60th Annual Asilomar Conference hosted by the World Affairs Council of Northern California.
Plenary 1: Shaping the Geopolitical Landscape with moderators J. Stapleton Roy and Jane Wales and panelists Thomas Fingar, Jeffrey Garten and David Sanger
What factors will affect the United States' role in the world over the next fifteen years? How will the US maintain competitiveness in global economy? How will shifts in the balance of power affect US stature in the world, and how can Washington maintain strong relations with its allies in the context of the War on Terror and military efforts in the Middle East?
Dr. Thomas Fingar
Dr. Thomas Fingar was Assistant Secretary of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) from July 2004 until May 2005 when he was named Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis & Chairman, National Intelligence Council. While at the State Department he served as Acting Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research (2003-2004 and 2000-2001), Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (2001-2003), Deputy Assistant Secretary for Analysis (1994-2000), Director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-1994), and Chief of the China Division (1986-1989).
His intelligence career began in 1970 as the senior German linguist in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, USAREUR & 7th Army in Heidelberg, Germany. Between 1975 and 1986 he held a number of positions at Stanford University, including Senior Research Associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control, and Director of the University's U.S.-China Relations Program. Other previous positions include assignment to the National Academy of Sciences as Co-Director of the U.S.-China Education Clearinghouse, adviser to the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, and consultant to numerous U.S. Government agencies and private sector organizations.
Dr. Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (B.A. in Government and History, 1968), and Stanford University (M.A., 1969 and Ph.D., 1977 both in Political Science). He is a career member of the Senior Executive Service. His principal foreign languages are Chinese and German. Dr. Fingar has published dozens of books and articles, mostly on aspects of Chinese politics and policymaking.
Jeffrey E. Garten
Jeffrey E. Garten was dean of the school from November 1995 to June 2005. Prior to that he was Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade, 1993-1995. Before government service he spent 13 years on Wall Street, specializing in debt restructuring in Latin America for Lehman Brothers, building Lehman's investment banking business in Asia, restructuring some of the world's largest shipping companies in Hong Kong, and working on mergers and acquisitions business for The Blackstone Group. From 1997-2005 he wrote a monthly column for BusinessWeek on major challenges facing global business leaders. His articles have also appeared in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, and the Harvard Business Review.
J. Stapleton Roy
J. Stapleton Roy is a senior United States diplomat specializing in Asian affairs. A fluent Chinese speaker, Roy spent much of his career in East Asia, where his assignments included Bangkok, Hong Kong, Taipei, Beijing, Singapore, and Jakarta. He also specialized in Soviet affairs and served in Moscow at the height of the Cold War. Ambassador Roy served as Assistant Secretary of State for intelligence and research from 1999 to 2000.
Ambassador Roy was born in Nanjing, China of American missionary parents. He attended Mount Hermon School (now Northfield Mount Hermon), and in 1956, graduated magna cum laude from Princeton University, where he majored in history and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa.
Roy rose to become a three-time ambassador, serving as the top U.S. envoy in Singapore (1984-86), the People's Republic of China (1991-95), and Indonesia (1996-99). In 1996, he was promoted to the rank of career ambassador, the highest rank in the United States Foreign Service.
Roy is currently a managing director of Kissinger Associates, Inc., Chairman of the Council for the Johns Hopkins-Nanjing Center, and a director of ConocoPhillips and Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc.
David E. Sanger
David E. Sanger is the chief Washington correspondent for The New York Times and is one of the newspaper's senior writers. In a 24-year career at the paper, he has reported from New York, Tokyo, and Washington, covering a wide variety of issues surrounding foreign policy, globalization, nuclear proliferation, Asian affairs, and, for the past five years, the arc of the Bush presidency. Twice he has been a member of Times reporting teams that won the Pulitzer Prize.
His most recent book is The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power (Harmony, 2009), a Times best-seller that explores the national security challenges facing President Barack Obama.
Jane Wales is vice president of philanthropy and society at the Aspen Institute, president and CEO of the World Affairs Council, and founder of the Global Philanthropy Forum.
Previously, Wales was a special assistant to President Clinton, senior director of the National Security Council, and associate director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.
She also chaired the international security programs at the Carnegie Corporation and the W. Alton Jones Foundation and directed the Project on World Security at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.
Wales is the former national executive director of Physicians for Social Responsibility.
