The Marshall Plan and Its Relevance Today

It's my pleasure to welcome you to the first of our book events this is for the Alma & Joseph Gildenhorn Book Series in their conference room and it's my great pleasure to welcome both both of our hosts our moderator and our guest Greg Behrman. My pleasure first is to introduce the moderator Jim James Hershberg you have his biography but let me just say very, very briefly that my husband and I know Jim in very personal ways, so this is a special pleasure for me. Jim met my husband [0:00:53] ____ in at at Harvard, we were sitting at '81 we see the a lot of things there. When he was there at the Charles Warner Center, and Jim was a senior, mostly writing for the Crimson, but thinking about his thesis and they made that connection and a long friendship ever since and Jim went on to be foreign correspondent for few years and then decided in fact to become an historian and took his PhD at Tufts and wrote the definitive biography of James Conant the proper title there is the you get the Jim I am going to forget the title Creating a title of James B. Conant. James B. Conant: From Harvard to Hiroshima. Yeah, the making of the Nuclear Age. I know that the making of the Nuclear Age. Exactly, forgive me. But he is also the founder of the cold war history project which started at the Woodrow Wilson Center and is now primarily a GW where Jim is an associate professor. So I am delighted to welcome him and he will introduce Greg and have a conversation. And of course we will we will here as always to promote books and sell books and that will be done at the end of the end of the session. Thanks. I think you have that actually. Well, okay thank you Susan. Thank you all for coming and I have to say, I am trying to finish a book and help my wife take care of two small kids so I am determinably saying no but it was impossible to say no to Susan literally and I saw it inevitably when I had to say yes, but within a couple of pages of reading Greg's book, I was very pleased to have the pretext to get away from the book I am writing on the Vietnam war and read someone else's take on history because it was quite an enjoyable experience which doesn't mean as once we do that he used to send me the press that we will not have a spontaneous and unrehearsed conversation for you and you know, probably the few curve balls in there. I think you all have buy it so I won't repeat everything in it about, Greg and I think you see the impressive lineage of this book although some academics will sniff you know, that the effect that it does not represent a clear academic track to get there, actually to say - she corrects Susan intro and once I never decided to become a historian and I I started writing a newspaper article that became a 1000 page book and by the end of it I the fact I was a historian simply because I can not write it any more shortly. Greg I won't go through the bio but I think we will just start talking about the book and I will just clarify one thing at the beginning, I am not sure how many of you came because you are devotees of Marshall planned history, how many of you are interested in US foreign policy presently and how many are explicitly interested in the lessons and legacies of the Marshall plan for other US foreign policy endeavors that today you haven't worked out so well. I mentioned when I just met Greg recently, the entire book I think passes without a mention of the word Iraq. But we will inevitably get to you know, whether or not there are some things to be learned or things to be kept in mind as you modestly say at the conclusion of your book. But I thought it would make sense to at least begin by discussing the Marshall plan in it's light and what in it's histories what we can learn about the Marshall plan itself from Greg's book. But I want to start you know, with the inevitable trade question for an author because it is quite fascinating, he is he is the author the "the invisible people" how the US has kept through the global aids pandemic the greatest humanitarian catastrophe or have you gone from there to the Marshall plan as a topic and in particular it didn't come from the presenters interest looking for lessons to apply or was there something intrinsic about that history? Yeah well, you know, I have wrote this book about the global aids pandemic and America's response were really lack of a response and it really became sort of an anatomy of a failure of a sort of application and in the face of this really great humanitarian strategic challenge and so it examined the politics and the personality behind why we didn't do what we could have done and so I wanted to sort of tell the story of where we got it right. the question is you know, where did we where did we meet a great challenge with response that was at once strategic, affective and that sort of reflected you know, our national ideals and what you always hear is sort of the Marshall plans or the archetype of this this sort of program and it's almost sort of come to have this myth quality to it you know, and something goes wrong and chances are someone is going to call for a Marshall plan. And you will see it everything from global warming to post Katrina, new Irelands to Iraq to Afghanistan, so for me and it always had sort of captured my imagination because the myth of these was sort of how I liked to think about America as children of emigrants. And so I want to tell the story, I want to surely get behind the myth and see did the plan live up to it's building and if so my hope is that there would be insights and principles which could serve us well in meeting the you know, our own challenges and opportunities. As I say that about how as I say how it would look behind the tinsel to find the real tinsel underneath when you look behind the myth. Were you surprised, did it rise up to your expectations in terms of the stories you found and how the US conducted itself. There was more contradiction, there was more new there you know, there were things it's often sort of thought of this very generous thing and what I found is that was a it was a no way charity and altruism did not guide it, it was a strategic program, very much meant to very much response to to the soviet threat, to a series of political and economic problems in Europe and it was very much our security and economic interest and it was the Marshall plan helped to fund some of the first covert CIA operations The first diversion for Iran contract if it is? Yeah, but possibly if you know, it was less careless possibly more effective. But I think that but I think that I am but I think that you know, so even in sort of in getting sort of the real