Acclaimed author and security expert Max Boot explores how innovations in weaponry and tactics have not only transformed how wars are fought and won but also have guided the course of human events, from the formation of the first modern states 500 years ago, to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the coming of al-Qaeda. His new book, War Made New, is a provocative new vision of the rise of the modern world through the lens of warfare. Boot argues that the past five centuries of history have been marked not by gradual change in how we fight but instead by four revolutions in military technology - and that the nations who have successfully mastered these revolutions have gained the power to redraw the map of the world. His book concludes with an examination of what America must do to survive and prevail in the Information Age.
The World Affairs Council was founded in 1947 out of the interest generated by the founding of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945. With over 10,000 members, they are the largest international affairs organization on the west coast.
Max Boot is a Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He is also a weekly foreign-affairs columnist for the Los Angeles Times, a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard, and a regular contributor to The New York Times, The Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, and many other publications. In 2004, he was named by the World Affairs Councils of America one of "the 500 most influential people in the United States in the field of foreign policy."
His new book is "War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today" (Gotham Books). His previous book, "The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power" (Basic Books) was selected as one of the best books of 2002 by The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times and The Christian Science Monitor. It also won the 2003 General Wallace M. Greene Jr. Award, given annually by the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation for the best nonfiction book pertaining to Marine Corps history, and it has been placed on professional reading lists by the Navy, Army, and Marine Corps.
Boot is a frequent public speaker and guest on radio and television news programs, both at home and abroad. He has lectured at many military institutions, including the Army and Navy War Colleges, the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School, the Army Command and General Staff College, West Point, and the Naval Academy. He is a member of the U.S. Joint Forces Command Transformation Advisory Group and a Corporation for Public Broadcasting advisory board. Before joining the Council in October 2002, Boot spent eight years as a writer and editor at The Wall Street Journal, the last five years as editorial features editor. From 1992 to 1994 he was an editor and writer at The Christian Science Monitor.
Boot holds a bachelor's degree in history, with high honors, from the University of California, Berkeley (1991), and a master's degree in history from Yale University (1992). He grew up in Los Angeles and now lives with his family in the New York area.
Nancy Jarvis is Senior partner with Farrand Cooper, P.C., San Francisco, where her practice includes high-technology clients headquartered in Asia. Before practicing law, she was a foreign policy editor at MIT Press. A member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, she is a former chair of the World Affairs Council of Northern California.
State of conflict, generally armed, between two or more entities. It is characterized by intentional violence on the part of large bodies of individuals organized and trained for that purpose. On the national level, some wars are fought internally between rival political factions (civil war); others are fought against an external enemy. Wars have been fought in the name of religion, in self-defense, to acquire territory or resources, and to further the political aims of the aggressor state's leadership.
It is clear that the "EuroAmerican" point of view is stuck on the common high tech overbelief. While I may agree on that military tech could be a cofactor, it is clear that succession of empires came about due to the internal mechanics which got them to fall, not victories in the battlefield.
Also, we should remember that for every high tech complex solution (be this homing munitions, B2's, whatever), *there is always a low tech response which may be as effective* (and not sensible to attack by high tech systems): the Ho Chi Mingh trail, the Al Qaeda organization system, IED's hitting Strykers, etc. can only be defeated by grunts on the field with low tech, "carnage-prompt" tools (and a high degree of "intelligence"). This may be the reality of current limited wars.