I really liked Fingar's conclusion in which he urged Americans "to be much more attuned to the concerns, the interests, [and] the issues that others put on the table and to try to be objective rather than thin-skinned when criticism is leveled at what we do and say." In order to resolve the current tensions that exist between America and a number of countries around the globe, it seems obvious that the United States is going to have to listen to these countries' grievances and to be responsive to their opinions.
The last fifteen years have seen dramatic changes in the world.And with technological advances we can assume that the pace of change is going to continue rapidly.We are now the sole super power in the world and in a way we got there by accidentbecause instead of defeating our opponent, we became the sole super power because our principle advisory collapsed.And in looking back through history and thinking about it I have not been able to identifya comparable circumstance where the strongest power in the world got that way becauseof a collapse of an opponent rather than by defeating the opponent. This mattersbecause if your engaged in conflict with an opponent you have a sense of what your goalsare, but if you become a sole super power by virtue of the collapse of your opponent youhaven't thought through with what you should do with that extraordinary power that yousuddenly have available to you. As the sole super power we are positioned to exerciseenlightened leadership or we can become the target for everyone else. And we shouldalways remember that you can't be a leader if others aren't prepared to follow. So leadershave to pay attention to whether or not people are inclined to go where we would like to go.And if they don't then we need to consider whether those are the right directions in which to move.We also have to consider whether we will still be the sole super power at the end of the next fifteen years.We can be challenged in a variety of ways, we can be challenged by coalitions of other powersand we shouldn't fool ourselves into thinking that we are all so powerful that if other countriesunite against us we will not find our selves facing severe challenges.But we can also be challenged by rising powers such as China, but rising powers won't necessarily challenge us.They may choose to cooperate with us and how we behave will partly determine whetherthey choose to cooperate or to confront us. With a globalized economy the balance of power is changing also.Some observers have seen the global balance of powers shifting from Europe to Asia and the Pacificand certainly the most dangerous problems of the world are located in East Asia and at the same timesome of the most dramatic success stories of the world are located there and we have had ahistoric role there for hundreds of years. So this is an important area and we need to thinkabout it carefully. The conference has been organized into five major plenaries and fivebreakout sessions designed to enable us to look in depth and in separate groups at some ofthe particular issues that are touched upon in the plenaries. Let me take a moment just togive you a brief preview of what lies ahead. In tonights plenary, "Shaping the GeopoliticalLandscape" we will examine the factors that will affect the United States' role in the worldover the next fifteen years in terms of global competitiveness, military power and foreignIn tomorrow morning's plenary, "Rising Star: China", speakers will address whatChina's relations are likely to be with the surrounding areas of Asia as well as the UnitedStates as well as the obstacles the China may well encounter in sustaining its current growth.Plenary number three, later tomorrow morning is on the topic, "India: Looking East or West."That session will look at another emerging Asian powerhouse and will explore therole that India will have in shaping future political and economic relationships. These arevery significant topics because China with 1.3 billion people has been growing at a rate of10% on the average for over ten years and India, now, is beginning to grow very rapidlywith a population of a billion people. Never before in human history have we encounteredsuch rapid growth effecting so many people and its putting enormous pressure on globalresources. We may look back with nostalgia on the days we only paid three dollars andthirty cents a gallon for gasoline. Because if the Chinese reached our level of economicdevelopment and had the same number of automobiles per capita that we have, they wouldconsume more than total global consumption of energy everyday. So you can see what theimplications are of these giant countries. But our fourth plenary session, "Other Rising Powers",will also look at Brazil because we don't want to become so focused on Chinaand India that we forget that right here in the Western hemisphere we have one of thesignificant emerging countries in the world. Through all these discussions we hope to findwhat it is that will affect what makes countries into global super powers and what impactthey will have on the global landscape and on what is frequently referred to as North-Southrelations or East-West relations. North-South usually refers to the differences between thedeveloped countries and the less developed countries. East-West differences haveEast-West differences have historically had to do with different ideological systemsof the sort that we can see in the Middle East. After the forth plenary,we will break into the breakout groups which willaddress topics such as the global economy and globalization, natural resources in theenvironment, national and