National Security in the 21st Century

You all know Former Secretary of State, Former Secretary of Labor, Former Secretary of the Treasury, George Shultz, I think what's important to know amongst this group is that he is a graduate of Princeton University, the other important thing to know is that he began his government service as a marine. George Shultz as you know got his undergraduate degree at Princeton in Economics, led into the marines, he then earned his PhD in economics from MIT, he served as a Senior Staff Economist to President Eisenhower's council on economic advisers, taught at MIT at and also at the University of Chicago. He resumed his public service under President Nixon as Secretary of Labor and is director of the office of management and budget and then later as Secretary of Treasury. And then of course he came back here to the Bay Area to be the only non family member to be CEO of Bechtel. He of course returned to the Reagan Administration and became chairman of the Economic Policy Advisory Board as well as finally Secretary of State. He is now a distinguished fellow at Hoover Institution at Stanford University and together with Anthony Lake Secretary Shultz served as the honorary co-chair of the project that we are going to be talking about tonight, The Princeton Project on National Security. He will be joined by Anne-Marie Slaughter; Anne-Marie Slaughter is the Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School at at Princeton, she is also a Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and co-convener and academic co-chair of the Princeton Project. She was formally at Harvard Law School and there she was professor of International, Foreign and Comparative Law and was Director of the International Legal Studies Program. She has a rich interdisciplinary expertise which makes her particularly suited to talk about the dangers and the opportunities of the information age. They are joined by a third author and that is John Ikenberry, he is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, he is of course at the Woodrow Wilson School as well, he is co-director of this Princeton Project on National Security. He started at Princeton in 1984 and he has since held posts at the State Department, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington and the Brookings Institution. Prior to joining Princeton he taught at Georgetown and was a fellow at the German Marshall Fund. So please join me in welcoming our three distinguished guests. And they are going to get armed with microphones, so it would take a brief pause while they are and just say one word, the purpose of this study, the initial purpose of this study is to take a look at world a very very different world than we inherited right after the Second World War. A world that's shaped by new trends, by the information revolution, by economic globalization, by population surges at the low-end of the economic ladder and ask ourselves ask themselves the questions, what kinds of dangers does that create, what kinds of opportunities, what kinds of new new actors who are in power and so we are going to start off with Anne-Marie Slaughter and ask her to give us just a quick very quick overview of of what they undertook and what they learnt. So this is a project that engaged almost 400 people over two and half years that I am supposed to now distill into six minutes. Let me give you the outlines of the report. But let me begin by saying, the genesis of this report was actually George Kennan's 100th birthday, George Kennan, another great Princetonian Secretary Shultz is is arrayed in Black and Orange, on his 100th birthday in 2004 Colin Powell actually came to Princeton to celebrate this and I sat there thinking in the audience that George Kennan had written the X-article and the X-article had had set out really the basic principles of U.S. National Security Policy for the Cold War. And that anybody in my business whether they admit it or not dreams about writing the next X-article. But even if you were George Kennan you could not write the X-article as a single person to design a National Security Policy, to face the threats of the 21st century for a very simple reason, there was one overriding threat, the overriding threat of the Soviet Union. It wasn't the only threat but it was certainly the primary one. But today we are we are worried about the implosion of the Middle East. We are worried about nuclear proliferation, we are worried about global terrorist's networks, we are worried about the bird flue which could kill 50 million of us, which certainly qualifies as a threat by my definition, we are worried about energy security and we are worried about the how we integrate China and India into the international system, never before have two powers of that potential magnitude been integrated into the existing system without a major conflict. We don't want that to happen this time. With that array of threats we have to we decided we had to assemble a large group of people to think about how do you design one national security strategy that could actually address any of those threats as they become a primary in any given period of the next coming decades? That's the genesis. I will say, it's a bi-partisan report in the sense that the people who like it are in both parties and the people who don't like it are in both parties, that's our definition of bi-partisan. Let me give you the overview of what we call Forging a World of Liberty Under Law. The phrase "Liberty Under Law" is chosen advisedly. It is a way of thinking about what our founders called order of liberty. They our founders did not talk about democracy in the way we do today, actually James Madison didn't like democracy all that much. But what they did talk about was how you created institutions that would secure government by the consent of the governed that established liberty and associated values under the rule of law. If you take that vision of what states ought to ideally look like within states and a world of relations between states of liberty under law, what would your policy be? Not a threat based