The End Of History Revisited with Francis Fukuyama speaking at a seminar hosted by The Long Now Foundation.
Frank Fukuyama's 1992 book "The End of History and the Last Man" had profound and lasting impact with its declaration that science and technology, the growing global economy, and liberal democracy are leading history in a quite different direction than Marx and Hegel imagined. In this revisit to those themes, Fukuyama examines conflict with and within Islam, the need for a diffuse form of global governance to deal with problems like climate change, and the deeper implications of biotechnology- The Long Now Foundation
Dr. Francis Fukuyama
Professor Francis Fukuyama has worked at several prominent think tanks and public policy organizations, he has served the U.S. Department of State in posts related to Middle East affairs, and is a 2002 appointee to the President's Council on Bioethics.
Until 2010 Francis Fukuyama wass Bernard Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and Director of its International Development Program. He is now Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow and resident in the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.
He is the author of The End of History and the Last Man.
Francis Fukuyama, political scientist and author of The End of History and the Last Man, argues that radical Islam does not pose as effective a long-term challenge to modernity and liberal democracy as many of its critics think.
Major world religion founded by Muhammad in Arabia in the early 7th century AD. The Arabic word islam means surrenderspecifically, surrender to the will of the one God, called Allah in Arabic. Islam is a strictly monotheistic religion, and its adherents, called Muslims, regard the Prophet Muhammad as the last and most perfect of God's messengers, who include Adam, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and others. The sacred scripture of Islam is the Qur'an, which contains God's revelations to Muhammad. The sayings and deeds of the Prophet recounted in the sunna are also an important source of belief and practice in Islam. The religious obligations of all Muslims are summed up in the Five Pillars of Islam, which include belief in God and his Prophet and obligations of prayer, charity, pilgrimage, and fasting. The fundamental concept in Islam is the Shari'ah, or Law, which embraces the total way of life commanded by God. Observant Muslims pray five times a day and join in community worship on Fridays at the mosque, where worship is led by an imam. Every believer is required to make a pilgrimage to Mecca, the holiest city, at least once in a lifetime, barring poverty or physical incapacity. The month of Ramadan is set aside for fasting. Alcohol and pork are always forbidden, as are gambling, usury, fraud, slander, and the making of images. In addition to celebrating the breaking of the fast of Ramadan, Muslims celebrate Muhammad's birthday (seemawlid) and his ascension into heaven (seemi'raj). The 'Id al-Adha festival inaugurates the season of pilgrimage to Mecca. Muslims are enjoined to defend Islam against unbelievers through jihad. Divisions occurred early in Islam, brought about by disputes over the succession to the caliphate (seecaliph). About 90% of Muslims belong to the Sunnite branch. The Shi'ites broke away in the 7th century and later gave rise to other sects, including the Isma'ilis. Another significant element in Islam is the mysticism known as Sufism. Since the 19th century the concept of the Islamic community has inspired Muslim peoples to cast off Western colonial rule, and in the late 20th century fundamentalist movements (see Islamic fundamentalism) threatened or toppled a number of secular Middle Eastern governments. In the early 21st century, there were more than 1.2 billion Muslims in the world.
End of History , we now know, was a crock. One senses that even Fukuyama knows this (and I credit him with recognizing his 'neoconservative gospel' as Derrida famously called End of History as a work ultimately flawed by the hubris of the 20th century geopolitical position of the neoconservative movement). What I would like to see him address more profoundly is what would seem to be the re-emergence of the Marxian position in light of the present state of free market capitalism. I wonder if he grasps the peculiar reversal that has taken place from 1990 to now...
Thanks for this lecture. I have been looking for answers for my country's difficult path towards democracy. The answer is that our culture is totally different from the West. This lecture confirms my thoughts.
