Iraqi Reconciliation

To the Washington Institute, I am Rob Satloff, the Director of the Institute, I say that because we are joined today by a viewing audience throughout the Middle East live via Alhoora and I am delighted to welcome you all to the Washington Institute. Today it is a great pleasure for me to be able to host this special session on the prospects for Iraqi reconciliation in the context of the new security strategy being implemented in Iraq, we are joined today by a colleague of many year standing, a gentleman with decades of experience in the Middle East and here in Washington working on the Middle East, David Satterfield is one of Americas most experienced Middle East diplomats, his career in public services included tours as Ambassador to Lebanon as well as holding key positions here in the National Security Council and the State Department. He served as Deputy Chief of mission at the American embassy, the US embassy in Baghdad, and now is the coordinator of Iraq policy and the senior advisor to the Secretary of State on Iraq issues. David speaks authoritatively, speaks with knowledge, speaks with great insight and on an issue as volatile as Iraq these are attributes that we hold in high standard. It is my pleasure to turn the podium over to Ambassador David Satterfield. Thanks very much Rob, David appreciate very much the chance to talk to you today. What I have been asked to speak to is to move a bit away from the security side of what is taking place in Baghdad, but to look at what we hope moves ahead in parallel to the security efforts being made under David Petraeus's guidance, setting partnership with Iraqi security forces. Because that security surge, that security press in Baghdad and elsewhere cannot by and of itself achieve lasting stability or security for Baghdad or for Iraq as a whole. What it is intended to do is to help buy time, to buy space as other processes on three other fundamental tracks move forward which can, if they are pursued with sufficient vigor by Iraqi's, if they are enabled and facilitated and assisted with sufficient thought and vigor by not just the United States but also by Iraq's neighbors, by the region as a whole, by the international community, can put Iraq on a course of stability, prosperity, self sustainment, self-defense and ultimately produce for both Iraqi's and for the region as a whole and certainly for us, a better more positive future. And those other tracks are political reconciliation, economic development and provision of essential services and diplomatic engagement, all need to move forward. And our approach, our strategy, the President's "New Way Forward" articulated in January, is designed to press on those tracks as the military process moves ahead to try to stabilize the situation both with respect to sectarian violence but also with respect to the insurgency. Now, political reconciliation critical to any secure, stable, prosperous Iraq, how is it doing? How much are Iraqi's doing, how much are they bringing to this process? Should we optimistic, pessimistic, somewhere in between? Well, first I will restate again, it is absolutely essential that a vigorous and comprehensive political reconciliation process be pursued and pursued by Iraqi's. Iraqi's have to be in the lead on this. The US, other allies and friends can want to see progress on this track but at the end of the day we cannot want it more than Iraqi's prepare themselves to discuss, come to agreement, move and implement on the ground, this is about their future, this is about their country, the issues in play here are issues that relate to their pasts with each other and to some extent with their neighbors, they have got to come for in a reconciliation. Now, how if they don't? Certain progress has been made on political reconciliation related issues. A national hydrocarbon framework law which has both an economic component to it as well as a political reconciliation component has been approved by the Council of Ministers, is being prepared for submittal to the Council of Representatives. The framework law is important for two different reasons. The first is substance of the law itself. It does represent a major step forward for Iraq in terms of developing a hydrocarbon sector which is not just open to investments from outside but which is much more open to greater productivity, greater development and exploitation inside Iraq. It's a law which contemplates both Iraq at a national level in terms of management of both the sector and its resources but also management development exploitation and resource exploitation at a local, provincial or regional level. And that's very much reflective of the current reality of Iraq, a federal state with Kurdish region in the north and the potential for other federal regions to be developed in the future. We think it's a very positive thing; it's a positive thing for another reason, though. It represents and repudiation of the argument that's often made that Iraq's divisions, sectarian, ethnic are so profound, they can never be transcended. That Iraq is doomed to a faith of adverse fragmentation and division, at best a very uneasy, uncertain and unstable grudging coexistence. The hydrocarbon law represents a real compromise between Kurds and non Kurds, between Sunni and Shiites, with in the Shiite community, with in the Sunni community, and that's important. It's important to recall as we look at other issues where the dividing lines may seem quite profound if on hydrocarbons. Because the issue itself was seen as so critical to the future of all Iraqis irrespective of the ethnic or the sectarian identity that they had to get it more right than wrong, the same logic should apply can be made to apply to other fundamental issues as well. So it's an encouraging step. There are other measures on hydrocarbons which still need to be undertaken, including resource management in terms of revenues. That's under way right now in terms of discussion and debate, we hope very much in the weeks to come that a comprehensive