picture and seem some of the self interest and some of those things. I actually came to think of it as something greater than is than we think of I think that you know, mature power assonates its national interest, but what was special about the Marshall plan to me is that we were able to pursue our strategic interest in a way that sort of cohered with our national ideals. And we responded to a security threat through non military means through through institution building, creative diplomacy, economic instruments and it was you know, we read the strategic game we did without firing one shot, losing one life and so in that sense I have come to - and it also just scope in ambition even something much greater, much larger or what it aimed to do or how it aimed to refashion the world. so actually I have to come to think of having greater admiration for the plan and it's historic significance. One of the things about the book that's interesting and worth noting is you know, modern history and especially diplomatic history or international history often you know, is continuing between poles, there is sort of great man of history of individuals making decisions and you know, the dead white men of course talking to another as some would criticize versus social forces board trends and you have could be chosen the former without discounting the latter your book revolves around it a number of key individuals who you are paying very engaging and fascinating, but you chose to begin in Moscow in early 1947, and you really set up George Marshall and Joseph Stalin as really opposite poles of the story. Marshall of course will continue to animate Stalin is usually sort of working offstage as a sinister presence but tell us a little of that how and why you chose the structure of the book the way you did? I think because it's one of those areas where there is the classic sort of structure agency problem and I hope I did sort of payee just to say the structure and some of the broader forces but it is one of those moments in history where individuals really mattered were not for Marshall and his sort of strategic vision and he may not have went forward and had it not been for people like George Kennan who approached you know, who introduced containment and a certain sort of you know, strategic principle the sort of goddess in the cold war, we may have reacted differently. People, you know, Winston Churchill wanted to take may be possibly more of a military approach while the America still had the atomic monopoly, so it could have taken many different turns and individuals individual decisions really mattered. Another example is is you know, the plans passage through through congress and the American public was vulgar after the war. Americans have come together to sacrifice as never before during the war they have been for eight programs but so there was an essence of an eight fatigue that they had failed, Americans wanted the peace dividend after after Marshall's speech of Harvard a polling showed the most Americans did not favor the idea of a large ambitious eight program, but but you know, and so Marshall and this statesman actually went out to sort the American public in the Barnstorm and they talked about the plan its need and they highlighted the necessity for they made clear that the Americans would after sort of have to come together and share the national sacrifice, but the main point is that we are not for sort of that decisions like that for the currency of Marshall's prestige on the relationship that Marshall had with the republican senate named Arthur Vandenberg and bipartisan which helped the plan to get to congress, history may have taken very different turns that this was not this was not something that was historically determined or foreordained, it was in my view a product of decisions. And I hope we will come to Vandenberg because this history of the bipartisan collaboration is really again one of the most striking things about history again because of its relative absence. But first talk a little bit about Stalin and Marshall you know, one thing you mentioned that this came upon where new are the orthodox were traditional history of the Marshall plan would be you know, Stalin was up to take over the world starting with western Europe and this was a reactive response. Then you know, eventually things would swing to a more envisioned units you know, this was simply the America self interest economic strategic and otherwise you can to see you know, more gray and in particular you know, you mentioned that Stalin that in the end that you did not find any seeking confrontation but that he wanted peace at his terms and how -- explain how that confrontation between Marshall and Stalin really set Marshall to thinking that something grand have to done and also give us your judgment that you know, was that threat really commensurate? Right, well Stalin you know, saw the world through in an ideological prism, the idea that you know, communalism and capitalism eventually would come into conflict and he had design you know, he believe that communism instead of takeover and grow and communist will eventually come into conflict. And Stalin would pursue expansion opportunistically as he could, but the Soviet Union was incredibly weak after the war, America had come after the war stronger than were with the atomic monopoly. And Stalin craved you know, his greatest fear was sort of capitalist circumvent so he craved after the war sort of a near term you know, if not cooperation at least to modest [0:13:20] ____ where the state could live you know, peacefully for sometime when the Soviet's regain its strength. And so Marshall however saw what was happening in Western Europe, and America's vital strategic interest on during the world war two, the reason why we fought the war was to prevent obviously to sort of defeat the axis powers, but in a larger strategic sense it was to prevent a total training state from the dominating the duration land mass that's how we thought of it. So we had a situation after world war two even though we achieved our you know, our extensible objective and the Soviet Union emerged as a sort of totalitarian power that meant that this over strategic threats still existed and so so Marshall and his colleagues attempted to achieve reconciliation with the Soviet Union, they tended to cooperate to rebuild Western Europe because because that region was sliding, and so overtime they saw this negotiations that soviets would delay they would temporize and Marshall realized that Western Europe was had reached a position of weakness such that he could they could no longer abide it, it represented two greatest