policy not this is how we are going to respond to this threat and that threat but an overall positive policy. Three major parts, the first, Liberty Under Law within states. If you took liberty under law as your goal you would you certainly wouldn't disapprove elections, you want elections but elections would be only a small part of what would be needed to create not just a democracy, but our constitutional democracy, a liberal democracy. We argue the United States should pursue democracy. That should be a focal point of our policy but in a very different way and specifically we talk about creating a power system, a system of popular, accountable and representative governments I am sorry, popular, accountable and rights regarding governments. So instead of just asking are there elections, you would ask is it a popular government, the very different ways to represent the people, is it an accountable government and is it a rights regarding government? Moving on that's about a years worth of work, but let me go to the second part of the of the of the overall framework of Liberty Under Law here we look to relations among nations and we argue and Professor Ikenberry will amplify this that the United States was very well served, has been well served by a world of institutions, the institutions are force multipliers, they are ways that we bind other nations to us and ourselves to other nations in ways that pursue our interests. These are not idealistic visions of world government these are very pragmatic institutions that advanced our interests. Many of those institutions are in serious need of reform. They were created for the world of the late 1940s, we have different countries, different threats and we need to overhaul them. We propose that you would start with the U.N. Security Council, you would actually reform the Security Council to include the major powers of the 21st century certainly Japan, Germany, India, Brazil, African countries, Muslim countries. We proposed that the United States should lead the way in doing that just imagine what it would be to the world to have the United States actually saying, you know we recognize the tables got to get bigger and other countries need a seat at the table. That would be part one. But part two in the world in relations amongst States would be to create a concert of democracies. This is not a global NATO, its not an alliance of democracies, but it would be a concert of liberal democracies and we propose how you would actually identify who would be in that in that organization. They could provide an alternative to the Security Council when the Security Council was completely blocked and more importantly would provide a pressure group to reform other institutions, the U.N., the World Bank, the IMF it would give us a forum where we were working with likeminded nations, but alongside the U.N. Finally, World of Liberty Under Law whether it's within a country or among countries requires the actual or the credible threat of the use of force. You can't have a domestic society without a state monopoly on force and you really can't have a liberal order internationally unless force can be used credibly under the rules governing the system. So we look and hear, we rely heavily on a Hoover Institute Project that we participated in with Secretary Shultz and other others. We look at how you use force and specifically when you should be able to use force preventively. We argue that in a world in which you have States like North Korea, States that are not responsible that are possibly nuclear power, States that are also possibly transmitting weapons of mass destruction to terrorists, you cannot take the preventive use of force off the table. But we would argue that it has to be approved the use the preventive use of force must be approved either by the U.N. Security Council or by a regional organization that is at least as representative as NATO, so you can't convene an organization of three States and have them approve it. It has to be an organization like NATO or the OAS or the OAU. Finally, we also talk about the way the United States should think about the military balance of power and we argue against primacy not that the United States shouldn't be as powerful as it needs to be, obviously no one is going to say the United States should be a weak Nation, but that to announce to the rest of the world that we are determined to maintain primacy and we want no peer competitor essentially is asking other countries to rival us. And finally, we look at the uses of deterrence and we argue that even though we are in a world now where we face non-state actors, we shouldn't be too quick to throw deterrence out the window. The deterrence served us well in the Cold War and in a World of Liberty Under Law often you you can still achieve many of your goals by deterring States rather than actually using force or threatening them. So overall, a World of Liberty Under Law would be a world in which the United States was much safer and more prosperous world, a better world, you would get there by promoting democracies under a power system, by overhauling the international system and rethinking the rules governing the use of force. Thank you Anne-Marie and John let me just turn to you very quickly and ask you to say a little more about the institutions institutional capability we need in order to to envision this world and the norms that they are there to defend. That's excellent. Yes, let me underline the two points that I think are right at the front of this report. One is about threats which gets you to institutions, the biggest I think judgment we had to make was how to think about the threat environment for the United States in the 21st century. What do we think are the are the the great dangers abroad and academics get paid to worry and in some sense that's really the question. What do you worry about, what should we be worrying about and how should we rate our resources to address those worries? And we came as and we said to the judgment that it's the multiplicity of threats shifting, uncertain and - and synergistic in some cases of