international governance, future conflicts and the impact of theprivate sector in emerging economies. You will then have time to relax and enjoy everythingthat Asilomar has to offer. Following dinner you will have a choice of two films, so we willbe voting with our eyes, in a sense, because one film is on China and one film is on Indiaand it will be interesting to see how we divide ourselves up. The films will be followed by afestive musical program on Brazilian music. On Sunday morning we will conclude our conferencewith the final plenary, "Looking at the Wild Cards: Uncertainties that Could Affect the Balance of Power"and this will focus on two issues, the uncertainties that are being generated by the Middle Eastand the uncertainties emerging from the intense competition for global energy. Some technicalities are worth noting.You have question cards on your seats. They are available and will be available at all of the sessions,please feel free to write down any questions as they occur to you and they will be collected bycouncil staff and read during the question and answer period as a general courtesy alsoplease remember to turn off your cell phones and to avoid beepers and other types ofdisruptive electronics which is part of that technology that is driving that process of change.Before i conclude, i would like to recognize once again the impressive array of speakersthat have assembled here this weekend. I want to thank everyone of them because theyhave enormously busy schedules and they have agreed to come here and their contribution,i think, will make this a much richer experience for all of us. And now i have an additionalpleasure of introducing to you Ms. Jane Wales, who is the President and CEO of TheWorld Affairs Council of Northern California. Ms. Wales will be chair of tonight's session.Please join me in welcoming Ms. Wales. (applause)Thanks Stapleton. Let me just take a moment to say a word about Stapleton Roy,because i had the pleasure of serving with him in government.He is our chairman for this, for this weekend. He knows of which he speaks,he served in Moscow, he was in the State Department for forty-five years. He served inMoscow during the height of the Cold War. He was in three times U.S. ambassador. Hewas ambassador to China, and arguably the best we've ever had, ambassador to Singaporeand ambassador to Indonesia. He is an old China hand having been raised in China,speaking fluent Chinese. He rose to the rank of career ambassador, a position very fewpeople have held, and then became assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence andResearch, so you are, will have the benefit of the wisdom of and experience of, of a manwith an extraordinary career. He is now manager at Kissinger and Associates. Now asStape said how we are going to start the process of trying to envision the world of 2020,where we will stand, what the whole geopolitical landscape will look like and what our rolewill be, what will be the U.S. role in such a world? How will we relate to rising powers,such as China and India? How will we respond to turmoil in the Middle East what will wedo in the face of a competition over resources including a competition of energy resources,how will we fair? The National Intelligence Council has just finished on doing a report thattakes a look at the world going forward, which is the NIC's role, and it argues thecontinued economic military and technical dominance by the United States will characterizethe years ahead. Yet, it notes that several questions arise. It notes a number of certainties,some things it predicts for the future but it also notes some uncertainties, things that wemight influence by our own behavior or maybe influenced by the behavior of others. So wewill have an opportunity to think things through how we will fair and also in our relationswith our allies, both in the context on the war on terror but also in the context of a variety oftransnational governance challenges that we will inevitably face together. We have got threeextraordinary speakers to address the question of what the future may look like. The first isDoctor Thomas Fingar who is the author of that report, of that NIC report, he is DeputyDirector for National Intelligence for Analysis and he Chairman of the National IntelligenceCouncil. Prior to joining the NIC he served in the State Department in a variety ofcapacities over a twenty year career. He's somehow managed to bring that process topublish a number of books and articles, mostly on aspects of Chinese politics, so you'll havea chance to quiz him on that as well, and on Chinese policy making. His topic will bechallenges of a flat, unipolar world. He'll be followed by Jeff Garten, with whom i was alsofortunate enough to serve, Jeff is now Professor of International Trade, Finance andBusiness at Yale University, having served as Dean for ten years of the Yale School ofManagement. Prior to that he served as under Commerce for international trade in the firstClinton Administration he had been managing Director of the Blackstone Group and ofLehman Brothers. He is the author of numerous book and articles. I'm sure you have readhis work. He's going to focus tonight on the topic of America and the global economy: thechallenges and opportunities posed by emerging markets. Our third speaker is DavidSanger, who you probably watch on Friday nights on KQED when you watchWashington's Week in Review if you haven't been reading him all week in The New YorkTimes. David is the White House correspondent for the New York Times, He's had atwenty-four year career at the paper. He's reported from New York, from Tokyo and