strategic threats, and so they have the sort of late night meeting at the Cleveland in which the Marshall makes the last attempt to achieve reconciliation with Stalin and he and Stalin sort of says its important to be patient we must we must be manipulate well cooperation is possible and Marshall realizes at this point he heard that meeting and he is chilled, and he realizes that you know, this is it and America has kind of move forward and even if it meant you know, a breach on which Soviet Union abiding the world into two blocks opposed to eachother. And just to be clear because again in the history of the time and unlike you all that you have to remember those cold war years finally the threat was not so much the march of the - march of the red army westward in any of media sense it was home grown of people its field by economic discontent and social right. It was you know conditions were were in western Europe were such the they caught beyond the death and destruction there was intense commercial-financial dislocation, the traditional trading parents which is sort of govern governed the Europe's economy had sort of coming down Germany had fallen off and there was there was an incipient economic recovery in Western Europe but what was happening in is they couldn't the caught and could not could not produce enough to pay for the goods that needed to fuel lab recovery. So there is a huge balance of payments deficit never these sort of structural economic problems, and so and so and of course there was a sort of prevailing sense of dispute ness after this sort of characters make work, said that more Western Europeans more Europeans face starvation in the year after the war then all the warriors combined. So on so coming after the war of these problems were were you know intensive beyond belief and another current which is happening is that capitalism was largely was sort of discredited and largely pursued as sort of a different immoral system, there was the global depression of the 1930's, capitalism was often presumed a sort of feeling that the factious states the Nazi what they call war fare war fare state and now sort of capitalism was continuing the Europe in the past four years. So national communist parties as you said were really finding fuel after these conditions and were emerging and were permutable forces you know, in the in the legal electoral process and it is conceivable in my view and that if that if you didn't engage and were not for the Marshall plan there is a scenario where these parties actually win we are ballot box and take over. But what that would have meant and it wasn't entirely or necessarily clear at that point but I think what we know on in retrospect would have meant now is that where where there is a sort of peaceful ascension of the national communist parties in absence by the proxy that would have meant that would have equated to Stalin and Soviet expansion And it is necessary to add you know, especially for the younger audience that in many cases these communist parties had a great deal of credibility because they had spearheaded the resistance to Nazi occupation or to the Fascist. And again here there is this you know, irony of history that is lived for but written backward you know, we would know again in retrospect have corrupt and and you know, the cool and impressive then until system turn out to me but Stalin and the commit had a great deal of more of stature at that moment in history. There were an edition there were in many quarters that reviewed as liberators, and of course what the Soviet Union offered well and communist offered was a sort of Utopian vision at a time in which people will desperate, and wanted to latch on to something different and something you know, aspiration and you know, I am I suspect later goes to draw parallels positively between some of the radical ideology of today, and the conditions upon which its defeating. Now one of the striking things about this book you know, its someone who is being teaching cold war history classes and feeling professionally applies to read all these cold war books is most service of cold war history they focus on which just to transform in 15 weeks. You know, that the moment from the the winter of 1946-47 which is a terrible winter when much of western Europe and Britain is in very well and British are going bankrupt, were the British basically come over and ask the Americans to assume security obligations and you have this format in the spring of '47 to Truman Doctrine and the Marshall plan we often called the two half's of the [0:19:10] ____ of Containment and you got this moldering that leads to Marshall speech at Harward in June 1947. And then more or less the Marshall plan disappears from the narrative you know, and then went on the rest is history. But the book really follows the trajectory in the evolution of the plan in fascinating ways but before we get to that, I want it just to ask a another thing that about the origins of that it, you described it as a noble plan but you do acknowledge that it was not a charity of the - and you know, to your honor you go towards Kennan saying you know, that the one of the key underlying motivation is so they will buy from us and so though have enough self-confidence to withstand that and pressures and another point that you have described it as being noble as Marshall defined it. I could see a bit of hedge that not necessarily however we else defined. Where do tell us quite a little bit more about where you see the nobility of the plan these of the self interest as critics you know, especially in the 60s and 70s would start to focus on? I think it's because you know, we defined our ourselves and we looked at a security threat and we we formulated a policy, but in formulating a policy we are able to do so in a way which which Peet Heed which incorporated our ideals. It wasn't it was not a militaristic policy as I said before, we sort of harnessed, we sort of used imagination, we used vision. Marshall at Harvard said that said that this is not going to be America's plan, this is going to be Europe's plan, we are going to offer a hand in partnership and invite the Europeans to come together to formulate their own plan. America wishes to sort of stand with them. We are going to underwrite the endeavor, we are going to work with them to formulate innovative in effect of policies, and in that sense it's sort of events, the sense of cooperation and humility and that was hugely important to these European these were the old European empires which had sort of been running the world for a couple of hundred years and they are desperately weak. And and now this upstart