these various threats that that are are distinctive when we look into the future. And that lead you to in effect a grand strategy, I would like to say a grand strategy of multitask scheme. You have to have capacitates to do lots of different things. You have to have lots of friends, ready resources and kind of circuitry build into the international system. So that when particular threats become a a predominant you can activate those those collaborations and capacities to to do what you must. And that of course leads to the to the discussion of the institutions and our view is that that they have been eroded and degraded over the last decade or so that the great burst of institution building was after World War II, America's brilliant career on the global stage has really been conducted with the US sponsoring and working through the whole multitude of institutions security, political, economic, multilateral, regional, global and those institutions have done a great deal of work. But today they are in in bad repair and so we have an agenda for strengthening them and we we make that - what we think is that pragmatic case linked to this multitasking vision of what we need to do. So, in addition to renewing those institutions, alliances and then the UN, we also propose two new institutions in the in the report. One is a I guess a quasi-institutions so it's like concert of democracies and we said it's a gathering of democracies that would do what what really would be a a gathering of democracies to enshrine the democratic peace. Democracies don't fight each other, we know that and to strengthen the cooperation that flows from that peaceful set of relations are is part of what we are are after. We know that that democracies are more likely to cooperate, you know, shared values lead to commitments and and join to purpose. And so our task there is to do that the concert will also be a vehicle for bringing in to the global system new democracies; India, Mexico, South-African Countries that are seek - seeking a seat at the table. And so that is on our agenda. The other institution is, to - we propose that we start thinking about security organizations in East Asia. That in Asia, there are many moving parts, we have two great dramas unfolding among others, the rise of China and the should we say the normalization of Japan. And each of those developments are in motion and in some sense inevitable but individually and certainly collectively can create conflicts in securities security dilemmas as what we call them in among international relations scholars. And so, institutions can be very useful to provide commitments and reassurance and and the transparency and and then all the rest. So we propose that perhaps on the heels of the group of the six-party talks that that gathering of states certainly China, Japan and the US and Korea would would form a prototype of a security mechanism in North-East Asia. So I'll stop there. But that's, some of what we've proposed in the in the realm of the institutional institution building reform. Before I turn to Secretary Shultz and ask him about the the importance of putting forth the positive vision, not just what we are against, but what we are for. And and how relevant that is to some of today's dangers. Let me just ask you about, a a quick question about the user force because in your report you argued that that what you would ask of members of the United Nations is it they accept the concept of the duty to protect the notion that they must protect their citizens against against harm, preventable harm and if they fail, the international community not only has the right but the obligation to intervene, so I am so I guess my question is how far are we from there and when will we you know, how far we're from having the mechanisms in place; the cooperative security mechanism in place to act on such a norm? I'm not able to answer it. She gets the hard question. Yeah, I was going to say. So its not we do we do say that States have to accept the responsibility to protect, it has not yet turn into a duty - you know, we are in a world now where its illegitimate to intervene even when a government is massacring its own citizens. The current rules of the game are rules set in 1945 that say there is an absolute norm of non-intervention. So the responsibility to protect is the first chink in that armor and it says and this was actually endorsed by the United Nations although it has not been given real life that if a government is gravely violating its duties to its citizens, so perpetrating crimes against humanity or genocide are really grave acts abusing its population then the international community has the right to intervene. You are quite right to say that even that's is a long way from the capacity to intervene and again we only talked about the highlights of our recommendations for U.N. Reform. But longer the sort of broader program does include various schemes either to designate certain forces that would be available in a kind of rapid reaction force to intervene or being able to task regional organizations with that kind of responsibility, although as we see now in Darfur, the African Union can't do the job alone. So even that is only a partial solution. I think there is an additional problem solved. Here you have the U.N. Security Council and it makes a determination that his balance should be disarmed, what happens? Nothing, there is no problem. It makes a statement that it's not acceptable for Iran to continue with its enrichment process and if it restarts the enrichment process there will be dire consequences. So Iran flamboyantly restarts its enrichment process and what happen? Nothing, same with North Korea. Maybe we are beginning to get somewhere, but been through a lot of iterations like that. You mentioned Darfur very early on Colin Powell label that genocide and from anyone can see that is exactly what is going on. We say never forget, never again the holocaust. So where we were in Rwanda? The U.N. pulled out when it clear some good could have been done. And here we are with Darfur. Why aren't we doing