fromWashington covering foreign policy, globalization, international economic upheavals, nuclearproliferation, Asian affairs, high technology, and for the past few years the arc of the Bushpresidency. He will talk about how the war in Iraq may have affected the president'soptions. Following their presentation we're going to move to your questions. And so whatwe will ask you to do is when Stape is done, is to write your questions down on yourquestion cards and send them up my way by way of our staff and i will try to order them ina logical way. I'll be paraphrasing so if you don't precisely recognize your words, knowthey're your thoughts, but not precisely your words. So please join me in welcoming ourfirst speaker Dr. Thomas Fingar. (applause)Thank you Jane. Let me add my warm word ofboth welcome and congratulations for being part of the self selected group of peopledemonstrating an extraordinary interest in international affairs. The work of the WorldAffairs Council is, in my view, absolutely critical to our ability to deal with the kind ofchallenge that Stape began to outline and then all three of us will mention this evening. Letme begin with a disclaimer or two. The first is though i would be proud to be the author ofthe NIC report on global 2020, that was actually produced while i was the AssistantSecretary of State for Intelligence and Research so i can take no credit other than as one ofthe hundred of people who participated in the session. The other is to make clear that i amhere tonight in my private citizen capacity. Cut me some slack, though i am an official in theadministration i am not attempting this evening to either defend or criticize the actions of theadministration. I'm a forty year analyst and that's the basis for my presentations, so you'll getpersonal views. I've defined my task as navigating around subjects that Jeff and David willaddress and help frame the discussion because this is a terribly important set of questionsand you're gonna get one man's view of some of the key features and dynamics and driversthat are shaping events now and will for years and perhaps decades ahead. In sketching outthe nature of the geopolitical landscape, my starting point is a bumper sticker phrase, "we'reliving in a flat, unipolar world". That captures it, it probably means different things todifferent people and it probably should cause many of you to scratch your head and say,"what exactly does he mean by that", and I'll attempt to explain and attempt to exploresome of the dimensions and the consequences, again deliberately avoiding some of theareas that will be covered by others. For those of you who recognize the title as that of TomFreedman's book, or at least the flat world part of it. Yes i stole it, yes i agree with much ofwhat he said, most of what he said in that book, but i wanna focus on sort of what i think ismeant by the world being flat, he's focusing on the outsourcing dimension, for me its thelowering of barriers. The lowering of barriers to movement of people, of goods, of ideas, ofdisease, of anything else that we could name this evening. Distance has been dramaticallychanged but more so than the shrinking of the globe image, which we have used for manyyears, impediments to movement, political, economic, cultural, technological have beeneliminated but have been fundamentally transformed. Transformed in ways that makeanyone, anywhere at anytime, a potential neighbor, a potential partner, or a potentialproblem. We as Americans need to be much more aware than i believe we are as a nationof what is happening beyond our borders, because beyond our borders isn't all that faraway. A few hours by airplane. A few days by ship. Our jobs, our health, our (unidentified)capabilities are very much enmeshed with the rest of the world. Even though American mustbe more concerned, more involved, more engaged in international affairs than we haveintended to be. Part of American exceptionalism has been the ocean buffer that hasseparated us from the problems, the troubles of the other parts of the world. But if we arenot at converse of developments around the world as we might be, part of the unipolardimension is that the informed publics, the movers and the shakers, and increasing numbersof ordinary people in countries around the globe pay attention to us. Sometimes pay moreattention to what we say, what we do than we Americans do in our own country. We willdismiss a statement of "well that's just political grandstanding". Its probably not going to beheard that way by millions of people, arguably billions of people, around the globe, thespotlight is on us. People pay attention to us, people have expectations of us and that is verymuch apart of the political landscape. One of the dimensions of being the sole super powerhere is that whether we want to or not were the five hundred pound gorilla. We're theelephant turning around in the grass, whether we intend to do well or intend to do evil a lotof grass gets trampled. Others cannot ignore us. We at our peril ignore the broaderimplications of what we do and what we say about what we do and what we say aboutwhat others are doing and what we say and do with respect to developments elsewhere inthe world. Its a fact, and likely to remain so for some time, that United States pre-immanence is unparalleled in history. Our power is unrivaled, but it is not universallywelcomed. When i used to teach political science it was almost axiomatic, poli sci 101 thatwhen any nation or group of nations acquires the kind of pre-immanence that we have, thenatural dynamic in international affairs is for others to form coalitions to