal should concern us every single night. The problem is that one a physical security as one of the political security and the political situation is deteriorating and it is not in probable to conceive the scenario where military forces that become ideologically connected to the extremist transfer their weapon to the extremist and the extremist have said very very clearly they will work to move the weapon somewhere to get used to get started its not just a matter of one weapon it could be a matter of multiple weapons. So while we can talk about the difficulties of security in Russia the United States etcetera in these countries where the ideological royalty of the security forces is involved and where the political situation is deteriorating we don't need to worry about what might happen three years from now we need to worry about what might happen tomorrow. We don't have the same policy tools to deal with the problem I mean the nice things about just safety of the nuclear material is you can put in better security measures as well as prevent that from happening. Better fences are not going to solve that probably you are worried about Pakistan. Just two quick points it seems to me highly unlikely that zero but we have a very non people making decisions about security of existing of weapons where nuclear material. Either they are in different in the compromise or loss of weapons or the material in which case are relevant or they understand the importance of the - it is equally relevant. I think you got attribute on lot of concerns read in this morning there is the demand for nuclear material by terrorism there is a bound to be a supply under some set of circumstances I just been reading the book that's coming out in the December called nuclear jihads some of you may have seen the gallery it's a spell bound in the account of A Q Khan's operation from the very beginning first employment. And what's really striking about is the number of responsible government authorities that they iteratively allowed the supply of all of the elements which the Pakistani nuclear program. The Swiss government knew that the centrifuges that they often launched for shipment they were going to going to do Pakistani nuclear program and enrichment program they concluded that while these system is a force in the head of the individual components were not that was the basis on which they allowed and there was purely for commercial reasons. The Dutch government knew what A Q Khan was doing in time to serious economic proliferation activities they made the liberate decision that cabinet level not to do with because to take the appropriate actions which was well within their capabilities they will have to acknowledge I mean better. The German government authorized sale after sale after sale there were dozens I mean dozens of suppliers to the A Q Khan program in Pakistan, and the governments all over the world approved the transactions and committed that to happen. So I am really worrying about decisions to allow things to happen and particularly where a large sums of large sums of money may be involved. I just wanted to agree with on the point about the will of recommitment to nuclear prohibition how to build the consensus, I don't believe so but I am a bit more optimistic about the grounds well of the policy support for anti terrorism measures. You know, in Russia this is really an area for action and cooperation that's been blessed and I just know to be a part referred to this Duma this Duma testimony a couple of weeks ago but each of those points there on your subjects were addressed by military people saying, we need to write better legislation in these areas, we need to be cooperating Internationally specifically, we need to be cooperating with the Americans in all of these areas which surprise the heck out of me because I had been a custom to cooperation with America being a very negative sense. So I think that we were going to see the most success in building up mostly the momentum is by focusing on counter terrorism as a policy initiative, and I give Bush Administration full marks for things like the PSI for their more recent anti terrorism initiative which has attracted a large number of countries and entire nuclear terrorism initiative. So I think that frankly its been good area and should be one we should replace or emphasis but I doubt that there is a link between the denuclearization recommitment. Comment and a question, the comment that we to have to do with the question of nuclear field of the Korean weapon that came up what was the role before just let me say that Universe advanced nuclear weapon country cannot precisely predict the yield of a weapon, and to think that anyone in their first move become that close to know you them its just my mind unthinkable, its very difficult, especially when you get back to very low level and so I have to really that it was impressive that they got the yield to understand, but I don't think it was something calculated to be carry on missile anything or all like that it just and it just injustice and my question that was you talk about getting to - Let me just clarify I wasn't saying that they wanted to be that yield I was saying that they want to be delight and they may have screwed it up because they were trying to do some thing a little more advanced then Nagasaki - I thought I did get that clear sorry, my question is you there is hope and Sam Bergman have said so to get the 100 percent closure on the weapons, so I would like to know from you first of all what are the main barriers political getting to know too much or financial in completing that the charge on the other aspects from where they knew their jobs and then how do you see that the open threat reduction initiative developing in terms of making progress on the outside - All right, and so the global threat reduction initiative for those of you who don't know is the part of the department of energy that's now charged with a converting research reactors, so they don't use highly enriched uraniam anymore b gathering up highly enriched uranium from these various places and c upgrading security for these places while the highly enriched uranium there. They also - by the way radiological sources which is another important topic that is not covered my paper, and they have succeeded in greatly accelerating the pace at which highly enriched uranium getting moved out to various places and reactors are getting converted. And but greatly accelerating compared to this null space we were at the four is not in my judgment where we need to be. I think we need to look more broadly then they are now doing add the material that needs to be removed if they finish everything they plan, there were still be enough HEU at civilian sides in dozens of countries for hundreds of nuclear weapons, and that should not