America is you know, Europe's progeny is you know, has half the world's economic production, has a monopoly on the atomic bomb. And so this is this is important for two reasons, first is because you know, America wish to deliver Europe to economic self sustainability. This was going to be a break with eight programs of the past. No longer should have ad hoc peace meal aid, this was meant to get Europe back on track and Marshall and his colleagues knew that I mean already do that Europe really had to reclaim control of it's destiny and had to own it's own response. The second is that much of this was psychological and that these countries were fragile and pride mattered and Marshall's approach sort of paid homage to that. And so it's in our approach, it's in the principles the insights which we which we used in format, and it's because we defined our interests in a way that was compatible with Europe's interest. And there was a congruence between ends and means which wasn't always the case during the cold war? At this point you know, that many cold war surveys that they look at the drafting of the plan itself and the internal worries that what if Stalin accepted, what if Stalin wanted in and you know, some would than and later when Stalin blew it you know, he could have borrowed from within. When you look at the story, did Stalin blow it, could he have played a shrewder hand or what did he correctly recognize that and this is one those rare cases where you can use communist archive to show a direct correlation between intelligence information and policy, that was a place in chaos that there were so many strings attached sort of way or otherwise that he could not have accepted it and retain the empire that he wanted in Eastern Europe. Well, so one of the big issues which occupy the Marshall's attention going forward is what do we do about the Soviet Union. We are going to make this big offer of aid to Europe, this is Soviet's war time ally, and so we are going to include the Soviet Union, Kennan counsels on he says, "Play it straight". We don't want to be perceived as the guilty party in the split. So they do but they are desperately hoping of the soviets don't accept because if they do and they can temporize, they can delay which is what's been happening for the past sort of a year and a half, two years and we have been unable to read sort of an accommodation and the peace agreement. And the other thing is you are talking about spending vast American tax payer dollars and the American public wasn't keen to sort of transfer its funds, the Soviet Union and these communist countries. Stalin sensed a delegation to the first meeting in Paris, then pulls them back and Averell Harriman American ambassador of the Soviet Union says, "Uncle Joe Uncle Joe, saved us again". And you know, the people in you know, diplomats and scholars were mystified because Stalin you know, the sense was that Stalin could have the best way that Stalin could have could have blown this up was to participate and sort of I am sabotage from within. And but Stalin was deafly concerned about was wasn't even giving exposure to his Eastern European satellites to the west. You know, letting them play, putting them under the thrill of this offer of aid and recovery and because for Stalin you know, he desperately wanted these buffer - his own his Eastern European states. So in the end, was was it a wise judgment. I don't know you know, I think he had I think had have participated and from recovery or you know, yeah I think he probably could have done lot more harm, and he sort of played along and sabotage the effort Now the Paris conference in the summer of 47 is a dramatic part of the book and a dramatic part of the story and much better known actually is the story that Greg has outlined of how Stalin at first seems going to participate and then essentially not only yanks his own delegation but pressures the Czechs, the Poles, the US, the Finns, not to persuade toward this would be considered an unfriendly act. Much west well and I found absolutely fascinating is the second part of the conference after the Soviet's block, how Marshall has put it to the Europeans. You guys need to come up with a coherent program in yourself and you need to measure national interest in way that I thought talk about the second part of the passage generally it gets much less attention but you really find and shows the birth place of this seed of integration. One of the other things which which is a big question when I decided to move forward to this program is do we do we actually do we tell the Europeans what they are going to get and what to do or do we give them the initiative? And it was a tall order to bring together 16 European countries and who would necessarily, naturally set to a sort of cooperate and work and concerts. Some were big, some were small, some wanted Germany to recover some didn't, some had a bounce payments deficits, some didn't and now we are and some were at war with each other, a couple of years before. So now we are asking these countries to come together, to work together, to come up with a common program economic program and and it was fraught with difficulty but one I think Kennan said, you know, if they can't come together that's their initiative are so important so self help is a governing principle because as I said before they realized that for this to work for European recovery to become self sustainable, they had to own it. And Kennan said you know, if it doesn't work then rigor more that he has already said in and we can't do anything for them anyway. And a Marshall has asked a press conference, you know, so what's going to happen, what are they going to get, what are we going to do and he said, "the Europeans have the gun, lets let them get out of it". And that was it. And I think it was it mattered that that they were given the initiative but they were able to work through all of that. that when the end when they got there it was the European's plan, but they are able to sort of find this modest present it whether they could cooperate and live together and I think it really helped to serve, in some way it's the basis in the starting point for European emigration. Then talk a little bit more about another issue that was difficult to finance. Now you mentioned that Stalin had bailed them out by pointing out and obviously was much easier but by no means easy to agree and you had the sixteen countries but formally one of those countries was not Germany, and yet Germany is going to benefit a great deal most from Marshall plan aid but also the Marshall planned process. You know, how does Germany get financed into the process? Just