We're delighted to welcome Max Boot, who is the Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, at theCouncil on Foreign Relations in New York. He is also a weekly foreign affairs columnist for the LosAngeles Times, a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard, and a regular contributor to the NewYork Times, the Washington Post, and Foreign Affairs. Before joining the Council on ForeignRelations in 2002, Max spent eight years as a writer and editor at the Wall Street Journal. And from1992 to 1994 was an editor and writer at the Christian Science Monitor. Max holds a BA in Historywith high honors from the University of California at Berkeley, and an MA in History from YaleUniversity. His previous book, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of AmericanPower, was selected as one of the best books of 2002 by the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times,and the Christian Science Monitor. Tonight we have the pleasure of hearing him speak about his newbook, War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today. Please joinme in welcoming Max Boot.Thank you very much, Nancy. It's a pleasure to be here with all of you. The World Affairs Councildoes such tremendous work, so I'm happy to be a part of your programming, and of course it's a specialpleasure for me to be back in the Bay Area, in San Francisco, one of my very favorite cities, and notonly back here, but back here a few days after the Cal football team displayed what is its no-longerremarkable prowess on the gridiron, but pretty remarkable to me for my memories of the Cal footbalteam when I was a student. We didn't win a lot of games, and now we seem to win every game, this isquite an astonishing development, and one that I'm happy to see occur.Well, I'm here to talk about the book over there, as Nancy mentioned. War Made New. And it'sessentially the story of four great revolutions in military affairs that have changed the world over thecourse of the last 500 years. Now the question I often get asked as an author is, How did you getinterested in this topic, and I guess the more important question from your perspective is, why shouldyou be interested in it? The answer is the same. Which is that we are in the middle of one of theseperiods of major military change right now. The information revolution. Which has been changingeverything in the world, from business to the social scene to military affairsAnd this is something that really became evident I think to most people around the world in 1991, inthe Gulf War, that showcased a lot of these amazing information technologies which had beendeveloped in the previous several decades. Technologies such as the first use of GPS devices, to makepossible the famous left-hook through the deserts of Iraq. Or amazing surveillance aircraft, such as theJSTORS or the AWACKs. Stealth fighters. And in some ways, the most amazing development of all:precision-guided munitions.I mean, this is something we take for granted, but you have to put it into historical perspective, which isthat from the dawn of the gunpowder age 500 years ago, up until fairly recently, once a projectile left agun barrel, or later a bomb bay, it was pretty much on its own. It wasn't terribly accurate, because itwas guided by nothing more than gravity and sheer luck. So it was veryhard to predict where it would fall. In World War II, when my wife's grandfatherwas flying B17s over Europe, they were lucky if they got a bomb within half a mile of the target.So if you wanted to take out a German war plant, you had to send a thousand B17s, 10,000 crewmen,you'd place many of those at risk, and you still might not take out the target.And instead you'd wind up devastating the entire neighborhood around it. Well, by 1991, one airplaneone pilot, one bomb, could achieve the same results that had taken athousand airplanes to achieve in World War II. And these days, really since the Gulf War, not only doair force officers think about hitting a target, I mean it's well-beyond that now, and these combinedoperation centers are thinking about do they want the bomb to come in from the east, or the west, andimpact the second floor or the third floor, they may well have a predator drone flying overhead to providelive video imagery of the bomb as it impacts, and do damage assessment on the spot.All these things have become a routine part of warfare as waged by the United States military.We sort of take it for granted today, but it really has been something very unusual and very different from the way warfare was waged in the past.There's been a lot of talk, of course, about these developments going back 15 years or morebut I try to do in the book, to look not only at this revolution but othersTo think about where we are and where we're going.The first revolution I look at is the gunpowder revolution, which began around 1500, and includedmuch more than just cannons and muskets, it was also sailing ships and other associated technologies.Then I look at the first Industrial Revolution, which really made its impact felt on war from about 1850to 1914, from the Crimean War, to World War I. Then I look at the second Industrial Revolution,driven by internal combustion on airplanes, radios, and all the rest, which transformed warfare in the20s and 30s, with the full impact being felt in World War II. And then I look at the informationrevolution, driven by advances in microchip technology since the 1960s.This is obviously a big story to tell. 500 years of change across the world. And so to try to make it alittle bit more digestible, what I do is, I tell the story through a series of battles that illustrate the largertrends going on in the world, beginning with the French invasion of Italy in 1494, and concluding withthe American invasion of Iraq in 2003. And along the way I try to show different kinds of battles,battles on land and at sea. In the later stages, battles in the air. Battles pitting Europeans againstEuropeans as