anything? Fundamentally because Chinese are very interested in the oil that's there, they have a veto and they are not interested in doing this. So it isn't the structure, it's the different interests that people have and you said yourself all the time, well, if the so called International Community or the Security Council having been around something will do something then maybe somebody ought to do it - My response -. - and that's the problem. And your report actually response specifically to to this issue, so but - You know, more you are expecting way too much of the U.N. If you think the U.N. is the organization that's going to do then we have been disappointed all along. The U.N. is the organization that legitimates action, so in the First Gulf War when we got this so the approval of the Security Council, it was very easy to get lots of countries to line up and to fight with us. Similarly even in even with respect Hezbollah the fact that the U.N. says Hezbollah should be disarmed makes it a lot easier for Israel and other countries to actually do that, because they are carrying out a U.N. Resolution. Similarly at or the flipside of that of course is when we didn't get U.N. approval for going into Iraq, then the Turks couldn't lead us over fly their country, because their people needed the U.N. Resolution. My view is that Nation States have to take action and a concert of democracies could well take action. But the United Nations has proven itself to be important in legitimizing action which particularly in countries of democracies is very important and that's why we need to expand the countries at the Security Council, because for much of the world when the know, India wasn't there there was no African country there, no Latin-American country there. Well, I think we shouldn't expect the U.N. to actually be able to do the best we can hope is that it can it can mobilize collective will. But you are -. The more the more voters you have the more likely it is that some of them are going to vote against. I feel that way about Congress all the time. But your -. It will probably be the faculty of the school. There is a lot of appeal to the structures that you recommended particularly that the congress of democracies. But I think that you can overplay the importance of institutions and you have to recognize that the way people react and the way Nations start to see their interests and so on it is so important that is the reason why I have always advocated in diplomacy the importance of gardening. That is to say you plant a garden, you go away for six months, you come back to this. So if you are halfway smart gardener you come frequently and you get the weeds out when they are small and then you can grow something decent. And so I think that the institution that needs to be built up the most is the Department of State, because that's main - that's the leader in the gardening and the Department of State was rundown very badly Colin Powell really saved it because he came along having seen the there were years when there were actually no foreign no new foreign service officers taken in at the bottom and you know you are running a big organization that brought bring in new talent benefit you are going out of business. And Colin understood that a General knows that if he doesn't have any (indiscernible) insurgence and he is not going to get anywhere. And he turn he turned the situation around that in order to garden effectively in order to just work with countries constantly, go there when there is no crisis and just say I am listening and I recognize the importance let's try to understand things well and so on is a way in which when a crisis come you have the basis for getting somewhere. Two quick points just to that what that Anne-Marie had hadn't quite got a chance to get to is that the report also say, we will take away the veto in times of crisis for a single State. Now, I don't know if Secretary Shultz thinks that any of these ideas would fly, whether the U.N. Security Council whatever adopt these reforms, that's another matter. Do you want to comment on that before I turn to your gardening, because I am about to turn to your gardening? The well, the U.N. was able to be put together only because the veto was put there and the major countries insisted on it. The United States, the Soviet Union in particular, I believe that's the history of the veto. You are not going to get yourself for the position of being voted against. But Roosevelt actually originally didn't want to veto it and Stalin did and then Congress agreed and we I do want to clarify we do not think you should get rid of the veto on resolutions censuring other countries and we are not we are not going to get rid of being able to veto resolutions that are censuring Israel, for the sake of censuring Israel. What we do argue is that the United States is the country always pushing for action. As you have just said with respect to Darfur you know we are the ones who want action and other countries typically are vetoing us. So what we recommend is that you replace the veto on resolutions going for direct action with some kind of weighted majority system and we have weighted majority systems in the U.N, the World Bank and the IMF. It wouldn't be simply as acknowledging majority rules and we wouldn't which we would make it infinitely infinitely harder. That are all good comments. But I just come back to the fact that in the end procedures, structures and so forth are trying you try to build the best you can, but then it's the nations and the people who use them. So let's get to the interest. I want to - I think that's right and I think institutions are the solution, they could be a vehicle for actors doing things that maybe important and the end the U.N. will be effective if the leading States that are part of it it's a trade union of States. It's not an institution on its own. It when States act together then the U.N. acts, when they don't the U.N. doesn't act. So one shouldn't you have to be reductionist if you will hold about the U.N. It's really the pieces matter and in that case the great powers and