Its based on this and his previous trips to the region. Senator Reed brings to this task an extensive background in military matters and public policy. Following his graduation from the United States military academy at West Point in 1971. Senator Reed served eight years as an army officer. As an army ranger and paratrooper, he served in the 82nd airborne division as an infantry platoon leader, company commander and battalion staff officer. He returned to West Point in 1978 to serve as an associate professor in the department of Social Studies. Following his resignation from the Army as a Captain in 1979, Senator Reed completed a law degree at Harvard University, practiced law here in Washington and on Rhode Island and served three terms in the Rhode Island state Senate. In 1990 he was elected to the House of Representatives in Washington where he won a reputation as a relentless advocate for his home state. But also for leadership on national issues ranging from education to health care. And in 1996 he campaigned for and won for the U.S. Senate seat, vacated by Claiborne Pell. In the Senate, Senator Reed has focused heavily on national security and other issues through his service on the arms services committee and three other major senate committees. Following his remarks tonight, Senator Reed has agreed to take a number of questions from the audience and please join me now in welcoming Senator Jack Reed. Good evening. Let me first thank John McLaughlin not only for that very kind introduction, but for his selfless service to the Nation over many years; and that service continues as a Merrill Center senior fellow here at SAIS. Also let me thank Dean Einhorn, for her gracious invitation and Bob Einhorn for being here. And a particular word for Elliot Cohen, a distinguished scholar and a distinguished gentleman. Elliot is also the proud father of a United States Army Ranger. And, let me begin by saying that its my belief that in all our deliberations here we have to attempt to summon the wisdom to match the service and sacrifice of thousands of young Americans, like Raphael Cohen, who served this nation in the uniform of the United States. So tell Raphael, tell Ranger Raphael I say hello. On July 7th and 8th, I conducted my eighth visit to Iraq along with Senator Joseph Biden.The situation in Iraq remains critical and the outcome remains uncertain. A dangerous escalation of violence, especially in Baghdad, threatens progress made on the political front. The installation of a permanent and popularly elected government was finalized with the naming of a Minister of Defense and a Minister of the Interior. In addition, there has been progress in the training and deployment of the Iraqi Army. This progress has bought additional time. However, our efforts on the civilian aspects of the counter-insurgency remain inadequate. The capacity of ministries to function is still primitive. As such, the delivery of essential services to the Iraqi people is severely constrained. In the face of political challenges among and between sectarian groups, many with their own militias, poorly trained and equipped police, continued high unemployment and economic malaise, inadequate public services and a deadly mosaic of insurgent, sectarian and criminal violence, the limited progress noted above is not irreversible nor a guarantee of ultimate stability. The United States still lacks a coherent and effective strategy. The Administration's sloganeering is wearing thin. "Stay the course" is difficult when a critical component, robust attention to the non- military demands of Iraq, is lacking, and the presence of American forces is both difficult to sustain at present levels and invites growing concern within the United States and within Iraq. At this juncture, the critical question is: what outcome can be achieved in Iraq? Reality has disabused all but the most ideologically obsessed that our presence in Iraq will be non-contentious and that Iraq will be transformed with little effort into an oasis of democracy and market economics, which will, in turn, transform the region. A range of outcomes potentially exists in Iraq from a further downward spiral of violence and instability leading to civil war, or to a renewed authoritarianism dressed up initially in the trappings of democracy, or to a gradually emerging society respecting and expanding the rule of law and market activities. In my view, the most decisive factor that the United States has in influencing a favorable outcome is our attention to the non-military needs of Iraq from its economic development to its political maturation as a pluralistic government. And, it is this effort that has been most acking and is most likely to be given short shrift as budget pressures and other looming crisis constrain our efforts in Iraq. In my judgment, our current difficulties in Iraq emanate from a flawed strategy, inadequate planning and, particularly in our non-military efforts, faulty execution. And, this is not a recent view. I concluded in October 2002 that Iraq did not pose an imminent threat requiring military action. This is in direct contrast to Al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups whose avowed apocalyptic beliefs and demonstrated willingness and capacity to strike us require a strategy of unremitting preemption and strengthened homeland security. In response to September 11th, the Administration correctly and effectively struck Afghanistan to dislodge the Taliban sponsors of Al Qaeda and to destroy the leadership of Al Qaeda. But, before the job was complete, they shifted their efforts to Iraq without, I believe, sufficient strategic justification and with a naïve belief that transforming a country after years of dictatorship and economic isolation would be "easy." They conducted military operations with insufficient forces and insufficient attention to the tasks of