well as Europeans against non-Europeans.And what I try to always keep in mind as I go along is the human factor, the importanceof soldiers and their commanders struggling with the impact of this new technology.Because the real story here is not just about the technology, but about how various armies have adaptedor not adapted to this new technology, and about these commanders struggling with innovations.Whether it was Sir Francis Drake in the 1580s trying to figure out how to take advantage of artillery to defeat the Spanish Armada.Or Curtis LeMay struggling in 1944, 1945, to figure out how to use long-range B29 bombers to defeatJapan. That's the real story of this human struggle with technology. Not just with the technology per se.What I try to do in the book is to tell some good stories, to tell a good narrative, but I think there's morehere than just history, I think there's also a lot here that bears on the present dayand the dilemmas we think about when we think about the future of American power.Now I draw a lot of lessons toward the ends of the book, and to get the full array of lessons, you're going to have to plunk down your 35 bucks or whatever it is and turn to the back of the book, but let me kind of give you the Cliffs Notes version here.In the next few minutes. I'll try to do like 500 years in the next ten minutes or so, so you can figure out how many years per minute that is. I'm just going to go over a few basic lessons that I draw from all this historyThe first major lesson is just how incredibly important these revolutions in military affairs have been inmaking the world as it is. There's a tendency in academia not to focus these days on military factors,but to focus on other instruments of change, whether it's sexual roles or germs or demography,environment, all these other factors. All of which are important. But we can't lose sight of howincredibly important military skill has been, and especially military skill and taking advantage ofchanging conditions of warfare, how important those have been in reshaping the world in the course of the last 500 years.Starting with the very first revolution I talk about the gun powder revolution. I pick up the storyaround 1500 or so, when gunpowder was starting to become dominant on the battlefield. But if you goback a few years before that, to around 1400 or so, and you ask yourself, well who was the mostpowerful military force on the planet around 1400? It wasn't the Europeans. It was probably theChinese or the Mongols. In 1450, the Europeans controlled about 14% of the world's land surface. By1914, they controlled 84%. From 14% to 84%.And in many ways, that's the big story of the past 500 years. The rise of the West. The Europeantakeover of the world. And how did that happen?Well if you'd asked a European in the 19th century,they probably would have told you it was because we're pre-destined to rule or are a superior race,all this other kind of stuff, which in retrospect just seems like hogwash.It was a contingent set of historical circumstances that allowedEuropeans to dominate the world, and those circumstances werethat Europeans were more adept at harnessing gunpowder technologyand industrial technology than anybody else around the world,including the Chinese, who invented gunpowder but couldn't take very good advantage of it.And so Europeans were able to go everywherearound the world and conquer pretty much everybody they met.But not everybody in Europe was equally successful in taking advantageof the gunpowder revolution. When you look at what happened, some of the early movers,Portugal and Spain in particular, countries that were very important veryearly on in the gunpowder age, couldn't keep innovating, and they faded out.By about the 18th century, by the time Industrializationwas occurring, the Iberians were on the sidelines,and you saw the emergence of this Northern European tier of great powers.Britain, France, Prussia, Austria, Russia, those became tthe new super powers of Europe and of the world by the end of the gunpowder age.Then the Industrial Age comes around, and certain powers are able to Industrialize effectively andothers aren't. And those who aren't pay a catastrophic price on the battlefield. By the end of WorldWar I, the major conflict of the first industrial age, you see the collapse of ancient empires. Ottoman,Hapsburg, Romanov, all able to generate a fair amount of military power in the gunpowder age. Butnot able to compete effectively in the Industrial Age. So they collapse and we see the rise of newsuperpowers: Germany and Japan, which are adept at industrial warfare.Then the second Industrial Revolution comes along, and once again, certain powers are able to adapt,others are not, and what you see is most of the great powers of the past being swept off the board. Notonly the vanquished Germany, Italy and Japan, but also the winners, Britain and France, cannotcompete in the second Industrial age with the two superpowers that emerge.We'll skip ahead a few decades and come to the mid-eighties and early nineties. The period whenSecretary Schulz was in office and presiding over these momentous changes that occurred in the world,and ask yourself, why was it that the Soviet Union collapsed when it did? I mean, there's obviously alot of reasons for that having to do with the inefficiencies of the Communist system going backdecades, but what precipitated the collapse when it occurred?Again, there are a lot of reasons, which have been much debated, but I would submit too that a goodpart of the explanation has to do with the fact that we had a Silicon Valley and they didn't. They couldnot integrate the information technology into their economy or their military as effectively as we did.And by the early 1980s, they saw themselves falling further and further behind. They tried to reform,they failed, they collapsed. Now, that's about a ten-second version of the fall of the Soviet Union,about which you can write books and books have