their interests and there, what I think, we are emphasizing is and it's consistent with the notion, (indiscernible) notion of garden you know, of building greater consensus, getting mechanisms in place so that we are, before these crisis, before the Iran issue blows up, that we are working on exchanging views and developing common views on threats and how we deal with these, with rogue states and so forth, and you can find, you need kind of multiple layers of that kind of gardening. You need multiple venues for gardening. NATO needs to return to what NATO needs to regain its older function as a site for strategic discussion between Europe and the United States and a place where the US can get cooperation from Europe by, in some sense sharing its decision making power over the use of force with Europeans in return for Europeans responsibly engaging the US on it's security interests. And then the concert of democracy is in a sense trying to again provide a vehicle for that kind of consensus building among the democratic powers and the UN itself. So I think that it's consistent with our building capacities and cooperation, the great powers will determine whether there is action or not. But we have periods in history where the great powers despite their separate interests do see things together. The concert of Europe after 1815 when the states, the leading states saw that they had a shared interest in stability and ensuring territorial integrity. So anyway I think we are close. Secretary Shultz. I would like to make a comment about the Princeton project that hasn't been made before here. First of all I think it's really a terrific effort to try to think this through and try to create a framework for discussion, make proposals and talk about them. Because it's way over due to try to do something like this because the post World War II arrangements and ideas of they were great but they have run out of steam. And the second comment I made is that I would like to bring out something that's in the report but hasn't been mentioned. We have had all this discussion so far and the word economics has not been mentioned. I, at Princeton, Anne Marie, I was a student in your school, so I am one of your alumni, and I studied Economics and I am still thinking about those subjects. And I remind you that before the George Kennan telegram and so forth there was (Brad Norwitz) and the beginning of the construction of this post war architecture was essentially came from the realization of the statesmen of that time that the protectionist experience in the 1930s which so damaged all our economies, let alone the world economy and contributed to a war breaking out. It was something they wanted to get away from and so they created the GATT process, they created the monetary arrangement designed to counter competitive devaluations and things like that and they created, what we now call, the World Bank but it was its real name is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and they looked around and they saw all the damaged economies and lets get them reconstructed and so and so so they put together an economic package and I think when you are trying to look out and say how are we are going to have an architecture that works, it has to look at the economic aspect Right now I think the world has never been, never in its history has it been in a moment of such promise. There is economic expansion going on all over the world. US economy is no doubt the leader of it in the and a lot of the confident comes from us but it's a very widespread. Never has anything like this happened before. And you see poverty being eliminated in places like China, India, that have been mired in poverty for so long and people are beginning to hold their heads up and so on. So you have this tremendous moment of opportunity and I think it's very important to preserve it by doing positive things and that is continuing to open the world economy. And if we succumb to protectionist pressures in this country and other countries do, you can bring down this growth of this golden moment very easily. So this is something we need to attend to and this is in the report that. You didn't mention this, so I thought I would bring it up. And of course economic integration has been something that is being pushed by the United States through the post post war period. It worked it has worked. And its worked, so its part of this positive vision that can be put forth. Absolutely. But how should we think then about China's rise and India's rise. Should we be welcoming their economic success? We are looking at, in the case of China our first multidimensional competitor. Its an economic competitor, its military competitor, its may even be a political competitor, how should we look at that? You are looking at me. I think we should look at it very, very positively. This is part of a rising economic process, the more prosperous the world around us is, the more prosperous we are going to be. The more prosperous the world around us is the more chances there are for stability and the kind of political order that you are talking about. So, I think, it's a welcome development and of course, we need, to make them as the saying goes, stakeholders in the world economy. So there are rules that have been set out, that people agreed to when they joined the World Trade Organization. We have to be willing to observe the rules and by and large we are. Sometimes we don't like it but we are. But we China to do it too since they have joined and hold them to it without and relentlessly and another countries as well. But still I think the natural economic course is if you let them work they will do well for you. And this economic development, conscious economic development in the developing world part of a national security strategy John? Absolutely, China and India are part of the developing world and they are coming on strong and even when they are have economies the size of ours, which is not too far over the horizon, if current growth trends continue, they may not but we are talking about the so-called BRIC countries, Russia, India, China, Brazil