reconstruction and political mentoring. Their predilection to conflate the "War on Terror" with their designs in Iraq might have had an appealing political logic, but it made very little strategic sense. And, if the title tonight was "Iraq: How we got here" rather than "Iraq: The road ahead," I could simply elaborate on these points. But, I would like to try and suggest some of the critical challenges that we face in Iraq today and some of the significant consequences of our operations in Iraq that create further problems in the region and throughout the world. Over the last few weeks, we have seen a significant surge of violence in Baghdad, a state of emergency declared by Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in Basra, and continued violence in the Sunni Triangle. One must recognize that there are areas of relative calm in Iraq, most noticeably in the Kurdish region. Nevertheless, this violence is particularly disturbing for several reasons. Baghdad is the capital and a multi-sectarian community. It is in many respects the center of gravity of the country. And, if the center cannot hold, can the country? Moreover, the violence in Baghdad is taking place after Operation Forward Together, a commitment of approximately 50,000 additional security forces charged with the specific mission to end such violence. Operation Forward Together's current failure is ominous. We should also realize that the character of the violence is changing. As General Abizaid pointed out, the violence is more about sectarian strife rather than insurgent activity. This sectarian violence raises the specter of civil war, a battle for political control not instigated by international jihadists but by Iraqis claiming their position in the new Iraq. If we are caught in these sectarian rivalries, then the logic of our presence and the sustainability of our presence become questionable. In some sense, a low grade civil war already exists as political rivals with their militias in the Shia community joust for advantage and the Sunni community actively or passively supports the insurgency. What is lacking is an explicit challenge to the legitimacy of the Maliki government. Such a challenge may emerge either through political calculation or in response to the perceived or actual inability of the government to provide security or basic services. One other point should be made concerning the violence. It is very difficult to separate politically inspired violence from criminal activity. For example, if you talk to the Marines in Al Anbar province, they will describe their opponents more like the mafia than any irregular army. Their criminal activities fund their insurgent activities (and some politicians in Baghdad) and their insurgent activities provide a patriotic gloss to a long history of criminality. What is also lost in press accounts is that political violence is only a fraction of what the Iraqi people endure. Rampant criminal activity from kidnapping to car-jacking is sapping their strength. Our military forces are unprepared to deal with this "run of the mill" criminality, and the Iraqi security forces are inadequate and insufficient. At this moment, we are confronted with the crisis of violence in Baghdad. With the failure of Operation Forward Together, the Bush Administration is playing the only readily available card, the commitment of approximately 3,000 additional American troops. This raises the obvious question: if 50,000 troops, including several thousand Americans, cannot end the violence in Baghdad, why are we not committing a significantly larger force? The answer goes back to a problem that has plagued us since the beginning. The Bush Administration consciously rejected the idea of committing overwhelming force in the invasion and occupation of Iraq. They denied for many months the emerging insurgency and did not augment our forces to deal with it before it became well established. The window, where robust American forces might have been decisive, has closed, and the limited force structure and stress of the ensuing months has made the commitment of sizeable forces very difficult. There is another dimension to our dilemma. A large part of the problem in Baghdad must be resolved by better intelligence and police work, not by military formations. If we are simply committing American forces to man checkpoints and batter down doors in midnight raids, especially if they are not supported by dependable translators and Iraqi security forces, then we could antagonize more Iraqis than we pacify. Finally, the Administration is not increasing our forces in Iraq. They are merely shifting them from other areas in Iraq. And, one of the difficult lessons that we have learned is that our adversaries in Iraq are resourceful and adaptive. I would assume that as we shift our forces they will seek to exploit their absence. As I said, the Administration is playing one of their last remaining card and there is no obvious alternative. However, I doubt that it is a "trump." All of this argues for renewed energy to reform and deploy adequate Iraqi security forces. Our efforts to improve the training of the Iraqi Army are making progress. The Iraqi Army is fielding ten divisions with variable capabilities. They still lack adequate equipment and support, but these efforts are on a positive trajectory. The same cannot be said for the Iraqi police. This is a function of many factors, but one major factor is the differing nature of soldiers and policemen. In many respects it is easier to master the tactical skills of a soldier than the nuances of police work with its basis in a system of law, an understanding of human behavior and a more direct connection to the political system. In the context of Iraq, these police skills are further complicated because there is not really a functioning legal system. Finally, police ultimately operate among the people