been written. That's obviously a bit oversimplified,but nevertheless I think there's a large grain of truth to it. Our mastery of information technology gaveus a tremendous advantage over our adversary, and the fact that the Soviets could not adapt to theinformation age ultimately sealed their doom. So by the mid 1990s, you had the US standing aloneatop the world. Our major rival disappeared. Our military had just shown its prowess in the Gulf War.We were this unrivaled hegemon.But of course what we've discovered in the years since then is that hegemony is not all it's cracked upto be. Great power has its discontents. I'll come to that in a minute. But first let me ask you this: howdo you become one of these great powers? How do you become one of the victors in the struggle forglobal primacy and avoid being one of the vanquished. Now you might think that because I'm talkingabout military technology and because technology is in the subtitle of my book that the answer I wouldgive you is, develop really awesome technology. Develop better weapons than your adversaries.In fact, that's very seldom been the answer, for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that mostof the important weapons systems, or most of the key technologies that have changed warfare over thecourse of the last 500 years, have not been military technologies per se. They were not invented in anygovernment RND lab, they were not invented by any ministry of defense, they often came out of leftfield, starting with gunpowder itself, which came out of China, nobody knows who invented it, and itmade its way westward. Then you had the three masted sailing ship, tremendously important again.Nobody knows who invented it. The steam engine. The railroad. The steamboat. The internalcombustion engine. The automobile. The airplane. The radio. The telegraph. The microchip. Theseare some of the most important inventions for military affairs over the course of the last 500 years, andnone of them was invented for purely military purposes.The Wright brothers weren't thinking, "We need to come up with a new way to kill millions of people."They were thinking, "It would be really cool to fly." But out of that basic impulse, it would be cool tofly, they came up with a weapons system that wound up killing millions of people. It's very hard tocontrol that kind of creativity, it's very hard to say to somebody, come up with this invention that willchange the world upside down. That's like saying, you know, write a great novel by 5pm, or compose agreat symphony orchestra. It doesn't work that way. Creativity is very hard to harness. And on thoserare occasions when you can harness it, it's very rare that you can hold onto the fruits of your creativity for very long.The great example being, of course one of the most successful government-directed RND projects ofall time. The Manhattan project. We spent billions of dollars to develop the atomic bomb and boom!Within four years and I do mean boom within four years, the Soviets had the exact same thing.This has been the experience time and time again, we're seeing it now. When you think back a fewyears to, what were the most highly classified information the US government. The products ofoverhead imagery. Satellite reconnaissance photos, which we spent billions of dollars to developWell now anybody can go online and go to Google and get satellite reconnaissance imagery. It's outthere for anybody to see. Our advantage is vanishing. Or our technology's being disseminated, whichis what happens when you have something successful. It gets out there. You can't hold onto it for very longSo the key to being successful in this race for global mastery is not necessarily developing the besttechnology. It's making better use of technology than anybody else. And what that comes down to isbureaucracy, organization, management. Not terribly sexy, but that is in fact what I found time andtime again to be the key difference between winning and being defeated. Is, do you have an effectiveorganization for harnessing military power, for harnessing the technology of the day?The great example of that, being one of the most famous revolutions in the military affairs, theBlitzkrieg. How was it that the Germans were so successful in the Spring of 1940 in overrunningFrance and the low countries? It wasn't because they invented the tank. It wasn't because they hadmore tanks, or better tanks, than the Allies. In fact, if you looked at the equipment on the two sides, theAllies matched up very well. The French actually had better tanks than the Germans, paradoxically.If there was any technological advantage that the Germans hadit was simply the fact that they put two-way radios into most of their tanks and airplanesso they were able to communicate much more effectively with their forces in the field, and were able to maneuver them much better than the allies. But again: the radio was not a German invention.It was invented my Mark Honey, an Anglo-Italian. Everybody in the world had radios in 1940.But only the Germans thought that they would be important and utilized them very effectively.And why is that? It was because the Germans came up with a plan for a fast-moving war of maneuver.Being able to communicate with your forces in the field would be incredibly important.Whereas the Allies were still stuck in the static, trench warfare mindset of World War I. So the keyGerman advantage was not technology per se, it was how they utilized technology. It was the fact thatthey were able to out-think their rivals, and after that were able to out-fight their rivals. And if youlook at, what was the German advantage, it wasn't the Panzer or the Schtuka, as much as anything, theGerman advantage was the German general staff, which was a very effective instrument of militaryorganization, integrating new technologies and planning for military purposes, going back to the mid 19th century.The Germans, in other words, at least early on in the war, not later, not