hydrocarbon package can be submitted to the Council of Representatives for approval early this summer. Other positive steps, just yesterday, the Presidency Council submitted to the Council of Representatives for its consideration a de-Baathification reform proposal. There are several extant reform proposals that had been circulating in the Council of Representatives. But in the view of many Iraqis those proposals did not go far enough, they didn't go far enough to shift the focus on de-Baathification from criminality by affiliation, exclusion from national and governmental life purely by the fact of affiliation with the Baath, to individual responsibility, individual criminality, individual responsibility for specific acts committed. The new proposal advanced by President Talabani and the Council goes a considerable way to make de-Baathification reform move towards that personal accountability issue, away from affiliation as the key criteria for barring a return to participation in national life. This is an important reconciliation step as well, we are very encouraged by it, there will undoubtedly be a vigorous debate with in the Council of Representative over these many conflicting proposals. But we do believe what the council has submitted represents a good way, a better way forward for Iraq. But there are other steps that are still out there that need to be taken on the political process which together form the basis for a new national understanding, a new national basis for not just coexistence, that's a de minimis requirement, but for better cooperation towards a common future. There needs to movement forward on the provisions for provincial elections which we very much want to see Iraqis want to see, by the end of this year. An electoral law which is more open to free, fair, broad and representative participation by all of those interested in advancing a peaceful political process. There needs to be work on a disarmament, demobilization and re-integration proposal for Iraq's militias unless you just walk back a movement on where the security focus is today. The focus rightly today is on confronting, stopping, isolating. Those elements of armed groups who are actually engaged in violence, intimidation and threat, that has to be the focus today, that's the priority, stop the killing, stop the forced migrations, stop the violence, but it can't be the end of things. A political process needs to swing in and sing in properly. Once you have cleared, once you have secured populations in Baghdad and outside from immediate threat, from immediate harm into getting at the roots of the organizations and the groups that are threatening and harming and intimidating. And that's where DDR process in every post conflict state has proven over the last quarter century to be absolutely essential whether it's Northern Ireland or other models in Asia, in Africa or elsewhere. This process has to get underway. It has to be attended by an amnesty proposal and the rule of modern history around the world has been the more comprehensive and amnesty proposal is - in general the more the successful it is in bringing about national reconciliation. The more restrictive amnesties are the less the impact is. This will be true I think - in Iraq as well. These are difficult issues. De-baathification is an emotional issue; it's not an easy thing for Iraqis who have suffered under the baath to address. Amnesty will similarly be a difficult issue for Iraqis to contemplate and we understand that. But the goal of getting at the roots of extra governmental armed groups of militias of establishing the government and only the government as having a monopoly on force, a monopoly on the gun that's critical. It's critical for Iraq as it has been critical for every other conflict resolution process around the world and we have to move forward in Iraq as well. These are real challenges. They are challenges for a political leadership in government and outside government which had many, many things to do with the environment, is not a calm one. It's an environment in which the challenged by terror and the challenged by insurgent violence continues. Al Qaeda's tactic of attempting to provoke over and over and over, Sectarian violence - as a means of in Zarqawi and his follower's mad vision but a vision which appears to have a terrible fascination for many of a civil war - sectarian war that would result in the establishment of the Sunni Khilafat in Iraq. Still has resonance and that resonance is translated into those terrible images that we see almost everyday on our television screens of suicide bombers, of dead innocent Iraqis. That's the back drop. The back drop is the Sunni insurgency which continues to inflict harm above all. Not just on coalition forces, on US forces, on innocent Iraqi security forces but harm above all on Sunnis - on the fabric of Sunni life and Anbar and Sala Ah Din and Diyala provinces. Sunnis are literally killing their own future through this violence and it has to stop. We are encouraged as we had seen over the last six months, a movement of key elements in the conflict province most affected by the insurgency Anbar and most affected by Al Qaeda violence Anbar. By tribal elements who were responding to this killing by degrees of their life and their future moving against the insurgency against Al Qaeda and that is something we very much hope continues. But more is needed here. And here we talk about the need for economic progress and for helping assistance from outside Iraq. The Iraqi government must be made relevant again in the lives of the citizens. And that doesn't just come from pursuit of the national agenda on the part of Iraq security forces. It comes from a government which is seen as able and willing to extend its central services to all of its people particularly those people most prior to those services, storage, water, electricity employment. It's Baghdad, it's the conflict areas. Its other parts of the country where the central government isn't really relevant anymore it's