two years after it's Well, I mean the thing that France is petrified of, of course is German rehabilitation, France had been at war with Germany, I think I suppose it was three times in the past three generations and now here America comes wanted to rebuilt Germany back up again. Meanwhile unclear what England has been doing European emigration so France has the prospect and England left alone on the continent again with the rehabilitated Germany, again. So this is there is really sort of balancing act by Marshall and the Americans how did they encourage, bring France, bring them in at the same time how would they move to help Germany recover, how do they try to bring the British in and it really becomes a sort of interactive of process and really what happen is overtime they just, they the French regain strength, they regained a bit of confidence a sense of for momentum, but really it was America's pushing. And in my view France would never, could never have you know, politically moved to abide French, German recovery were not for America's pushing, America's underwriting the process with aid, the confidence that came from that, eventually the security guarantee in the form of NATO and eventually, France proposes the Schuman plan which launches which where France and Germany pull their gold and steel resources really launching the EU in proper and it's really I think one of the greatest achievements in statesmanship in the modern world the idea that five years after world war two and that France and Germany have been at war three times in the past three generations, they could actually pool their most critical resources and move together on the path of integration and I think if you you know, that political achievement is possible, you sort of looked you know, you look you know, the things which seem and soluble to us in the middle east that is something that to me, I look at and find inspiration. Yeah, we will come back to Jean Monnet I think later in- in our conversation because because that is one of the the engaging stories of of how again an individual can come up with an idea that that has such an impact and does thin that you know east we could have been judged impossible and if it didn't work we have been judged inevitably to have fail but I want to move the story back to Washington because the Europeans through incredible struggle are able to pound together this plan which again begins with them more or less coming with wish lists and then being told by the Americans now you need to actually coordinate and move the price back down because a back drown to all this is that the republicans are incredibly better for being at its power because for 20 years they have won the 1946 congressional letters, they can't wait to get rid of Truman, they really are are not eager to to fund all these and yet by April 48 in a hotly contested election here Truman is able to get congress to by into the right process and two names that come on, one is Vandenberg and the other is Paul Hoffman. Who who again seems too modest for history because he is often forgotten but two republicans who are absolutely crucial to the process, how does how does the Truman administration manage to get congress to pay for all this? Well first of all Truman does something which is which is very clever Clark Clifford who is his his chief political aid realizes that this is something special and there could be political currency to this, there could be and there there could be legacy from this and so he says you after call it the Truman plan and so Truman Truman says that's not going to happen and there were two reasons in my view, the first is that Truman Truman reviewed Marshall, you know Marshall was army Chief of Staff for six years before and during the war, his responsibilities were Olympian, he was he was the most reviewed man I think of that time and since probably and you know marshal was famed amongst other things for his sort of selfishness so even as the the commanding generals returned home to take their tape praise which we see in in footage, there wasn't there was no praise for Marshall, he didn't want it, during the war, he would he refused the war to decorations, he said it doesn't seem fitting to accept them, government employees are way of dieing and so for I think Truman, part of this is really to to honor Marshall and he also has sort of really the force moving in forwarded state, the other is is bit of a shredder decision, he says you know because of the political currents you are talking about in a political year, there is no way this thing gets through with congress my name on it, I am going to name it after the greatest living American and that's George Marshall and he did and I think it had it had you know serious political currency and then the other thing you have is is a straight political partnership between Arthur Vandenberg who is the republican senator for Michigan and The chair of the foreign relations. The chair of the foreign relations committee and George Marshall, they really Marshall brought Vandenberg in, he consulted him all the time, they are meeting regularly, some of these meetings are done secretly and and so Marshall responded at one moment he is being criticized in the press for this not being a bipartisan effort, so I think the quote as Marshal says "this journalist was profound in his knowledge and he didn't know a damn thing and he said you know, Vandenberg and I was just handling our business and in fact we couldn't that got much closer unless I sat in Van's lap or he sat in mine". So it's a great example of of bipartisanship, Vandenberg had great suggestions one of which is this really had should should break with foreign aid programs of the past and look much more like a business enterprise run by business men he had a few great suggestions, Marshall incorporated that, he made a he you know he made them feel good about it, giving the sense of ownership about it and Vandenberg was brilliant through through commerce legislatively in in shepherding the plan through and in managing the sort of his republican constituency. And then there was the studebaker salesmen? And there was there was a guy named there were there were six personalities which were the narratives were leads through and one is a guy named Paul Hoffman was a university dropout, he dropped out the university of Chicago after his first year to become a car salesmen and he was he was very good at it, and he became a millionaire and and then he eventually became president of the studebaker corporation and and so Hoffman was chosen by Harry Truman a republican in a democratic administration to run the plan and and was