Watch The Long Now Foundation
Unlimited access to all programs
Watch Francis Fukuyama: The End Of History Revisited
Good evening. Top that Frank. I am Stewart Brand from the Long Now Foundation. Its funny a whileago we had John Rendon who gave a talk a year ago and everybody assumed he was a conservativebecause he was giving work for the White House. Well he has done work for the last five WhiteHouses and probably will do work for the next five. And he was a hard over Democrat, basically bornthat way and will stay that way.Frank is my favorite kind of conservative, I used to know Herman Conn and Herman was wonderful,Frank is wonderful. And one of the reasons Frank is wonderful is unlike many intellectuals he willstand up and be accountable for the stuff he has said and thought and revisit it and engage in what'scalled intellectual honesty, Frank Fukuyama.Well, thanks very much Stewart. I am really grateful to the Long Now Foundation for bringing me outhere. I was actually supposed to give in a lecture in November but I had little accident on by bike. But Iam back on my feet and really glad to be here. When Stewart first asked me to speak in this series, hesaid this is the series on long term thinking and can you talk about anything. And I thought youknow, most of what I do is pretty a policy oriented towards the next six months to two years, and I saidwell, probably not. Then it occurred to me I had written this book a while ago called the End of Historyand the Last Man and I said, well, yeah actually that does fit in to the over all frame work of this seriespretty well and I have been thinking about this consistently every since I wrote the original article withthat title 17 years ago. So may be may be we can talk about that. So that's what I am gone a speak toyou about today.So what I am going to do is first since there has been a lot of misunderstanding about this I am justgoing to restate what the End of History was all about. And then I am going to go through fourdifferent objections. Every conceivable objection to this theory has been raised by one person at somepoint over the years but I want to deal with the ones that I believe are the most cogent and quitehonestly they are ones that I don't necessarily have answers to. And for all I know the theory could becomplete bunk and will be disproved and then in fact I will give you several empirical tests forwhether the theory is is correct or whether you will be able to see that it's correct as we go throughas we go through the lecture.And the four just to give you a little heads up, the four objections. First has to do with radically Islamand its rejection of modernity. Second has to do with the lack of collective action and accountabilityand basically democracy at an international level. The third has to do with the problem of poverty,about how you get on the modernization escalator. And the fourth has to do with technology. Now letme got to the question of what the End of History was about. In about 10 days I am going to get on anairplane, I am going to go to Japan to give a couple of lectures. And then after about ten days inJapan I am going to fly down and spend a couple of weeks in highlands of Papua New Guinea. Nowbetween Japan and Papua New Guinea you basically get the two ends of the developing spectrum atleast as it exist in today's world, from a society in the highlands where you actually have certainpockets of tribes that have not seen the next tribe over, in Piangi much less European or anAustralian or a Japanese or anyone else. It was a society that was completely acephalous there is nostate. And many of the people in the highlands are still basically living at a hunter-gatherer level ofexistence. And then of course Japan is Japan.So the question is there was a certain period in human history when virtually whole of the world looklike Papua New Guinea. Every body was divided up into these little groups of 50-60 people, veryisolated, without technology to produce agriculture, without higher forms political organization. Todayincreasing parts of the world look like Japan. China, the largest country in the world is hurdling in thatdirection. And the question at this race is, is is this a coherent process and is there a reason to thinkthat the kind of modernization that takes you from the level of Papua New Guinea to the level of Japanis actually driven by deeper social, economic, historical forces or is it all just a big accident? Could weall return to the status of being highlanders at some point in the future, and is there any particularreason to think that the kinds of political systems we see around us have a have this kind of deeperhistorical meaning.Now this is basically a theory about modernization. I guess that's the simplest way to explain it. And ofcourse modernization is something that virtually every intellectual believed in over the past, I wouldsay, 150 years and in fact in the years prior to the 1980s a large majority, I would say, of progressiveintellectuals believe not only that there would be a progressive modernization as human societiesevolve but that there is also an end of history and the end of history would be some form of CommunistUtopia. And when I wrote my original article in 1989 I made a very simple observation, which was thatI too, like all of the Marxists, believed that there was this progressive history that was propellingsociety to different and more complex levels of social organization. But that it didn't look like we areever gone to get to communism. That whatever seems to be at the terminal point of this modernizationprocess was some version of a market based economy and some version of liberal democracy. And soit was actually a fairly modest thesis that we would be getting off this train one stop earlier than mostpeople had anticipated. And so it was not