get the totality of our plan. We should have a plan at the end if is there isn't any HEU civilian sides any where in the world any more. And so I think they need to look at a broader set of reactors to be either converted or shut down, a broader set of materials to be removed from site, higher standards for the security up grades they do with at the moment or basically designed to deal with one outsider and one insider. And I think a broader set of tactics when you look at conversion of research reactors, for an example this, a lot of research reactors out there that were just you know they were designed for HEU, they are in a spectrum where you are just not going to be able to convert LAU but the vast majority of the world's research reactors just aren't leaded at this point and you know IEA which is a very pro nuclear organization has a major about 30 or 40 of the 260 ton of research reactors in the world they are actually needed so that means 80 or the 90 percent of all of them are out dated and we have no program in place yet to convince countries to shut down the ones that are not needed -. I think there is political opposition in a lot of the target countries where these things exist I think there is you know a lot of what we are talking about enrichment, there is the issues of national pride or set pride you know once the HEU leaves our side, what more we have left that makes us important and interesting and so on, may Congo detect an example, believe it or not the Congo has a nuclear research area. They have got HEU, they have got just chivied HEU material, its reactor is so poor for a while they didn't even have a telephone, you know it's in the middle of a civil war. Some of its some of the couple of the few elements from that reactor did show up in the hands of the Cecilian mafia, a decades so ago and there has been an effort to try to convince the Congo to shut down this place and get rid of all the LAU that's still there which was radioactive and with the potentially dirty about there and at least - so on it's just sort of a matter of good governance that there shouldn't be a research reactor in the Congo but because they have a research reactor, they are considered to a country with nuclear capability and therefore they are one of the ones that has to ratify for the CTBT ethnic efforts and this is you know a matter of national pride for them that you know there are up there with a big place because they have a research reactor, if they shut it down, they won't be with the big boys anymore - so you know there is all of the - so to deal with that kind of thing you have to go in at a higher level with a broader set of incentives and pressures both you know serious pressures and real incentives to convince countries to do what needs to be done. I have Ash, Tom, Mark and may be I will draw a line there so that we can get to dinner. I can be brief Mr. Chairman, this isn't a a big point but it's something I comment to your attention as you put this project together, secretary Kissinger said the right thing which is that of the picture you painted here of a world nominally free of nuclear weapons is is not in fact free of risk because of the reasons said and the possibility of rapid reconstitution and so forth and so one important part of the of any - making any kind of scheme like this look that all possible is a depiction at what you do if there is leakage, cheating and so forth and that in turn has two parts, I want to tell you make sure you volunteer that and help hostage by the one guy who has good bomb when everybody else but there is another part of it which is what I wanted to bring to your your attention and I am sorry Mike Mayer isn't here because it's something that he and are working on - because we shared John ____ fear which is that this might actually happen and we need to figure out what we do if and and that - that is the subject of of cooperative response to a nuclear detonation in some city, we have thought a lot about that and have been assisting our own department of Home Land Security in the so called 10KT plan which is one of the options in the national response plan and has a lot of dimensions to it and it's a rather greasily thing to contemplate but since it is - has some reasonable probability meaning in our our future, we need to take a look at it and it gets you to questions like how to predict fall out, glooms whether to evacuate or shelter in place and look part of the population should you expect to take respectively, both of those actions, what kind of doses, first responders and citizens we evacuate, then on to reoccupy their homes should be willing to endure in order to respond, to resettle dealing with the fact that it would almost certainly be believed that the first bomb is just the beginning of a handful and certainly the perpetrator is likely to allege that they got more - more fund that way and so we will all believe that this is just a beginning of more and what you do about that by - I just raise all these because I think that I just think that's part of this project, there needs for the consumer of it not as we sit in this room. There needs to be a picture painted in what you do if and there is a lot we can do and should do and if a nuclear weapon goes off in a city, it will be something that no one will ever forget or forgive at the same time, it doesn't literally eliminate the city, most of the people survive and we can make most of them survive that we take the actions advanced I know the public things the whole city goes away the whole city doesn't go away most of it survives and we need to take care and help the people who do survive and so. That's just something that I want to comment to you, there is no paper written on it or something, when you finally wrap all these up, it ought to be part of the - what do we do if pictures We might say that there are some good amount of motivator that we are looking for, how we get people to take this seriously, in one way you get them to take it seriously you say well, look what happen. I remember I think ____ you have a lot to do with persuading Ronald Reagan to say he would go for a zero option on INF weapons and cut strategic weapons in half and it's time people saw it was ridiculous but it happened that I don't know well I have but it was somewhat interesting to me the first meeting I had with Mr. Gorbachev after the Chernobyl accident, I found that he had asked the same question I had I had as at what does this - how does this relate to what would happen if a nuclear weapon a big drop there and the answer is a study, not a close comparison that so much were assumed that that's not an issue and I said I can't help it longer, if somebody might say suppose one of the high power nuclear weapons were dropped on Los Angeles how that compared with what's going on this is horrendous