extremely effective and the one story at one of the things that Hoffman was great at doing wasn't that he was a he was a Hoffman was as you say, he was extremely affable, he was self effacing, he was charming, really a master of salesman and this is the time also when when sort of salesmanship is critically important, this is when America sort of becomes a consumer republic. Its the idea that where where we have production booming out of the war, and we are going to sell we are going to sell we are going to spend our way out of recession or depression and so salesmanship is usually important Arthur Miller writes "Death of a Salesmen" around this time, and Disney comes up with the character, Scrooge McDuck to sort of you know, paint miserliness in in a bad sense around this time, so in this time of salesmanship Hoffman is a master salesmen and and he sells the plan, he goes to European, he does it amongst his European colleagues, he does it in congress, and the American public and the one story I like is he is talking to a group of New York business men he is telling the virtues of the plan and there are sort of skeptical at first and and by the time he has done that sort of [0:35:49] ____ invasion and and they are for it, and so one of the businessmen turns to another and then he says he says you know I just wish Hoffman would get out of government, and so the guy sort of surprised and he looks at me says why and he says he is such a good salesmen, I just love to buy something from him. And - I think its John Tabor one of his opponents who voted against him, essentially I think at the end of the story story comes up to him basically he said you know I voted against you but you know you were always on me and I decided not to fight you and the different between voting and fighting in this town you know, can be very big And Tabor said it's because it's because you are honest. Yeah, and so it is you know, in the middle of a very acrimonious political season you know, it is really striking so you have the money appropriate after this key interim period and then you see and you know we we don't have time to go into all the the inefficacies this incredible recovery begin to take shape and one key thing that was emphasized for congress and I think also key in the story is you know this is no longer simply relief, this is recovery and I don't think our current best price benchmarks was in there, but it had an end date, it had an exit strategy and there were certain things that were got to be and the funds were going to be less each year and amazingly enough it seemed to work, but you know I I couldn't help you know, one thing I would like to do is as the historians leave the footnotes first and then decide if I am going to read the book, you know Greg has a two page interrogate footnote to rebut the arguments of of another historian who essentially argues that the Marshall plan was nice, but not necessarily necessary or decisive, the Europeans would have modeled through anyway, the recovery would have happened, changes in physical policy could have produced similar phase, I take it you you believe in Marshall plan was much more essential than that you want to lay out that? Sure and the one thing I will you know, there are all these elements to it which really helped you know made the difference which helped to come for the success and one of them is is the idea of of terminal date that this is going to end and I think a democratic senator put it best he is of course was from Texas and and he said that the terminal date added a virility to the enterprise the sense that you know, this was going to we are going to have to move forward purposely towards our goal and then we are done, so it's I thought that was the interesting way to put it and and yeah I think that in in my view looks it's a you can argue the kind of factors all day what would have happened to Europe with that it's it's impossible to prove but I think there were there were two things which which were critical, the first is that the communist assertion was so strong, there was such a center disruptiveness that it is conceivable with the communist cut off cut off one in elections, the the second thing is and that would have I think given soviets power with the proxy. The the second thing is that in the past, what had always you know you are coming from the the global depression of the 30's in which you you this sort of economic nationalism is sort of actually lead toward this economic competition there are huge tariff barriers people are not trading and and they are holding resources and there is that that becomes sort of a conflict and and so there is the sense that the sense that's one of the real emphasis behind European emigration, there is the efforts and that sort of if goods can't cross borders, soldiers will and so integration becomes an imperative and with out the US pushing, with out the aid, with out the security guarantee, there there is very little evidence I think, a very little to suggest that Europe actually has the courage the alacrity really to embark upon this extraordinary project of integration and with out that the economic, story, the security story, the integration story which eventually happened in Europe I think you know most likely would not have happened yeah and also again the essential; back up is some one once again call me to the rescue just a couple of months after its past you have the beginning of the Berlin blockade and the prospect of the hanging, again concentrates the mind in the background of all of this Right right Again we don't have to go to the into the economics but I can't help working and have engaging it was for cowards feeling like oh this is something I don't understand before, the story of Richard Bissell and the counterpart payments. Yeah you know Richard Bissell who ends up in history because of the Cuban disasters of the CIA, the crucial role he plays here, do you want to say a couple of words about him? Yeah so you know you all know probably Richard Bissell is best for you know he was one of the masterminds behind the Bay of Pigs debacle and the failed assassination attempts to kill Castro but Bissell was an economist, he was the first person to teach Keynesian economics at Yale and he was a critical figure in the war effort on the logistic side a lot of these guys came out of war effort actually and and Hoffman brings Bissell in and he comes up with a lot of innovative economic policies to help make and which I think we can still learn from the context to foreign aid, one of which was counterpart funds and so so how it worked in in a micro sense is obviously the Marshall planers were very concerned