an outlandish thesis in terms of the way that people havethought about human history but it does seem to reflect to me what were the big developments at that time.Now in terms of universal histories, of which Marxism is a is a variant. There have been a lot of themwritten in history, a lot of them are Christian because the Christian Bible actually talks about thebeginning of history and the Garden of Eden or the creation story and it talks about an end of historywhen god's kingdom arrives. And in a certain sense Marxism was a secular version. It really in asense took Hagel to say that what we have in the human historical process is something like the story ofthe Christian Bible except played out in increasingly secular terms and that was a story that then Marxcontinued. You can actually enlarge the story because the kind of human history that I am going to talkabout has not been in existence for more than about 10,000 years. Bob Wright wrote a book a few yearsago called Nonzero in which he actually tries to place all of human history in a history of the biospherein general in which he noted that there was this very long term over the course of billions of yearsand evolution as you went from prokaryotes to eukaryotes to multi cellular organisms, or individualsingle cell organism learned to live with each other and cooperate in multi cellular beings and then, soon up the evolutionary chain.I am not going to get into that part of the story. But it is possible if you take a sufficiently longperspective, as I guess we are supposed to do in this series, to see that actually human evolution and theevolution of human societies does take place in a much broader evolutionary story that includes nonhumans as well. Now the main person who has raised a systematic objection to my version of the Endof History, my version of modernization, that is to say that there is a universal process ofmodernization that sooner or later most societies will arrive at. He is actually my former teacher andstill a friend, a good friend Samuel Huntington who wrote a book a few years after the end of historycalled the 'Clash Of Civilizations' and he made a very different kind of argument he said that theevolution of human societies in the direction of liberal democracy was a kind of accident, that culture isthe ultimate way that these societies to find themselves that there will be seven or eight major culturalgroups that will be largely invariant and that what I see as a universal set of values, potentiallyuniversal set of values and institutions that were developed in the west are actually the culturalemanation of the particular Christian culture that happened to develop in this particular part of thenorthern Europe at a particular historical time. But that if you grew up in a Hindu or confusion or anorthodox Christian or Muslim cultural context, there is no particular reason to think that you willdeveloped a similar sorts of political institutions.And so in a sense his view is that all of the developments that we have experienced in modernizingsocieties is really cultural bound and that ultimately you can be modern, you can have an Islamicrepublic of Iran that could presumably produce semiconductors and you know very high quality carsand yet be ruled by a system of mullahs where authorities come out of the Koran because culture is as I saidthe ultimate defining characteristic of societies that will not be overcome by the integrating forces ofmodernization. Now I have a interlinked series of arguments I would fly if you step back a little bit andtake this long perspective why should we think that history is directional as opposed to being simplycyclical or just random you know one damn thing after another. And I would say that the probablythe one social phenomenon that guarantees that you are not going to have a random or a cyclicalhistory, is the accumulation of knowledge related to modern science and technology, because if youthink about social phenomenon, the one thing that is cumulative and is not something subjected toperiodic loss unlike let's say the arts or the literature or even particular forms of government is thesteady accumulation of knowledge that is driven by human curiosity and the human desire to be able tomaster and manipulate the external world.Now I would say that at one end of this machine that I would construct you would put the developmentof science and technology as the driver and it is connected by a drive shaft to economic developmentbecause economic development is determined by the horizon of technological possibilities madepossible by any given level of technological developments. So the world of coal and steel or the steamengine produces societies that look a certain way, you start urbanizing, you start developing anindustrial working class, you have highly centralized a larger states but that is very different from thekind of world that emerges after the microprocessor, after the internet in which power tends to be morediffused and which it is much more difficult for centralized hierarchies to control the flow ofinformation, the flow of power, the flow of resources. And therefore each one of these economic agesis going to differ in systematic ways from the one that preceded it determined by the level oftechnology and I think that is fairly well accepted the process of industrialization as you go fromresource exports to light manufacturing to heavy manufacturing to a full industrialization and then to apost industrial society. That's a pattern that's been replicated by late developers whatever the culturestarting point from which they start off.Now - so the engine is science and technology, you have economics and then there is a much moreloose set of connecting rods that tie the economy to politics it is the case that there is a very strongempirical correlation