by the end of the war, but earlyon, they had a more effective organizational structure, a more effective bureaucracy than the allies didwhich is why they overran much of Europe. That's my point. Organization really matters. And thekind of organization you need for each of these different ages has been different. The gunpowder ageled to the rise of absolute monarchy and the first nation-states in Europe, because the feudal lords didn'thave enough power, didn't have enough wealth, to field these very expensive new gunpowder armies.Those kinds of military forces required the resources of a superlord. An absolute monarch. And led to the rise of nation-states.Later on, in the first two industrial revolutions, we saw further growth in government with the rise ofthese giant welfare and warfare states that can mobilize millions of men, take the full resources of anindustrialized society and utilize it for battle. Get millions of men killed, but also have the resources topay old-age pensions to those who survived. So going back more than 400 years, close to 500 years,the trend in warfare has been ever bigger, more sophisticated, more complex, more hierarchical governments.The trend the last two decades has been going in reverse. Because information technology has beenpushing organizations to be smaller, leaner, more decentralized. It is punishing old-style industrialbureaucracies. You see this in business. Where companies that were very successful in the industrialage, are not so successful in the information age if they keep the same kind of structures they used tohave. When you think about companies like Ford, or GM, or US Steel, formidable at one point, nolonger so formidable. And you see the rise of new challengers who are much more adept at utilizingthe technology of the day, and have different organizational structures. Companies like Toyota, or WalMart, or Microsoft, or Ebay, or Dell, or so many others, and for most of them, their key comparativeadvantage is not that they have better technology, but they have better ways of utilizing technology, which is available for anybody.The same thing is absolutely true in the realm of international security affairs. And unfortunately whenI look at international security affairs today, it's hard for me to be very sanguine, because what I see isthat in many ways our enemies are more adept at utilizing information technology than we are. Inmany ways, the US government is kind of the GM or Ford of governments, this old-style industrialbureaucracy that used to work extremely well, and no longer works so well. Whereas the enemies thatwe face are very decentralized, very networked. They're sort of the Ebay of terrorism. They in many ways have a better infrastructure for the information age than we do.I was making this point at Annapolis a few weeks ago, and one of the officers there said to me, Wellyou know sir, what's the big advantage that Al Quaeda has over the US Armed Forces? It's that theydon't need travel orders to go outside their AOR, their area of responsibility. I mean, in a microcosm, that's it.We have all this bureaucracy and they don't. And there's kind of a humorous element to it, but there's also a deadly serious element to it,when you look for example at what's going on in Iraq.Where for the last 3 ÃƒÆ’Ã¢â‚¬Å¡Ãƒâ€šÃ‚Â½ years, IEDs, improvised explosive devices, have been the number one killer of American troops.Now, by and large, this is not terribly sophisticated technology, especially early on, it was as simple asan artillery shell wired together with a garage door opener, or a cell phone. This is not the kind of thingwe would spend billions of dollars to develop as a weapons system. But if it's so stupid and simpleand it is stupid and simple! - why can't we defeat it? We have tried. We have spent billions of dollars,thousands of man hours, trying to defeat these IEDs, and we can't do it. We failed at some effective technologies.I mean, if you go to Iraq and ride around in a Hum-V, most of them these days have something called aWarlock, which is this jamming device developed by the Pentagon at great cost to jam certain ID frequencies. And those things workAnd yet, we're still losing two soldiers a day. IEDs are still as effective now as they were 3 ÃƒÆ’Ã¢â‚¬Å¡Ãƒâ€šÃ‚Â½ years ago.And why is that? It's because when we employ something like the Warlock, the insurgents don't say, "okay, we give up.We've had it, you guys win. See you later, have a good life." That's not their response, unfortunately. Their response is, "okay, you've taken away one way to kill infidels, we're going to come up with 20 other ways to kill infidels.Okay, you're jamming certain cellphone frequencies. We'll go to other frequencies, or we'll use pressure plates, or trip wires, or" there's a thousand different ways to set off IEDs and they're finding them all, unfortunately.And what we're finding is that we're usually about half a step behind. Because when we're trying to develop defenses, we have to get an appropriation with Congress, have to go through a bureaucracy, get sign offs from twenty lawyers of command.They don't have any of that stuff. They just go out and do it. If they're not successful, they die, and that's the end of that, if they are successful, they kill Americans and they start replicating that kind of organically by a process of trial and error.And by the time we field one defense, they're onto something else. And this has been kind of the story the last 3 ÃƒÆ’Ã¢â‚¬Å¡Ãƒâ€šÃ‚Â½ years. We're kind of half a step behind, I would argue, because part of it is of course the inherent difficulties in fighting a guerrilla foe, but part of it is of course the fact that we don't have the right kind of structure for dealing with the problem that we face. We have this overly rigid, bureaucratic structure designed for a different era of warfare. And this is a major major issue to think about because guerrilla warfare and insurgency is growing in importance, largely because of