not that it's performing a negative role, it's just not performing. We want to see an Iraq in which local governance is as strong as possible because our model our lesson has been local authority's tension know better. What is needed by the people in those areas that a central government does? Whether it's Washington or Baghdad? But that fact not withstanding. The central government does today in the near-term have a critical role to play on these basic essential services, the government needs to do more. Can the government do more? It has resources; the government has $12.5 billion in moneys in its current accounts. Now we have gone to the congress and asked in the '07 supplement and in the '08 regular budget request for almost $4 billion. That's an extraordinary thing to do. We will have a country with billions of dollars in resources in its current accounts yet we are asking for tax spare moneys for that government. Why? We are asking it for a simple reason. The government of Iraq is not capable of executing a capital investment budget which moves its own extant resources to the places where those resources are needed. Not for political reasons, not for reasons related to the security situation but because it literally lacks the mechanisms and tools to put its own money into play. This is not a sustainable situation; not for us, not for the Iraqis. What we are doing is focusing intently on giving the Iraqis the skills - the tools they need to execute their own budget particularly on capital investments. Why are we asking the Congress for this extraordinary level of assistance because we believe it is so vital to move now in a real time '07 context. Critical moneys that help stabilize the clear and secure phase of our military plan to translate that into a third phase built. Build Iraqi presences, build social services, build economic opportunities that capitalize on what the military have done to stabilize and secure. This is classic counter insurgency strategy. It is very much the approach which Dave Petraeus embarked upon, it is a critical part of the toolset he will require. But it's bridging and it's transitional in its very character. It is looking at '07 as a year in which Arab moneys help to jumpstart and push forward the bill part of clear secured bill. As Iraqis come in as quickly as possible with their resources and more importantly, we help, the International Community helps Iraq built its capacity to execute its own budget. So that when Iraq as it has done passes a budget with $10 billion, assigned for development and reconstruction it actually can move those moneys. And that in '08 when we speak to these issues, a year from now to the Congress, to the American people. We don't have to say that the ministry of Oil had $3.5 billion in its capital investment budget, real money which would have tripled, the amount of return of those $3.5 billion over a one to two year period in terms of increased exports and productions, but it couldn't spend more than six percent of those funds because it didn't not know how to execute a budget. You can say it once, you can't say credibly again. This is got to be a fundamental Europe budget execution profit capacity. We turn now to an issue that shifts the focus away from the US to the neighbors of Iraq, to the broader Middle East and to the International Community because they've got a role as well and a critical role to play. And a role which is not on the whole been played in a manner which has been supportive of the peaceful, stable, prosperous Iraq and a good neighbor to all of those in the Middle East and ally in the war against terror. Iraq needs help. We are committed, the administration, as the coalition is committed to providing help in this bridging transitional fashion on security; on economic issues. But the region has to step forward, Iraq's neighbors have to step forward and so does the broader International Community. And let me walk from that outer ring, the International Community back down to the neighbors. Last week in New York, the text of the International Compact for Iraq was formally closed. This is an extraordinary document because the product of almost a years worth of discussion and negotiation within the government of Iraq, between the government of Iraq and the World Bank, and the UN as an institution. It has had the active participation of a number of key states, including the United States, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, other critical neighbors and friends of Iraq who have together created not just an extraordinarily forward looking document which lays out an economic and development course for the Iraqi nation but which also contains commitments and pledges on security, on a national agenda with respect to political reconciliation, an overall vision of Iraq as a stable, peaceful, prosperous entity. It's more than just a good document. Much of that document on the economic side has already been implemented or is being implemented. The Iraqis did not wait for the formal closure of the text. Because of the importance of taking steps on an investment law on hydrocarbons, on removing subsidies from fuels and product, Iraq has moved forward consistently over the last year on these basic economic trade and commercial issues at a more vigorous pace than it has on other questions, and in that we find a source of encouragement. But Iraq needs support in response to these measures from outside. The purpose of the commitments Iraq has made in the compact is not just to send a roadmap to its own government, to its own people about where the state is going but also to elicit from the broader international community, meaningful public and private sector support. Now in Madrid, it seems many years ago, over $31 billion were pledged by the international community to the Iraq in terms of grants, soft loans, debt forgiveness. Some states have come forward very generously, the UK, the European Union, Japan with commitments. Others have not, debt forgiveness by the key gulf debt holders has