between the high levels of economic development and liberal democracy. NowHuntington would say that this is simply accidental that it just so happens at the Christian westmodernized first and therefore this correlation between wealth and democracy is a by-product of thiscultural phenomenon. But it is still striking that even outside of western - of the bounds that would becalled western society including countries in Asia, this very interesting pattern has emerged where atabout $6000 per capita income, which is about the level that Taiwan and Korea achieved sometime inthe early 1980s. You get the development of an industrial working class, urbanization, much higherlevels of education, universal literacy, development of a professional class, a complex civil society andthe development of a property property of middle class where middle class that define in terms of itsownership of property. And all of these things have been linked in various ways to the emergence ofpolitical demands for participation in systems, there is no question that you can have authoritarianmodernization at very rapid rate, this is what South Korea, Singapore China today have all done. But ata certain level of wealth it seems that there is a change in the nature of the society that seems todemand a greater involvement and accountability in a way that governments function, which is whatwe call a political democracy.So the first two parts of the machine are connected fairly rigidly but the second part is a pretty wobblyconnection, they are very rich societies like Singapore that aren't democracies and there are relativelypoor societies like Costa Rica or India that that are democracies it's not a perfect correlation. Now thefar end of these machine you get - I don't know things connected by strings or something becausewhen you get to the realm of culture, I actually agree with Huntington that the connections are not thatgreat I believe that ultimately you are not going to get a homogenization of cultures around the worldand in fact I would hope that we do not get a homogenization of cultures but there probably issomething in the boundaries of cultural evolution, that needs to take place in a in a really modernsociety. One of them may be secular politics because of some other things, it doesn't seem like it's verysafe when religion enters politics in a big way when you get a politicized religion. But I think it'sprobably safe to say that at the end of this train of gears or whatever they are that cultural homogenization-we're never going to become what what Huntington calls 'Davos man' you know this globalcosmopolitan globalize technology using consumers you know self satisfied consumer thankgoodness. But the rest of the you know the rest of the process it does seem to me, you can make anargument that there is this kind of set of connections and the question is whether the institutions that wesee in currently modern societies are actually you know there is no question that Huntington is rightthat this stuff appeared in the Christian west for reasons having to do with a particular set of culturaland historical events that took place in early modern Europe. Democracy, universal human rights is in away as many philosophers Tocquevill, Hegel, Nietzsche, have all said it is a form of secularized Christianity,our doctrine, contemporary doctrine of human rights comes ultimately from the Christian doctrine of universalequality of human beings under God based on their possession of certain divine attributes like choiceall right.So there is no question that historically there was this connection but the question is once you discoverthese institutions, do they become functional in a way that they are usable by any other civilizationregardless of its cultural starting points. The scientific method was invented by Rene Descartes and othersin Europe at a certain historical point but once it's discovered it's invariant whether you are an Africanor Asian or Latin American, the scientific method becomes a kind of universal possession. So thequestion is are all liberal democratic institutions are market institutions in the economy like that or arethey as Huntington would argue culturally - culturally bound. And I believe that even with all of the -sometimes terrible political events that have happened since I first wrote this article back in 1989 rightas the Berlin Wall was coming down. That that basic story about modernization is still on track. It isvery fashionable - I don't know may be it's different here in San Francisco and Washington rightfashionably pessimistic about every thing and a lot of people like the intelligence agencies are paid tobe pessimistic. And so you focus on terrorism in the middle east but we are actually today and over thepast five years have been living through one of the most remarkable periods in global human historywere there is not a single region of the world that is not been experiencing sustained growth and thetwo largest countries in the world, China and India are leading a pack in terms of the growth rates now.Obviously they are down sized to this global warming and all sorts of you know perhaps un sustainabletrends that we have started but in terms of people being lifted out of poverty you had several hundredmillion in that category over the past 20-25 years because modernization has been very successful inmany many parts of the world. And so I think the basic story line of human development is still verymuch with modernization. The question is does that modernization then require liberal democracy ornot. And here you have got these really two interesting social experiments going on which are Russiaand China because Russia and China are both modernizing, growing economically but under basicallyunder authoritarian regimes. I mean in Russia you have got elections but