in the decades ahead having aggregate GNP the size roughly of the G-6 countries. So they are going to be major players, but they are still going to be poor countries but, the populations have made them large global economic significance. And so part of the, and this is in the report, part of the way in which we try to bring these these renewed global institutions and partnerships to bear on those development tasks is precisely to bring these countries into our institutions, that's why we put so much emphasis on expanding the Security Council. Bringing in India and other countries and developing mechanisms so that those agendas are reflected on the agenda of the older driven institutions of the 1945 period. So we are, in effect, trying to change the configuration of the tables so that new players can sit around the table and help make the decision. I will this Anne Marie just go ahead. I was going to follow up on that in terms of how you engage these countries? Because we agree absolutely, as Secretary Shultz said, the rise of China is not a threat, it's a challenge. It's an important challenge. If we don't manage it right we are either in big trouble economically or conceivably politically. All you need to think about for a second is to imagine if China, the economy stumbles within China and the Chinese government is worried about domestic instability so ratchets up a crisis with Taiwan. Suddenly we and the Japanese could be in a very unpleasant situation. So it's a challenge we have to manage. But on the point of how do what we need to do with China and India is to convince them that they also have responsibilities, they have been developing countries, they are developing countries and if you look at India India wants a seat at the table. But India also likes being the lead developing country, the head of the Non-Alignment Movement and part of the point about of creating a concert of democracies and of expanding the Security Council is to say to the Indian Government, "You are a rising power, you are going to be a great power, you have responsibilities. You need to recognize that you have common values with other other democracies and bring you are not going to agree with other democracies all the time. But it is important that you shoulder some of the responsibilities for global order". So part of the point of institutions is to actually integrate nation's that have, I more traditionally thought of themselves as outside the power structure. You are speaking of political responsibilities, Secretary Shultz, let me let's look at economic development responsibilities that the issue is not just that they develop, but how they develop; and as we think of our - our concerns about climate change, I know that you've thought a lot about the whole question of how we pursue our, and that how we meet our own energy needs in a way that is environmentally responsible. What kind of what kinds of steps should we be taking or what should we expect from the Chinese, the Indians and others? I think this question of climate change and it's connected with the national security threats we worry about with our dependence on oil. These are important problems to address. And I believe that people who are pushing the hardest are working on the wrong concept. They are working on a concept that won't work. The concept is essentially the Kyoto concept. And there is a reason why the Senate board at 95 to nothing, not to send it. And that is a reason why the Chinese and the Indians and the others won't accept it, because what it says is accept a cap on emissions, read; accept a cap on the rate of the economic growth and they won't accept such a cap. So you have to say to yourself is there another way to go about it. And I believe there is, that has a chance of getting somewhere and working and it's a way that has been tried and its the only environmental treaty that's worked. That was negotiated during the Reagan administration. And the person who led the work within the state department was a genius at it. And this is something called the Montreal Protocol. And the problem was very similar in many respects People, there were scientists who were worried about the Ozone layer widening. There were others who weren't so sure. But they all agreed that if it happened, it would be a catastrophe. So even if you are skeptical you are willing take out of the church policy. So the Montreal protocol, so let's keep studying the issue and learning or understanding it better. And let's take the things that can be done and let's do - agree to do the doable things. And then let's keep studying additional things you can do. So that got agreed to. The Senate consented to ratify it by an overwhelming margin. And it worked, in another words it was a bottoms-up thing. But it had agreement that we are going to agree and we are going to do some things. We are all going to do them. Now the genius that led the way within the state department, that I should try to give cover to was assistant secretary for Senate. His name was John Negroponte and I was in Washington the other day and made a comment along these lines and he was present and I said John, I have got an encore. But I think that this is a way of going about it that will appeal to the - the Chinese, the Indians, and others. Because it doesn't say that we are trying to restrict your growth. And that but it does say you as worried as anybody else about the pollution in your cities. And this is a way of getting out it. Of trying to draw the ideas and methods and techniques that have been developed all over the world and know about them and put them into effect. So that's the way I would go about that. And I think it fits in very much with the theme that Anne Marie and John were talking about. And that is to get us in the position of advocating things in a positive way. We are not just against something; we are for things that will work and be out in front. And of course the private sector also has got an important role to play in all this and its investment to alternative fuels. The most of the ideas, I think, practically all the ideas