alone or with a few colleagues. The dangers and temptations of their position are palpable. In a place where corruption was endemic and continues to flourish, it is very difficult to quickly instill the values of honesty and fidelity to the law. Further complicating the development of both the Army and the police are the inadequacies of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior. Both of these organizations lack many rudimentary procedures and policies, and they are staffed with personnel who generally lack the professional skills demanded of their positions. Of the two, the Ministry of Defense seems to be the more capable, and the new Minister of Defense appears to be an effective leader. Both the leadership and the effectiveness of the Ministry of the Interior appear highly questionable. Training soldiers and police to exacting standards does not make an army or a police force without the administrative infrastructure to support and sustain them. That infrastructure is still lacking in Iraq. If simply training and supporting an Iraqi army and police force were the mission, it would be difficult and daunting. But, the security situation is rendered infinitely more difficult by the presence of other official and unofficial paramilitary forces ranging from the militias to the Facilities Protection Services. Twenty-seven of thirty-one ministries of the Iraqi government have their own paramilitary forces, generically designated the Facilities Protection Services. They constitute approximately 150,000 personnel under arms. The Facilities Protection Services has a reputation for gross misconduct. Indeed, according to the Prime Minister's and his remarks to Senator Biden and me, they have in numerous cases caused more mayhem then the insurgents. The militias, most noticeably the Mahdi Army and the Badr Organization, are large military forces explicitly linked to political organizations. These linkages make them rivals to Iraqi security forces. There is general agreement by Prime Minister Maliki and certainly by our diplomats and generals that the militias must be disbanded and a portion of the militia personnel individually integrated into Iraqi security forces and that the Facilities Protection Service must be reformed. But, these are very difficult political steps in Iraq. It is the classic Prisoner's Dilemma of Game Theory. There is a general recognition that the situation would be better with the absence of militias, but there is a particular fear that a statesman-like surrender of your forces would leave you vulnerable to the lethal onslaught of the politicians. It will take a powerful Prime Minister to challenge these militias and ministerial armies. Maliki does not appear at this point to have such power and it is unlikely that it will be willingly given to him by his political rivals in the Shia community and elsewhere. Prime Minister Maliki is attempting to reach out to the Sunni community with his policy of reconciliation. At this point, it appears to be a vague appeal to lay down their arms in exchange for some type of amnesty. Off the table are serious efforts to change the Constitution to attract more Sunni support, particularly in the area of the treatment of oil revenues. As many have pointed out, failure to engage the Sunnis will result in prolonged conflict and complicate regional politics with Sunni dominated governments. A great part of Prime Minister Maliki's problem and our problem is that reconstruction efforts and capacity building have gone so poorly that few benefits can be associated by the Iraqi people with his government and our continued presence. There is still widespread recognition that the United States removed a homicidal tyrant from Iraq, but rampant violence, ineffective governance, limited public services and significant unemployment are replacing profound appreciation with growing frustration and anger. The United States has spent roughly thirty billion dollars to aid in the reconstruction of Iraq. But, there is shockingly little to show for it. Much of the money was eaten up by security costs. Too much of it was lost through incompetence and corruption. Indeed, with daily reports of mismanagement of these reconstruction activities, there is a real question whether the Bush Administration has the capacity or the willingness to create the capacity to ever make a decisive contribution to the physical and institutional reconstruction of Iraq. Without such an effort, our military sacrifices will be undone. Our strategy has to recognize these realities on the ground in Iraq and the consequences of our commitment in Iraq that reverberate throughout the region and throughout the world. The scope of our commitment to Iraq has not been lost on our adversaries. It would be off the mark to suggest that all of our problems in the world are a result of the Administration's missteps in Iraq. But, it would be also be inaccurate to fail to recognize that these missteps have enhanced the positions of our adversaries, emboldened their behavior, and otherwise presented high opportunity costs for the United States security interests elsewhere in the region and the world. For example, North Korea continues to defy the international community after its breakout from the Agreed Framework and its declared development of nuclear weapons. The launch of a long-range missile on the Fourth of July was a boldly provocative step. In Somalia, we may be witnessing the emergence of Islamic fundamentalist rule in the midst of chaotic conditions. And, in Afghanistan, where the first and most effective blow against Al Qaeda was struck, violence is increasing and the Taliban is reasserting its presence. Yesterday saw the Mideast crisis escalate further, with the tragic loss of life of dozens of Lebanese after an Israeli air strike in Qana and Secretary Rice's departure from the region. Earlier in the week, President