balance, or check orlimit, or at least remind us of the need to take the interest of others into account. In myview we are just beginning to enter a period which others are becoming uncomfortable withour pre-immanence. They worry more than they used to about what we do. For decadeswe got the benefit of the doubt as the leader of the free world, not just self proclaimed butuniversally recognized as the spark plug behind the institutions of the international systems asthey exist today from the Dumbarton Oakes agreements in the financial area to the existenceof the United Nations to a series of arms control regimes to international regimes of allkind, we built the international system. Now there is concern that we may be unilaterallyseeking to change a status quo that had actually worked to the benefit of billions of peopleand most countries around the globe. To state it again in bumper sticker kinds of terms,recognizing that its an oversimplification, people worry about our pre-immanence, wonderwhether we will remain the bright shining city on a hill. A beacon on human rights, a modelfor open markets, a paragon of democracy, a respecter of the interest of people outside aswell as inside of our own borders to think in terms of global good rather than narrow selfinterest. Or will we become and behave like the king of the hill? I'm on top and you're notknocking me off the pedestal. Much of this is in the realm of perceptions. We can argue tilldoomsday that our intentions are good, or at best are benign, or at worst are benign, ifothers perceive us as having a fortress American mentality- pull up the drawbridge, morealligators in the mote. What's good for me is good for me, you're on your own, we've got aserious problem. Its again not what we think we are doing, it may not even be what we aredoing, its what we are perceived to be doing and how we are perceived that we interactwith others. Let me give a short list of some of the characteristics of this flat unipolar world.The first is that the world, including Americans, are still adjusting to the post-Cold War era.Its actually quite astonishing that sixteen years into it we still don't have a way of describingthis new era. All we know is that its really quite different and that ways in which weorganized our thinking and our behavior and our institutions and our expectations fordecades no longer seems entirely appropriate but we don't quite know what should replacethem. We live in a world in which an image of the Cold War is a kind of tug of war wherenations are lined up on our side or their side. It was pretty simple. A single game. Weworried about how to move people from their side to our side, keep people on our sidewith us on our end of the rope, the rules were clear, everybody understood them anddevelopments in all arenas sort of played out in a predictable and understandable way.Now we live in a world in which the playground has got myriad of games going onsimultaneously. Some have rules, some don't. Some have referees, some don't. Some havefolks looking to the United States to act as the referee, others want nothing more than thatwe refrain from acting as the referee of the global sheriff or the policeman. The pre-immanence that makes us the source of great expectations that we will help pull anothernation out of an economic recession with the power of our market, that we will provide themilitary where with all to bring to an end a, an ethnic clash in a part of Africa, Darfur. It alsomakes us a target, a target of envy in some case a target of terrorists where kill the umpiretakes on more than totally symbolic meaning. We've still got problems left over from history.Short list: the Korean peninsula, China-Taiwan, Israeli-Palestinian, Cuba. But just as wehave these problems that haven't yet played out an institution that were developed in anearlier era from purposes that are still around and the normal instinct is to lets reach forwhat's in the tool box. Let's see if we can use NATO in Afghanistan without pretty muchthinking, is that what NATO is for? But its available and the old think, the way in which wetend to maybe look for a substitute for the Soviet Union. Some of the interest, the concernabout rising powers, though i believe misguided but at least in the minds of some are lookingfor a substitute for a return to the familiar patterns of the past, but one of the themes that iam sure will be underscored this weekend is how different the world is. But it is a world thathas not just rising powers and Stape listed the most important, which are on the world stageand by virtue of the size, size of the territory, size of the population, size of the economiesare not just one more addition to the existing arrangements that they not simply going toaccommodate themselves to the existing order of necessity the order will be changed byincorporating though not because necessarily they are malevolent in any respect, butbecause of their size and because of the interest of many in finding a way to balance theUnited States. Again not to defeat us, not to antagonize us, just to balance us. The changingin the world has blurred a lot of distinctions. Domestic and foreign was a convenient way todistinguish between again domestic politics and international affairs. Economic policies forour country and global economic system. All of this has been blurred, now for a decade theterm "intermestic" has been used, its a lousy word, but internal domestic or international anddomestic. Its also blurred and changed and narrowed the gap between individuals,individual security, individual safety and national security. The war on terror, concerns