not moved and it needs to. The international community, the region, Iraq's neighbors need to tangibly demonstrate their support for a stable, peaceful and prosperous Iraq. We hear and we listen to the concerns expressed by many of Iraq's neighbors, many of whom are good friends of the United States, that they are deeply worried about the growth of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, that they are deeply concerned at negative Iranian influence spreading in Iraq. These are real concerns, we understand - we are sympathetic with them. But the way to address these concerns is not by turning ones back on Iraq, it is not by walking away, it is not by isolating a moderate government as it pursues a national, not a sectarian agenda. That is a guarantee for the outcome with which those states are so rightly and we are so rightly concerned. They need to do more. We hope that through the process of moving forward the international compact and the other process which has just moved underway, a regional engagement by Iraq's neighbors and a broader collective of the international community a preparatory meeting for which was held on March 10th in Baghdad, that we can see a positive, constructed and tangible supportive relationship between Iraq's friends in its neighboring familiar in the broader middle east and the international community, that has been the case in the past, we want to see this process move forward, Iraq wants to see the process move forward. We hope very much there can be ministerial meetings of Iraq's neighbors and associated international partners and of the international combat participants in the very near future, perhaps in the weeks ahead. This momentum needs to be sustainted. It is a positive regional engagement. Something else is needed from Iraq's neighbors. Syria and Iran had not contributed constructively to a stable, peaceful and progressive Iraq. They have not helped in addressing the concerns felt by innocent Iraqis subject to violence indeed, in both cases, either actions or inactions or a combination of the two have contributed to the suffering in that country. And have contributed, in the case of Iran, very immediately and directly to the death of American soldiers and coalition soldiers. This is not a situation which can be allowed to continue. Iraq has made clear using both direct channels and the vehicle of this new regional engagement, to make clear to all that its sovereignty, its borders, its desires for peace at home need to be respected, that it welcomes positive relationships with all of its neighbors as indeed do we. But that neighbors who wish to have a positive relationship with Iraq must do so on the basis of mutual respect, for sovereignty and for the integrity of borders, and we think that's a very solid basis for a positive relationship to emerge. The US has its own bi-lateral issues with Iran. The US has broad concerns over activities and inactions taken by the government of Syria. And we hope those concerns are addressed seriously with respect to the challenge posed by Iranian engagement - state engagement, in providing explosively foreign projectiles, other material, training, which are being used by Iraqi elements to attack, to kill US forces and we have stated I think as clearly as we can, that we will not stand idly by and allow those attacks to continue. We will act to defend, our forces, those are actions which we believe very much can be pursued in the context of Iraq and not more broadly. But we would hope that Iran understands that they cannot continue these activities unchallenged, that if there is a belief on the part of the government in Teheran that the United States will not respond, that they are wrong, there has been a response, there will continue to be responses. We would hope that the Syrian Government understands well that its rhetoric which is quite clear of support for a peaceful stable prosperous Iraq has been matched by actions and above all first and foremost they stopped the transit across the Syrian boarder of Jihadists who are committing those terrible acts of violence which are killing innocent Iraqis. 90 percent of the suicide bombers today as over the last several years are not Iraqis, they are foreigners. And while the mix of which countries are providing those bombers changes as the months and years change. A fact that hasn't shifted over the years is that some 85 to 90 percent of all suicide bombers come across one boarder that of Syria. There is a reason for that. It is not coincidental. They see Syria as a more accommodating country through which to transit across this boarder to come into Iraq to perpetrate their terror that has to stop. It is not in Syria's long-term interest to see this violence continue. It needs to be brought to a halt. Are we optimistic? I'm often asked. The answer is yes. We are optimistic cautiously so of course. Nothing is assured in Iraq. Success in that country however, success is defined depends first and foremost on Iraqi actions. We will do our part. It is why we have asked congress to provide the support on the military and on the civilian side that we need that our commanders need that the mission needs to succeed. But at the end of the day all of that support can only enable and facilitate and assist Iraqi lead and Iraqi actions. We have seen positive changes in Iraq's leadership, we have seen a national agenda being pursued more vigorously than in the past that is very encouraging but much more on political reconciliation, on economic development and provision of the essential services needs to be done and much more needs to done in terms of mobilizing the positive response the positive engagement of all of Iraq's neighbors of the region as a whole and of the international community but with that we do believe success in Iraq is possible and the stakes of that success for the United States here in America are so significant that we believe every possible effort needs to continue to be exerted to see that the positive goal is achieved. Thank you all.