what we ourselves have done.I mean it used to be that European armies would go on campaign against guerrillas whether on the northwest frontier, or the Sudan, the Philippines, lots of other places around the world, and this was really marginal stuff. This was what officers would call ankle biting warsThis was of very little consequence to the national security back home.That's no longer the case. Guerrillas are no longer isolated.They're no longer confining their operations to one region or one country. They are for the first time, able to operate around the world, with Al Quaeda we're facing the first global insurgency,which is largely a result of our success in knitting the world closer together with technologies likejumbo jets, the Internet, cell phones, all this other stuff which has been such a great boon for American business, but it's also a great boon for our enemies.They're able to operate all around the world for the very first time in a way that would have beenunimaginable to previous generations of Jihadists. And once they arrive somewhere, they're able tocause much more destruction than ever before. Just compare the two big attacks on American soil inhe 20th century. On September 11th of 2001, 19 guys armed with box cutters and a budget thatwouldn't buy you a single F-22 killed more Americans than the entire Imperial Japanese navy did onDecember 7th, 1941. This is part of a larger trend. More and more destructive capacity in the hands ofever smaller individuals. We've seen a proliferation of destructive technology around the world so thateven the most backward guerrilla in the most godforsaken country in the world has access to rocketpropeller grenades, AK47s, land mines, all these technologies that give far more destructive capacitythan their ancestors had fighting Western armies in the 19th century.But it gets worse than that, because it's not only this kind of low-end destructive technology which isproliferating, so are weapons of mass destruction. We're seeing nuclear proliferation. We're seeing theproliferation of biotechnology. All of this stuff is based on scientific principles that are very readilyunderstood, and with our success in promulgating Western science and technology, there are people allover the world who understand how modern science and technology work. This is no longerknowledge confined to a handful of Westerners. We've spread it all over the world. And therefore, wehave given much greater capacity for destruction to our enemies. This is one of the unfortunate upshotsof the information age and of the process of globalization, which so many celebrate. It has its darkside. And this could be catastrophic for us because we face the possibility of super terrorists, superguerrillas, with far more destructive capacity than an entire army a century ago.So what do we do about this threat, which is, I fear, growing? We can't get rid of our technology, weshouldn't get rid of our technology, because our technology can be helpful. But we also have tounderstand the limitations of our technology. We now have the capacity with precision guidedmunitions to essentially blow up any target on the planet whenever we want with an incredible degreeof precision and accuracy. Well that's a very useful skill to have. That's a very useful capacity to have.The problem, of course, we face, is in the global war on terrorism. We don't know what to blow up.We don't know who to kill in order to win the war, because our enemies don't present an obvious targetfor our munitions. And in order to figure out how to win this war, we're going to need much more thansmart bombs. We need smart people. We need people, lots of people, not only in the military but alsoin other agencies of government, who understand foreign languages, who understand foreign cultures,who understand information operations, counter insurgency, human intelligence, state building, allthese skills that have been in such short supply in Iraq and Afghanistan. What it comes down toessentially is organizational culture. Can we change it. That's the big challenge that we face.You know I was struck not long ago reading a story in the Washington Post about how five years after9/11, the FBI, out of something like 12,000 special agents, still has only 33 who speak Arabic. Only 33Arabic-speaking special agents five years after 9/11. Now, is that because FBI agents are inherentlyincapable of learning foreign languages, or because the FBI's inherently incapable of recruiting amongArab-Americans or other communities? I don't think that's the answer. The problem is theorganizational culture of the FBI, which clearly doesn't think that learning foreign languages is a high priority.And the same thing is true within the military. These are not the kind of traditional skills that ourgovernment bureaucracy select for. But those are exactly the kind of skills we need to win the globalwar on terrorism. So the challenge we face is, can we innovate organization? The technologicalinnovation will take care of itself. I mean, we spend more on developing new weapons systems thanany other country spends on its entire defense budget. So we are going to have the best technology, thebest military technology, and the best technology period, at least in the short term, because of the work being done over here in Silicon Valley. That's not the issue.The issue is, can we harness that technology to actually defeat the kind of enemies that we face, andthat in turn is going to require organizational innovation, which is very difficult to do. That's a huge challenge.I don't have a ten point solution for how we do that. It's very hard. What I've written here is basically a book of history analysis which doesn't purport to solve the problemWhat I try to do is to frame the issues, present the problem in a historical perspective, and hope to spark some much needed debate about these important issues.And I hope that some of that debate will come in the next few minutes.Thank you, Max.