basically no horizontalaccountability in the political system and in China you have got a fully authoritarian system thatsuppresses dissidence censors the internet, does all of these other sorts of things.So I told you I would give you a way of testing whether I am right or not, so one easy test is only youhave to just wait 20 years and then you can write to me. But I will be around hopefully I will be around20 years you can say you know has which of these systems has democratic modernization at a lowerlevel like India or the higher level like Europe and the United States and Japan has that proved to bepolitically stable and successful and economically you know productive or do these authoritarianmodernizers prove to have certain long term advantages. I will make the bet on the side of the liberaldemocracy because I believe that modern political systems have to be accountable you cannot havegood government. With out feed back loops built into the political system and as societies becomemore complex as they do more things and the governments do more things those feed back loops, thoseaccountability mechanisms become more and more difficult so that if people cannot protest the fact thata chemical factory is dumping very toxic chemicals into the Amur River as happened in Harbina couple of years ago. You are going to have a less successful society that one in which those kinds ofaccountability mechanisms exists. But it's a test and I you know I'm no prophet so we will have tosee how those experiments work out.Now let me go through the four objections to the theory I mean in the way the existence of China andRussia constituting them selves a kind of objection. But let me go through the other ones, lets beginwith Islam. Not the religion Islam but but the phenomenon that we have seen particularly sinceSeptember 11th, a very radicalized Islamists ideology. Many people have said openly this is a refutationof the end of the history radical Islamist Osama Bin Laden the Al Qaeda folks do not wantmodernization in any way shape of form not only don't they want liberal democracy, they don't want amodern consumer society and so they are very determinately stuck in the middle ages. Now I havealways felt even after September 11th that this is actually giving these groups too much credit becausein fact with the one complicated exception of Iran certainly none of the Sunni groups have succeeded incoming to power in a single country and in those places were they have succeeded Saudi Arabia,Afghanistan, Iran this is not for any body else that is not an alienated Muslim living at the fringes ofMuslim society these are not successful models of development that other people around the worldwant to emulate and the desire to promote this kind of political Islam really does not you know it's notsome thing that's typically felt by people that are not culturally Muslim to begin with.Now the deeper question has been raised by a lot of scholars is whether there are a permanent culturalobstacles to modernization either in the economic or in the political forum and that's some how thisone particular cultural group represents a particularly severe obstacle. My general view of that is it'sextremely unlikely that this is true that there is really as far as I can see no inherent reason in thereligion itself Islam to think that in this a Muslim society cannot modernize economically and in factyou have had several fairly successful cases of that like Turkey and Malaysia or Indonesia at a lowerlevel of development and I also think there is no particular reason why Muslim society cannot sustain -create and sustain a liberal democracy and again you got a number of examples again Turkey, MaliSenegal, Indonesia since 1997.So the question is really what is the radical rejection of modernity being driven by? and here I wouldsay it comes less out of the religion Islam per se. Islam as a religion it's very legalistic it's very rootedin local traditions and customs that define and describe to individuals their particular identities butwhat's very interesting about the people in the contemporary world that tend to be attracted to theseIslamists or Jihadist groups is that they actually are not people living in traditional Islamists Islamicsocieties they are people living at the fringes of western societies. Some times that's the case when theylive in Western Europe in Muslim minority communities as was the case of Mohammed Atta orMohammed Bouyeri who killed the Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh or the July 7th sub way bombersin London. Some time the alienation comes when the modern world comes to visit people in the middleeast in the form of internet, television, you know the Western cultural onslaught that we associate withglobalization and I would argue that the extremism you see is actually the result of actually what is thefairly familiar loss of identity for people that are caught in this cultural no man's land betweentraditional societies and successfully modernizing societies.It's quite interesting that successfully modernizing societies like India and China do not produce thiskind of terrorists but they really come more out of the stratum of people that have been exposedmodernization but have not gotten on the train successfully and this actually I think makes thephenomenon some thing it's not that's it should make you feel good about it but it's some thing wehave seen before because that was a classic sociological explanation for the social origins of bothfascism and Bolshevism that typical Bolshevik or fascist was the working class person who did not finda home in the industrialized world, just left the village that tightly woven community now living in abig city with out a clear identity. Hitler comes along and says I will tell you who you are you are aGerman and I think Osama