about mismanagement, about waste, about corruption or scandal and they also in large purpose of Vandenberg's doing in the republican push and wanted this did not want to disrupt normal market commercial channel channels so so what would happen is in France if if a French farmer needed a tractor, we we never send anything over or or send money over or what happened is the farmer would go and would buy a tractor, the proceeds from that purchase would be deposited in France's central bank which then America and the French government would would think about how to how to spend those funds recovery and then would do it together and then there is a very rigorous process as spot checking to make sure the funds were spend effectively and then then really the American contribution and tax payer contribution goods of sort of you know effectively reimbursing the American transfer manufacture but because of this it was we weren't sending over tractors, we weren't handing out things, the things that Europeans got were things that they needed, that they were willing to purchase and then as a result you know this was a $13 billion program, $100 billion in today's dollars as a comparable percent of GMP it was an excess of $500 billion and there was almost not one instance of corruption or scandal in the whole thing so I think you know I don't I don't know if if there are better people to to answer that needed to say if if counterpart funds is exactly replicable to current foreign aid or development but there are things, there are things there are procedures like these, innovations like these which served us very well and and it's because of another approach was that you know we had this was our this was the the lynch pin of America's grant strategy at this point, Truman brought on the very best, the most capable Americans from a broad cross section the public or private sector, there were some of the most capable business men, leaders from from industry and so you had people who run things, who know how to work things and and people who were not sort of the sort of career government people but wanted to come in for a for a couple of years, were aroused by the mobility of the effort as Marshall defined it and that's I think one of the big reasons why there was it was as innovative as it was and why it was as a as effective as it was. yeah and in a book he wrote he conveys the excitement of that moment that attracts you know people from across America with out ideological witness tests really and with that cronyism and that participation and To to give a sense of the ideological breath, there is Arthur Schlesinger, comes to work now and a lots in between Within a couple of years and by the by the way 1949, the recovery has turned around these economies so quickly and and the balance payments problems has faded much as the emphasis started to shift towards the integration and talk a little bit about how that process underway because you mentioned Collins deal on the Schuman plan but really Schuman as the the personification of this process and again that's often treated separately from the Marshall plan story but you really try those linkages. Yeah lets it's I think it's an in an American it's one of the imparters behind the work of different economies with that are you know are trading with each other, we need to sort of trade a larger market which will spur innovation, competition, specialization, growth and and so America is pushing Europe to that end but but again you know Britain is uncertain about the relationship it wants to have with the continent, France is uneasy about Germany I think one of the key things that happen is that Britain sort of essentially outsell, they say we are not going to play and and France was looking to Britain to take the lead and and what's also happening is that the cold wars sort of militarizing a little bit, the the soviets get the atomic bomb, china, you know becomes communist Mao wins and so there is the sense that that that we need to sort of build up Germany even more aggressively economically potentially even security security wise so France that you know could you conceive all those currents sort of pushing them forward and they say if we don't take the initiative, America is just going to keep building Germany up and we are going to be entire straights and so Germany emerges, someone has great imagination, creativity force and and proposes it's idea which is you know in retrospect it seems sort of obvious you know there there is so many reasons why why integrations makes sense but at the time given the the obstacles, the historic obstacles, the political currents was wasn't absolutely audacious sort of even mind bending idea, but he proposes it and and it moves forward. Marshall was a great sales man and also of course to me a great diarist because you you are able to describe his his works and his contestation and and it really this is one of those cases where the Americans are pleasantly surprised because the French come up with this on their own and yet it it is so clearly a case of France finally being able to happen itself interest because they realize if they say no and try to stop it, its going to happen anyway and they will be on the out side where it began. Yeah and it really I start if I can jump in but that you know self help was such one of the big crisis to the Marshall plan is they sort of say it wasn't as great as as it's billing, it didn't sort of totally account for European emigration and didn't save you economically but the Marshall planers never wanted it to, they wanted this to be Europe's recovery, they just wanted to do their bid, they wanted to offer a hand in partnership and so and so self help really was the governing principle and there is a story where there is a young economist working in Paris at the time and once Monnet announced that this plan - he says that he was actually in tears because France has now taken the initiative and and from that point on the initiative, economically in terms of integration, unification is is with Europe and as I think one of the Marshal plans that Europe is on the move. Then you have 1950 the savage year for Truman where you have first of all the real McCarthy and Mc McCarthyism comes to the four, you have got the Korean war, all these factors tend to start the downward trajectory at least the the modification, then talk a little bit about how does the Marshall plan get buffeted by these militarizing forces, McCarthyest forces, do you think that in itself was a premature termination of what the Marshall plan was becoming or had it already served this purpose and therefore it was perfectly appropriate that it