but it gets hooked you know. I just want to ask you when you have five steps up there, that kind of compare that with a PSI with the proliferation security initiative of them, is there any was that a good paradigm for you or with work or suggest in far order. The proliferation security initiative is a perfectly sensible thing to be doing that's for a mostly different purpose, it's mostly if you want to address things like missiles or major pieces that are occupied with being, that you are going to notice being shipped from one country to another. When you have when you have stuffs that consider a blocks like that, the PSI isn't going to solve your problem I am afraid. Unless you get a tip exactly and if you get a tip, you are going to act for sure and the reality is most of the cases that we know about of the real theft and plutonium and there are such cases we know about not because there was a radiation detector at the board of but because we got a tip, somebody involved to drop the time on the other people who were involved and so we need to focus more when we are thinking about interjecting nuclear smuggling, not just on spending billions of dollars on installing radiation detectors everywhere we can think off but on making sure all of the relevant countries have good police and intelligence capabilities in place to deal with these kind of problem and there there is good cooperation in place and that's been a very hard problem. the reality is the smugglers are multinational and our police and intelligence response has to be multinational and that's unfortunate to been a long standing problem in US Russian cooperation is a lack of real communication about key cases as they as they come up. I understand that this has gotten a little better on recent years but I think both of the Georgia cases on 2006 and 2003 recent cases of seized HIU I think there was significant concern that the Russian were not telling us by any means everything anyhow. Thank you - oh this point has been made already but I just want to emphasize it again the a lot of this discussion is the centered business your own security and in countries like Russia or Pakistan but I think first we should realized that there are limits to security and that it's not really necessarily Pakistan or Russia problem and in fact I would argue that at least Pakistan takes its nuclear weapons very seriously like the United States which has the minute accident actually demonstrated that it it was not really just a break of procedure. If you think about what happened was that the nuclear six nuclear weapons were removed from a US arsenal and it was unnoticed for at least 36 hours and had they not showed that in department sales, we don't know how long people would taken to discover the loss and that's I think that's just amazing, I finally had to believe that the United States have not had a kind of a inventory control that that would allow to actually discover this kind of loss in some reasonable times and I would think reasonable time in this case would be hours, minutes but that's the point and we may have a greater confidence in - when says that he has confidence that there is no material missing from the from the GOE but we may not have this confidence and actually I think after the Minot accident, I would say that we I don't have this confidence, all that I have is in Russia but that's I don't have confidence in GOE either. Another interesting example of - which again is not illustrated, this is not the it's necessarily kind of a Pakistan problem, it is the the incident of the ____ reprocessing plant in UK as in Chernobyl lab, they had a leak in the in the system there and the the - it took them nine months to discover it nine months and they had the ____ safe guards, they had everything in place, it took them nine months to actually realize that something's wrong going on. They lost 200 hundred kilogram worth of plutonium - 200 kilogram so that's that's my point, we should actually accept that this is this is - as long as this suffers Iraq there will be danger of actually loosing it and it's the danger may be actually more serious in in in the United States or in in Europe than in Pakistan that's I will be very quick, first I just want to say that John's stayed on Pakistan with which I agree is is strong support for this zero project and the end zero nuclear weapons may be the only way to control situations like Pakistan and there is got to be more Pakistans and I think this isn't the last one and second responding to something that Ash said few minute ago. Zero won't be free from this because of the issue that ____ was talking about and it seems to me that the reasonable end point of zero would be small virtual arsenals at least for some years until that issue I think gradually over time be accommodated in some way. Thank you ____ I believe the scope for the problem require some prioritization and I think it's useful to remind ourselves what the real nature of the market in elicit materials and elicit technology is. The technology - there are many countries trying to get it, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and India are still are pre-materials - the market is always what we know about its suppliers trying to to sell stuff, the the only demand that we know of is terrorist groups seeking of the actual incidents of it are are unknown but anyway the focus is on terrorists seeking materials and and there you know what you said about HEU and gun type bombs simply the should be the priority and I think you have done that in your paper and the HEU type problem. Yeah I have a couple of things I would like to say, first of all on that I think people often make more of a distinction than they should between HEU and plutonium and I think we absolutely have to secure both of them. HEU is a higher risk but not as dramatically a higher risk as people think. On ____ comments I absolutely agree that this is a global problem I think pretty much every country where this stockpiles exist has more to do to make sure that they are secure but I think in addition to incidence of the kind as happened, it might not - you have to look at the threats and the reason to be concerned about the Pakistan is not that they don't have a lot of security for their nuclear weapons, I am sure they do. It's that the threats are so huge in Pakistan and so I I really think that it is a global problem and that's why we need to focus on a global campaign, global standards and figuring out ways to convince countries to really sign up and be serious about such a global attribute. Thank you very much, it's been a very gripping discussion, I know that was reassuring but anyway there is lots of important work to do, you know a lot of it is a kind of a wake up call and we talked about in various ways here - how to figure out how to do that.