Bin Laden in many ways has been doing that. He says I will tell you whoyou are. You are a member of this global Muslim UMA and I can define your identity very precisely interms of the following ideology. So that doesn't mean that we are not going to have a lot of bigproblems dealing with this political movement. Now but I just you know I think that this is you know itrises to the level of a civilizational challenge.Second big objection to my theory has to do with the problem of International society and democracyat an International level. Now we have these things called a nation state democracies, United States,France, Japan, South Korea so forth. And actually after a couple of hundred years of politicaldevelopment we pretty much know, there is a lot of variance but we pretty much know what theinstitutions of the modern liberal democracy are to look like. But we really do not have in thecontemporary world our mechanisms that enforce a certain degree of accountability and reciprocity atand you know and that's another word for democracy at an International level. And one of the things Ithink that has been quite striking, just traveling around the world after the Iraq war is the degree towhich this has been exacerbated by the overwhelming dominance of the United States at a wholevariety of levels. United States today spends as much on its military as the entire rest of the worldcombined. You know the British at the height of their Empire tried to size their Navy so it would be aslarge as the second and the third next second and third largest Navies and we beat everybodycombined. And that hegemony is true at a political level; we can overturn regimes 8000miles away. We can in in economics the dollar continues to carry very great weight and culturally theUnites States is very hegemonic. But it sets up the ground for a huge amount of anti-Americanism inthe world; I think ultimately because of this lack of both American, what what non-Americans regardas American accountability and the lack of mechanisms of reciprocity. I've don't know how manynon-Americans I've heard say in the last few years; "You know, I really wish I could vote in anAmerican election because who you elect President has a big effect on my life, but AmericanPresidents are only accountable to American voters.And so I think there is a kind of institutional problem there. Institutional problem by the way that I donot believe is ever going to be solved by the United Nations. I think its going to be solved by actually alayering of multiple and overlapping international institutions; many of which will not look liketraditional international organizations that I believe you know, simply have to populate the world.This is one of the consequences of globalization; because globalization does create winners and losers.And if you are going keep the world stable at an international level those kinds of mechanisms ofaccountability have to be there. So that is a task. I don't know whether it will be accomplished but Ithink it's it's a task that's crying out to be done.Third objection has to do with poverty. And the question of how you get on this economic escalator tobegin with? I mentioned earlier that the correlation between a relatively high level of economicdevelopment and liberal democracy is you know as far as you know, I am just a social scientist; I amnot a natural scientist. But as far as we social scientists go almost qualifies as a law that these twothings are pretty well are pretty well linked. But that presupposes that you can some how get yourselfup to the level of $6000 per capita and it turns out that that is actually not that easy for many societiesand there is a big chicken and egg problem here. The problem with development I think is really notthe question of resources, its not needing an external big push ala Jeffrey Sachs; it is a question ofinstitutions. You cannot have a long term economic growth unless you have a state and unless that statecan do things that states are supposed to do, like provide public services and public goods, maintain abasic rule of law, domestic order, defense from enemies and the like. And I think if you look aroundthe world today, you'll see that those parts that have successfully developed had relatively strong statesin their pre-modern periods and it was only a matter of getting the policies right that then allowed themto take off.So the state in many respects - and China was more ancient than it was in Europe, you go all the wayback; you know, three and four centuries and you still have things that look like centralizedadministrative apparatuses with bureaucrats and taxation and cadastral surveys and all that sorts ofthings that states undertake. And so it actually wasn't that big a leap for a relatively strong state likeChina to figure out that Communism was a kind of stupid economic policy, replace it with one thatlisten to market signals and then they take off like like gangbusters. But in many parts of the world,including where I am going, Papua New Guinea and including many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, therewas not a prior tradition of stateness, there were in certain parts of Africa, but in many other parts ofthe developing world you had institutions that were at a lower level of development than thananything that we would call a state. And in many other parts of the world what institutions you hadwere severely disrupted by colonialism. And I think you know the case of this was clearly the worstin Africa where you had a whole variety of traditional institutions at the time of European colonizationin the and then colonization came very late there in the 1870's and 1880's. And the Europeans,basically by the time they got to Africa, didn't want to give them real institutions because they wantedyou know, they are kind of exhausted, they