ended up more or less moving moving inside? yeah well you have I think other combination of things, you have Harry Truman winning the election against Dui which is shocking to republicans and and they were deeply smarted by this which sort of allows them to you know to let give some McCarthyism rope and create some some very sort of negative currents and pressure on the democrats. McCarthy voted for the Marshall plan, he later calls the plan I think he said this this mass have been unrewarding boondoggle and and so the republicans ran about pressure on the administration and there is there is tying out there is soviets getting the bomb, there is NSC68 which is sort of this new doctrine that we really have to ramp up our defense and so defense these political currents, defends are beginning to crowd out economic aid and then of course you have the onset of the Korean war, and and so there is a sense that we really have to move now and so far as we are aiding our alleys and Europeans, it's got to be military aid and economic aid sort of gets crowded out but and it's and so the plan ends earlier in fact than it was scheduled to less funds are appropriated than it was originally planed and there there is a lot of concern amongst Marshall planers, did we do the job is Europe going to be self sustainable and and Europe reverted and had had some economic problems in the beginning of the war but it proved that the recovery was robust enough, integration was on the move and Europe had gone to appoint where not only could it could its recovery be self sustainable but but you see the beginning of the most prolonged and extraordinary economic boom in the continents history. Before I ask you the current war question that I for our graduate students I want you to talk a little bit about what this plan and its success meant to Europeans because you know there is there is obviously there is the sense you know a recipient is grateful but you describe more complex emotions, there are a couple of quotes actually in page 315 that that one is that you quote Richard Bissell is noting that much of the plans success in those years came about because of the subtlety the American approach. Yeah. And you know subtlety of the American approach to Europe is not a phrase that's ones heard about recently and yet the Americans have largely got the Europeans to do what they want them to do. And so you know a specially given reason European relations with the united states be curious for you to talk a little bit about how the Americans dealt with Europeans sensitivities but also you then describe you you quote Herald Nicholson the British diplomat and trying to say that it was not the you mentioned that there is not simple gratitude, its more complex amalgam of emotions and you you quote Herald Nicholson as saying that "it was not the Europeans were anti American, it was just that they were quite frightened that the destinies of the world should be in the hands of a giant, with the limps of a undergraduate, the emotions of a spinster and the brain of a peahen" and then you go on saying that Europe's perception of America was developing along many emotional fault lines, gratitude and bivalence, resentment, admiration, dependence, envy, disapproval and insecurity. Do you feel that we are still seeing deploying out of those emotions and and talk a little bit about again why such a complex mix of emotions was aroused from you know what Americans like to see as as simply this this this noble charitable act? Yeah I think you know I think as I lauded to before Europeans were uneasy because of you know the imperial experience and and the experience of the word, Europeans were uneasy about American power and what it represented and it would mean for them on the continent, the strings that may be attached, one of the the French planers says that it has sort "gratitude is in fact the hardest burden to bear" and so so you sort of may be we are doing something hugely atavistic and beneficial for European who expect there would be sort of uniform admiration and gratitude, but its more complex these emotions are more complex and but I think we are where we got it right is in the tone we had, these were these were people who knew Europe, who respected Europe, who believed in humility and cooperation and partnership, we pushed, we pressured, we get jolt, but we did not use blustery rhetoric, we were always mindful of of the psychological element and the element of pride and I think that made that made a huge amount of difference. Yeah that was one of the major sort of plains of you know that was one of the major plains here, there was an economic plain, a military plain and there was a psychological plain and and that was pretty good point. Yeah one thing that that again is fascinating you know inevitably in 2007 you know we get to question and answer and reading it, what can help but think of recent events in Iraq but one thing you didn't mention in terms of potential Marshall plans is very explicit it is our voice by east Europeans in around 1989, 1990, 1991 for a Marshall plan there and you mentioned the sensitivity and Bissell mentioned the sedulity of America and yet at the same time this was when western Europe became a Washington American culture in consumer goods. And you had you know the back clash of you know fierce of "coco colonization" it was was the phrase you you mentioned a couple of times and so it's not a process that can be strictly controlled or stage mania from Washington that comes through. And in the narrative, but I want to ask you no no one book about such a complex historical phenomenon can be definitive and comprehensive comprehensive, it disclose a great story but it is largely the story of of individuals making decisions, if you had unlimited time, unlimited space and unlimited travel budget and linguistic versatility to to read other languages especially long closed archives, what other aspects of this would you mostly like to know about? What are you know if you could get into the Soviet archives, you can get into the the European archives, about the internal consideration because there could be and in some cases are books about the Marshall plan in each of those countries, about the they tell the Americans one thing, but they are having arguments with themselves and some cases with each other, what would you most still like to know? What would you like a graduate student out there to find out for you? That is a great question and and I am yeah I am I wont do it I wont pit at a service by I will be in the background in all, it will be I will blurt out something in the Q&A may be. Okay I think you can cash in it. All right.