that were critical, and in turn then people the ozone layer thing that the people who are worried turned out to be right and the steps taken turned out to be effective than I think the general thing is probably is in the process of the working but the idea is of what to do came practically off in the private sector. But it its the social sector as well, came under this, Ann Marie has spent a lot of time thinking about non-governmental organizations and others but, in fact they were the source of, in more recent negotiations the idea of role in compliance, the idea of having treaties that could be changed to take new knowledge into effect. The idea of a missions trading, what kind of role do you see going forward Anne Marie for the social sector, the non governmental organization of this world in helping us tackle somebody's large problems and in particular in the treaty-making process. Well let me start by saying we agree with sensitive issues on Kyoto and also on the need to stimulate alternative methods and in our proposals probably not one that you would subscribe to. We also - we actually endorse the gas tax on the premise that it would slow economic growth but our premise was this is the city of Venture Capital. You need to keep prices high enough to really stimulate the private sector in terms of finding alternative energy sources. But, Jane to your question, we don't address the social sector specifically here, what we do say is that the governments ought to be networking the way corporations do and the way the civil society does and this is something I have written about and effectively what it says is for all that we like institutions, and we recommend institutions, a lot of international institutions are incredibly slow and cumbersome, even if they are working as effectively as you can make them, they are slow and they have very set rules, so we argue instead that in many of these areas you ought to have networked institutions. You ought to have a network of environmental ministers and the network that works with the secretary, the Foreign Ministers but that is able to implement a lot of the kinds of new proposals much more flexibly and those networks would plug-in to the social sector of the Civil Society Networks that you are talking about, it makes it easier for them to work with those other networks. And, of course, one of our biggest concerns is now with weak states instead of strong states and presumably these networks would have the effect on - of building state capacity which should be - Yes. - would be an objective. With the sober realization that is in the end, its very difficult, in the experts report after report are sobered in the prospects of actually building strong states out of weak ones, and but the best thinking does entail the bringing together of all the different levels and types of international community resources, private sector, government aid investment, it has to be co-coordinated concerted kind of effort and that is brings you back to networks very quickly. Of course the network we worry about most now what we are focused on as long we are worried about and that's terror networks. Your report takes issues with the term War on Terror. Say something about that, say what worries you about that metaphor. So as Jane is suggesting that we have, I just gave you the big parts of the report, the back half of the report has a set of recommendations on all of the threats that we identify then. On on terrorist's networks we argue that you shouldn't be talking about a war on Islamofascism, a War on Terror, that what that's doing is dignifying people who are mass murderers. They are criminals. And you are dignifying them in the way they want to be seen which is as holy warriors. They want us to identify them as the principle enemy and if we call them Islamic, so much the better because their narrative is the United States is waging a war on Islam. Our story has to be - no, we are fighting networks of mass murderers we use Law Enforcement but law enforcement alone is not enough. We also need to use vastly improved intelligence and special operations when necessary. So we prefer the term a Global Counterinsurgency with a criminal core doesn't have nearly the catchiness of the war on terror I certainly - We are certain that -. - well actually that we could work on how you package it. Although, you know, that the Pentagon itself tried to rename the war on terror the - a global struggle against violent extremism that didn't take either. But our point is really and this is a point made to ask by people of the National Defense University that to constantly talk about Islamic anything you want you can say Islamic Fundamentalism or Islamic Extremism you say you are not fighting Islam, you are fighting Islamic terror what Muslims here is that you are fighting Islam and you are playing into the kind of global struggle that Al Qaeda and associated groups seek to ignite and that we should not respond that way. Now, as you look at the hierarchy of dangers Secretary Shultz has written on this recently on the whole question of Nuclear weapons as we look at the hierarchy of dangers probably the greatest concern is the combination of terror networks and weapons of mass destruction Where does deterrence come into play or is this the situation where your focus has to be a strategy or denial or denying them access to weapons material? That - I am glad you actually gave me a chance to clarify when I was talking about the preventive use of force and you need needing authorization for the preventive use of force, I was talking about the preventive use of force against States. If we knew that there were a terrorist group that had a weapon of mass destruction, we are just about to put together a weapon of mass destruction we would strike, we would strike as a matter of national self-defense probably with other nations that's not a situation either where deterrence is going to work very well or where you would ask for permission and that is exactly where I said the war on terror the Global Counterinsurgency with the criminal core would - you would