Bush, with Prime Minister Blair, called for a robust international stabilization force manned with other countries' troops -- and increased assistance for Lebanon. Yet the United States' ability to help bring the violence to halt, put in place the necessary force on the border, rebuild and strengthen Lebanon: all of this must be tied to a strategic plan that "connects the dots" throughout the region Former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft recognizes that these elements cannot be taken in isolation, as he outlined in the Washington Post yesterday with his call for a comprehensive settlement to the Israeli Palestinian conflict. To do otherwise isolates only the United States, or Israel, to the security benefit of neither. General Scowcroft wrote that "It is even possible that a comprehensive settlement might help stabilize Iraq. A chastened Iran, bereft of the "Israeli card," might be more willing to reach a modus vivendi with the Sunnis and Kurds in Iraq, and with the United States as well. All countries in the region -- not to mention Iraq itself -- need a stable, prosperous and peaceful Iraq. The road to achieving this may well lead eastward from a Jerusalem shared peacefully by Israelis and Palestinians." If we do not reach this peaceful sharing, something else might be traveling eastward to Iraq techniques, tactics, personnel and motivation from a Hezbollah that could take on symbolic proportions beyond their actual performance. All of this could be aided and abetted by Iran, which is wielding growing influence in Iraq through Shia leaders in Southern Iraq and the funding of social programs. Furthermore, Iran is aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons program, which could pose an enormous challenge to the United States and dramatically shift the balance of power in the Middle East. Aside from political reverberations, there is another ominous consequence of our continuing operation in Iraq. Our land forces, both Army and Marines, are stretched to the breaking point, and they could break without immediate assistance. I want to reiterate that our military personnel are doing a superb job every day, and they will continue to do so. But, the wear and tear of today's operations needs to be addressed or the long term consequences will be severe. The accumulation of constant tours in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan impacts recruitment and retention. Last year, the Army's goal was to recruit 80,000 new active duty soldiers but they fell short by more than 6,000. This year, the goal, again is 80,000 soldiers. To date, the Army is meeting its monthly goals but only after extraordinary effort and further changing enlistment standards -- raising age limits to forty-two, and lowering physical and schooling requirements. But the critical immediate problem is the status of equipment. The Army and Marines need to "reset" , other words rehabilitiate, repair and replace equipment they are using in theaters of operations. The Army estimated two years ago that resetting equipment would require approximately $12 billion in funding every year of ongoing operations until two years after these operations ceased. In Fiscal Year 2006, the defense appropriations bill and supplementals only provided $8 billion in reset funding for the Army. Therefore, the Army now needs $17.1 billion in Fiscal Year 2007. The Marine Corps needs an additional $3.9 billion for their equipment. And these are numbers that are not going away. As a former company commander, I can tell you that one of the things that annoys and undercuts morale than anything else, is giving soldiers equipment they think is inadequate or in need of repair. Now I plan to offer an amendment during consideration of the Defense Appropriations bill to add $10 billion in emergency spending to begin to address the shortfall. Lack of funding for equipment readiness translates to declining readiness rates and constrains our ability to respond to a new crisis. Today, if troops were needed for a rapid response, the Army would be hard pressed to supply units that are fully equipped, trained and manned. Last month, during a House Armed Services Committee hearing, Congressman Ike Skelton asked General Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, "Are you comfortable with the readiness level for the non-deployed units that are in the continental United States?" General Schoomaker replied, "No." This is a disturbing conclusion from the top officer in the Army. The United States is at a critical passage in assisting the government of Iraq and in repositioning and rebuilding United States' land forces to meet growing challenges. As a first step, the Bush Administration must provide billions of additional dollars to the Army and the Marine Corps to reset and recapitalize their equipment before the readiness of these forces is decisively compromised. And, they must do this without the budgetary gimmicks that they have consistently employed to avoid the hard choices of funding our soldiers and continuing to support our domestic needs. In Iraq, the Bush Administration must make the redeployment of our military forces central to our strategy and complement our military efforts with increased attention to reconstruction and capacity building. An open-ended commitment to Iraq and constrains our strategic flexibility, puts considerable stress on the readiness of our land forces and signals to the Iraqis that they can continue to defer critical political choices. If the Bush Administration cannot summon the resources and developmental assistance to aid the emergence of an effective Iraqi government, then the logic of our military presence grows more and more dubious. In sum, the road ahead is uncertain. But what is certain is that it will require real sacrifices and not just from soldiers, marines, sailors and airmen. Thank you.
member. 