aboutterrorism perhaps illustrates this most strikingly. Where once upon a time law enforcementworried about protecting individuals or catching wrong doers after a crime had beencommitted and nation states developed control mechanisms and regimes and useddiplomacy and military force to deter defeat aggressive actions directed against nationalinterest now more and more of what we are actually concerned about expend treasure andblood to protect is in the middle ground. Its not entirely and international affair, its not notentirely a national security protecting individual Americans from the threat of terrorism is anational security objective. Boy does that change the world in terms of national policy whenthe unit of analysis around the globe changes from the hundred and two nation states tobillions of individuals, millions of corporations. Indeed it can be argued, and i am quitesympathetic to the argument, that nation states are becoming decreasingly important andindeed may already have been surpassed an importance by networks, networks have allkinds of manifestations. The networks that bring us fresh flowers from South America thatbring us strawberries for breakfast all year long, that enable U.S. design sneakers withfabric manufactured here, shipped to a Taiwan or South Korean company using machinerymade in Japan to a factory in South China to be assembled for shipment to American portsto be advertised by American public relations firms and a where house and moved aroundby truckers that those kinds of networks also facilitate the movement of people, aliensmuggling, movement of people for prostitution, movement of gray and black market arms,movement of narcotics, movement of raw materials for weapons of mass destruction,movement of imitation pharmaceuticals and actually cause rather than cure ailments. We'renot very well structured to think about how you deal, how one deals with networks. Butunless we do we are missing a major component of the action. And when we expect nationstates to deal with problems that are inherently transnational, beyond over which they havelimited control, over which we as a national government have only partial control.Expectations will be frustrated. Where does this lead us, lead me in this? Where i began.With acknowledging the importance of gatherings like this and underscoring the need of allAmericans to pay much more attention to international affairs, to be much more thoughtfulabout our role in the world. To be much more attuned to the concerns, the interests, theissued that other put on the table and to try to be objective rather than thin skinned whencriticism is leveled at what we do and say. Thanks you.Thank you Thomas Fingar. I am actually going to pose a question to younow to ponder for when the, the questions sessions begins. You remind us that right afterWorld War II there was a burst of social innovation that we led creating a set of institutionsand a set of processes for international governance and your remark suggests that the timecame right at the end of the Cold War for a similar burst of social innovation to create newstructures, new processes, new regimes, new norms for managing a world of networksinstead of a world of nation states. So the question I'm leaving with you to ponder till wemove to the questions session is why didn't that happen and how can we provoke it tohappen now? I'll turn it now to Jeff Garten.Thanks Jane. I have a very difficult task in talking about the global economyand the shifting balance of power in the year 2020 because virtually no one, withany accuracy, talk about the U.S. economy one quarter from now. They wouldn't knowwhat the inflation rate would be, they certainly couldn't predict oil prices and we're stillrevising the GDP figures from the last quarter. So, um looking ahead i thought that the bestway i could do this is to actually create a story and this is a story of a secretary of treasurywho in the year 2021 who assumes office and surveys the landscape and reports to thePresident about what is seen and what we should do about it. Now i have to, i have to juststart with two issues that we have to keep in mind as i tell you this story. The first is thatsince i am looking so far ahead I'm not going to say very much about all the issues that areprobably on your mind if you read the, read the newspapers regularly. I'm not gonna talkabout the big economic imbalances that exist in the world and the huge U.S. trade deficitsand the big surpluses in Asia. I'm not gonna talk about the budget deficits and all theproblems that we know will come with them. I'm not gonna talk about today's oil prices orthe debate over immigration or even the debate about whether the United States can becompetitive, because of we look ahead fifteen years, it is really impossible to know howthose issues are going to be dealt with. And I'm gonna try to go, really arch over all of thatand the other thing I'd like to say just by way of introduction is that no matter how far i tryto look out, probably I'm talking about the next ten years. In other words, i don't have theimagination to be able to really look at the year 2020, I'm gonna try, but you might thinkabout the things that i say as being accelerated, that is they could happen, the future is goingto come much quicker. SO lets assume that its inauguration day in the year 2021. A newSecretary of Treasury has been appointed and her name is Ellen Schumann, and Ellen hadbeen appointed by President Alessandro and she is preparing on that day to give him anextensive report about the global economy, America's role in it and what it all means for thebalance of power. Now Ellen is a