not you would include military force. You would have to - special operations. The U.N. Resolutions there is - that says that States that harbor terrorists are vulnerable. Yes. It can be taken out. So the UN Resolution has said that there is state responsibility. There is. I think it - obviously and I think people got away. You know, there is no war on terror. It isn't terror that you are taking on, you are taking on people who use terror. But, and I see the sense of your argument. However, the reality is that most of the problems that we are seeing are emerging from a radical brand of Islam which has a very different idea about how the world should be organized and is willing to use terrorist tactics to get there and if you are going to resist something in trying to get at something it seems to me you have to describe it to yourself accurately and I think one of our problems in this country is more do not just here is that we don't begin to understand world of Islam. We have to know a lot more about it than we do. It's not a homogeneous thing it's a huge numbers of people and the people in Indonesia and India where the biggest part of the population of them is - are very different from the people in Arab land. But we need to understand that and then have women look at the different from how men how kids that are hanging around coffee shop look at this different and its obvious that the part of the problem is - in lot of these country's unemployment is like 50 percent among young people. Its no wonder you have problems to bring you back to the economic issues, but I think we have to that we are facing a very serious problem that we have to work hard to understand it well and you can't get away from the fact that a lot of it is related to somebody's version of Islam and how they think it should work and it seems to me one of the tasks that we have and I see Tom Diane here he is very instrumental in this. During the Cold War we had an effort to communicate with the people and the countries behind the iron curtain and that was very effective. And we have to learn how to communicate better to the world of Islam because most of the world of Islam doesn't go along with this these tactics at all and we have to figure out how to be clear in the start that is trying to understand this thing and clearly we do now. John John was inspired by the word economics and well also turned public diplomacy. I was going to say our basic point is that to call it a war is a misdiagnosis of the problem that when you think of it as a counterinsurgency you then pay attention to not the actually wielders of violence but the groups around them the societies the various concentric circles of communities that either support them or don't and that in the end the nature of this threat 10 - 15 - 20 years from now depend on how those host societies feel about those radicals and how then the question is do we influence the environment and turn those societies into less hospitable grounds for for Jihads and that is not ultimately -. Did Anne-Marie allow you to say the word Jihads? Oh no. I'm shocked that comes to me. This this is from the military themselves. We agree completely. We don't deny that there is a radical Islamic ideology there certainly is but we our point is that the way we talk about it doesn't understand the varieties of Islam, doesn't give to credence to the millions and millions of peaceful Muslims and we are absolutely playing into their hands. This is a matter of tactics not of trying to deny that's the enemy. And we could debate it I would argue that we are truly supporting the story that they are telling not to the individual terrorist. The individual terrorist they got to they kill you, they capture you, do whatever they are going to take. They are lost. It's the people who support them and are you radicalizing those people or are you actually recognizing that there are many things they would like if you gave them alternatives and if you convince them that we are not fighting war on Islam that there are other other opportunities for them. And many of those communities are in Western Europe and woven into western society in ways that are so difficult to untangle and kinds of instrumentalities that do require a kind of framing of the problem that get you way beyond the war on Islam or radical Islam. So - we are so -. I haven't I haven't heard say anybody say the war on Islam. No but that's what cause -. People have gone out of their way and you remember the first thing President Bush did after 9/11 the first place he went was to a mosque and he said, "I'm coming here to send a message, this is we have no quarrel for the Islam. Islam is a dignified religion we respect it." It was one of his finest hours but he well, we talk about I mean that. No I didn't I genuinely mean that. It was a very important thing right afterwards to make that clear but to talk about islamofascism sends a very different message. The approach, you know, report starts out by saying that one of the criteria is that our approach to to all the dangers we are facing need to be multidimensional and this seems to me a fundamental message with respect to dealing with terror that it is not just a military problem it is a problem that has other aspects to it and George Shultz your former colleague and good friend Ken Dam is to be Deputy Secretary of Treasury has played a very important role in trying to work what was referred to as draining the swamps for trying to dry out the financial the sources of financial support for these networks. How important is that aspect of the task? I think it's important then it's very difficult to the price of oil the way it is and the money flowing the way it does to Iran for example. That's right. It's a tough yeah, but very important and I think a lot has been accomplished and among the things that have been accomplished is kind of something on the side as you as the phrase in the Watergate goes follow the money. If you if you do that you learn a lot you get a lot of intelligence about who is the problem by following the money as well as trying to drive that's hard.