were looking at each other wearily in the decades prior tothe great war and they wanted to do colonialism on the cheap.So instead of what the British did in India, which was spending a 200 year period building Indianinstitutions they tried to empower local elites. They did various variations on local law local rule thatmanaged to undermine traditional institutions without transmitting any thing like a modern stateinstitutions. And I think that this is one of the big problems in global development right now. Youcannot solve the poverty problem and get people on this escalator that will get you up to this $6000level without being able to solve this prior question of having a state and having a political order thatcan provide these sorts of basic services. I would go further than that and say that there is actually animportant degree to which the current international system actually promotes state weakness in a wholevariety of ways. Sometimes we kill countries by kindness. About eight percent to 12 percent of theGDP of every Sub-Saharan African country actually comes from the international donor community.So it's not like of generosity, I think that's the problem. But what happens is that when you transfermoney on on those levels you also infantilize countries because they actually don't need to createtheir own institutions. They can rely on NGO's and external donors to do this. A lot of cases we freeze conflicts.Europe went through, in its historical evolution to its current 20th century stage; it went throughactually three separate stages of evolution. There was a stage of state formation which was a bloodyperiod. European rulers fought each other to create territorially coherent spaces political spaces, a lotof that required basically ethnic cleansing to make sure that they are relatively homogeneous, a processthat really continued up through the late 20th century. Excuse me. Second stage was the implementationof a liberal rule of law that restrained the sovereign. And then finally and only at the end you haddemocratization. And that process that took 500 years in the case of a country like France, we areexpecting developing countries to replicate within a generation. Excuse me. And so for that reason theproblem of poverty remains. Well, I've been fighting a cold for the last week. My voice may be givingout. Fortunately we are at the fourth point now.Last point is technology. As I said the historical process is driven by the unfolding of modern scienceand technology. Up till now technology excuse me technology has been able to solve the problemsthat it set for itself; particularly the problem of economic productivity. There is no particular reason tothink that this will continue forever and we have certain technological developments that couldobviously end modernization tomorrow. The one that we've been particularly worried about is thequestion of global warming. But there are others as well. There has been a democratization of militarytechnology or the whole problem of weapons of mass destruction, democratizes extremely powerfulmeans of destructions that used to be only in the procession of nation states. Now individualspotentially can employ it and there are other issues as well. The ability to shape human behavior onvery subtle ways through biotechnology is another issue that I have written about in the future. Andthere is no guarantee that our political institutions will keep up with this pace of technologicaldevelopment. You just look at the collective action problems that are engendered by dealing withglobal warming and you see some dimensions of that problem. And on this the fourth point I give youno particular assurance. I cannot predict whether the growth of the institutions at international levelwill meet this requirements or not and if they don't I think that the technology itself that has been thesource of these broader story that I have been telling you about modernization may bring a whole ofthat to an end.Now I just want to end by saying the following. I have been accused of being a kind of Marxist and ofcourse the End of History was a Marxist concept and as I said, I was just getting off one station early.But I think I am quite different from most Marxists in the sense that I do not believe that there are ironlaws of history. I do not believe that any of the forces that I have described, that would tend to create along term process of modernization or universal history as I have described it, lock societies in.Agency, individual human agency is extremely important. If particular battles had not been won, ifparticular politicians had not gotten elected or had not taken power in a Coup-d'etat, the entiresubsequent history of those societies could be written very differently. I believe, as does Bob Wright,that in end there are certain equilibrating mechanisms in human societies so that if an invention isinvented in one society and then squelched as the as the rifle was in the early Tokugawa, Japan iteventually will get out because it confers an advantage and there will be a process of defensivecompetition as societies interact with each other. That means that none of these inventions can ever besuppressed for terribly long. But it doesn't mean that in the mean time you can't have tremendousvariation simply based on the kinds of political choices that we as citizens or we as politicians or we asgovernment officials make.So that the fact that I still believe that there is such a thing as history does not relieve any of us fromour responsibilities as individuals to be political participants because we in very important ways cancontinue to shape our political futures. I am not going to take any more risks with my voice completelygoing out. So may be I will just stop there we can just take questions. But thank you very much foryour attention.